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# CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY

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*A Quarterly Journal* devoted to research  
in the Languages, Literatures, History,  
and Life of Classical Antiquity

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# CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY

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# Classical Philology

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## ON VERGIL *ECLOGUE* iv. 60-63

BY DUANE REED STUART

Every student of Vergil knows that the text and the interpretation of lines 60-63 of the *Fourth Eclogue* constitute one of the perennially fascinating problems connected with this enigmatic poem. Is the *risus* of line 60 the child's smile at the mother or the mother's smile at the child? When a male infant is born to be the darling of the gods, is his great destiny presaged by his smile at his parents or by his parents' smile at him? It is the irony of fate that these four charming and tender verses, the meaning of which hinges on a question of "innocent merriment," should have proved to be a business so serious, should have evoked a volume of anything but lightsome discussion. However, the elusive shades of the poet's language, baffling to any unanimity of opinion, and the incidents of textual tradition have so ordered. Through generations of criticism, this *risus* has been, in respect to inscrutability, a kind of philological counterpart to the smile of Mona Lisa.

Even the war was powerless to interrupt the almost cosmic regularity with which this controversy seems predestined to assert and to reassert itself. Various scholars have, from year to year, returned to the old issue.<sup>1</sup> There is, consequently, no lack of

<sup>1</sup> Notes and articles dealing primarily with the problem are: Phillimore, *CR*, XXX (1916), 149; *CR*, XXXI (1917), 23; H. W. Green, *CR*, XXX (1916), 191; A. E. Codd, *CR*, XXXI (1917), 22; P. Rasi, *Riv. di filol.*, XLV, 2 (1917), 190-96; Birt, *BPhW*, XXXVIII (1918), 186 f.; Kurfess, *ibid.*, 760; Warde Fowler, *CR*, XXXIII (1919), 67. Passing allusion to the crux is made by J. Geffcken, "Die Hirten auf dem Felde," *Herm.*, XLIX (1914), 339.

recent and imposing precedent for yielding to the lure which this crux seems chronically to exert, although the assumption that it is possible to add, at this late day, anything significant to the discussion, necessitates, if only for the sake of modesty, a word of explanation. The immediate impetus to publish some jottings that have long been accumulating among my notes has been furnished by the fact that Phillimore and Birt have lately championed what has been with me an inveterate preference for *qui non risere parentes*, the corrected text of Quintilian ix. 3. 8,<sup>1</sup> over *cui non risere parentes* of the manuscripts of Vergil, the reading also of Servius. Concerning the criticism that has been centered on the *Eclogue* as a whole, Salomon Reinach has written felicitously: "L'histoire d'un problème littéraire posé depuis bientôt vingt siècles est un chapitre singulièrement instructif de celle des idées."<sup>2</sup> It is also possible to indulge in a generalization concerning much of the work that has been expended on the famous epilogue of the poem. The last four lines, because of the nature of their content, offer several points of attack to which those who interest themselves in trying to unriddle the poet's meaning will tend to direct their efforts according to their individual penchants and scopes of scholarly interests. So we can discern, registered in the various attempts at explanation, the faith of the several interpreters—*chacun à son goût*—that mythology, religion, folk-lore, Latinity, physiological law, or *Buchwesen* offers the key to the mystery. The reader of this article will soon see that my own pet ideas on this passage are concerned largely with the folk-lore which I find reflected in it. The notion that Vergil *garrit anilis ex re fabellas* is not new; nevertheless, there is a line of reasoning which has been quite neglected in this connection. Furthermore, though a meticulous evaluation, in the canonical style of the *Jahresbericht*, of the criticism that has been expended on this passage is not the prime object of this paper, I shall beg leave to comment, by way of preliminary and even at the risk of assuming at times the rôle of Browning's

Critic and whippersnapper, in a rage  
To set things right,

on some of the oversights of my predecessors.

<sup>1</sup> See Politian, *Miscell. cent.*, c. 89.

<sup>2</sup> *Cultes, mythes et religions* (2d ed.; Paris, 1908), II, 66, reprinted from *Revue de l'histoire de religions*, XLII (1900), 365-83.

The strength of Birt's defense of the reading *qui non risere parentes*, adherents to which have been in a decided minority among editors and critics,<sup>1</sup> lies in its objectivity. To what extent his reasoning is based upon the tangibilities of orthographical and linguistic usage will appear from a brief résumé of his main arguments: (1) the frequency with which in the third century A.D., the period when the text of Vergil was transferred from papyrus roll to parchment codex, *qui* as a dative form usurped the place of *cui*; (2) instances in *le vrai latin*, and Greek as well, of such free concinnity as must be assumed to exist, in case the *lectio difficilior* be adopted, between the plural *qui* and the singular *hunc*; (3) the currency, in the Latin of everyday life, of *ridere* with the connotation of the laugh of good-natured and tolerant amusement. Birt's arguments go far to stifle whatever misgivings on the score of palaeography and Latinity partisans of the text of lines 62-63, as it is indicated by Quintilian, might entertain. Kurfess, *BPhW*, XXXVIII (1918), 760-61, is apparently ready to be converted to Birt's view. Birt's chief contributions have to do with points (1) and (2) enumerated above. His instances of *ridere* with the accusative where sympathetic and responsive merriment, not mockery or derision, is expressed, are mostly the conventional examples that have passed into exegetical heritage. His list could have been extended had the exigencies of the times allowed him to consult Phillimore's earlier articles in *CR*, XXX (1916), 149 f., and XXXI (1917), 23. However, for the reading *qui non risere* it is sheer gain that the two scholars should have arrived independently at an identical conclusion touching the idiomatic possibilities of *ridere* followed by the accusative.

We shall see that Birt had one or two additions to make to the parallels to this passage forthcoming from folk belief. Of these

<sup>1</sup> As to this reading, approved by Scaliger, the estimate of Cartault, *Étude sur les Buc. de Virg.*, p. 247, n. 1, "est inadmissible," represents the consensus of critical opinion. In recent years the nominative *qui* has gained slowly in popularity, but most of the partisans of this variant tend to insist on *parenti*, e.g. Benoist, Cartault, Crusius, *RhM*, LI (1896), 551, Hirtzel, Havet, *Manuel de critique verbale* (Paris, 1911), § 76, p. 13, Plessis, *Les Bucoliques* (Paris, 1913); Postgate, *CR*, XVI (1902), 36, proposed to join with *parenti* additional emendation of ll. 62-63. Seaton's defense of *qui* . . . *parenti*, *CR*, VII (1893), 199, is accorded special mention on page 212. *Qui* . . . *parentes* is favored by Fowler, *Virgil's Messianic Eclogue*, pp. 71 f., Lejay, *Rev. de philol.*, XXXVI (1912), 6, Phillimore, and Birt, *op. cit.*

more hereafter. His point of departure is the oft-mentioned excursus of Crusius "Zur vierten Ekloge," *RhM*, LI (1896), 551. For some reason this paper has been vouchsafed the standing of the classic exposition of the merits of *qui non risere* for this generation. Thus, this scholar is the only champion of the reading prior to himself that Birt mentions by name, although we are told, and truly, that Crusius succeeded in promoting rather than in proving his interpretation of the passage. Similarly, in the Oxford text edition, Hirtzel motivates his adoption of the reading *qui non risere parenti* by the note "commendat O. Crusius." As a matter of strict justice Crusius' article hardly deserves this splendid isolation as the first-line defense. Some years before it was published, R. C. Seaton in *CR*, VII (1893), 199, had made a well-reasoned plea for *qui . . . parenti*. The one essential point in which Crusius was not anticipated by the British scholar is the way in which are utilized the statements of the Elder Pliny, *H.N.* vii. praef. and 16, in which is denied the possibility of even a "colicky" smile on the part of an infant before the fortieth day,<sup>1</sup> and the precocious laugh of the infant Zoroaster is chronicled. In the exegesis of these concluding lines of the *Eclogue* some play had been made with Pliny's homely wisdom long before Crusius cited it. There are echoes of it in the commentary of Philargyrius on the *Eclogue*, line 60, although the scholiast does not mention his source. Voss, whose attention few essentials to the interpretation of the *Eclogues* escaped, also cites it (see 2d ed., Altona, 1830, I, 172). It fell likewise within the ken of the English schoolmaster, B. H. Malkin, to latter-day fame unknown. Let the reader whose rigid devotion to the philological "science" as at present formulated does not exclude appreciation of the mellow antiquarianism of the old-time learning, turn to Malkin's "disquisition" on the concluding lines of the *Eclogue* in the book entitled *Classical Disquisitions and Curiosities* (London, 1825, pp. 397 f.). Sonntag in *Vergil als bucolischer Dichter* (Leipzig, 1891, p. 83, n. 3) also takes cognizance of Pliny's information. Modern editors of

<sup>1</sup> First reported by Aristotle, *Hist. anim.* viii. 10. 587b. 6 and *De anim. gen.* v. 1. 779a. 11, as a fact of infant psychology, and transmitted, through Varro, to Pliny and others: see Marx, *Neue Jahrb.*, I (1898), 127; Geffcken, *op. cit.*, p. 339, n.; Mayhoff, *Nat. Hist.*, 2 ed., p. 2.



the *Eclogues* have not been given to citing Pliny's words as pertinent; none the less is it evident that their applicability to the context in the *Eclogue* had become a part of the *ager publicus* of Vergilian exegesis long before Crusius' time. He was not the pioneer in establishing the contact, although he has received the credit for so being.

The difference between Crusius and his predecessors lies in this detail: They quoted Pliny as proof that Vergil could not have intended so far to transgress the laws governing the "expression of the emotions in man and animals" as to represent a new-born babe as smiling at its parents. Crusius, on the contrary, resorted to the legend concerning Zoroaster in order to establish the contention that Vergil was portraying the supernormal capabilities of a wonder-child, and that the passage in the *Eclogue* must be read and understood accordingly. This is the specific contribution made by Crusius, which, tested by the equities of scholarship, stamps his defense of Quintilian's *testimonium*, emended to *qui non risere parenti*, as a slight step beyond Seaton. The latter scholar, however, was as ready as Crusius to pass beyond the world of prose and plain facts in order to elucidate the poet's intention. For, in answer to Sonntag's assertion, based on Pliny, that the ordinary human infant does not smile before the fortieth day, Seaton wrote: "Whatever the literal fact may be, if Vergil chooses to make an infant smile or recognize on the day of his birth, he is surely within his rights as a poet."

These words have been written with no thought of instituting an invidious comparison. But, in a field so vast as that of Vergilian exegesis, it is a matter of prime importance for the progress of criticism that each successive contributor take pains to assure himself and his readers that he is making an essential advance over his predecessors. Otherwise, movement is not forward, but in circle. Thus the suggestion, elaborated by Birt in the conclusion of his article, that the poet assumed the rôle of nurse in writing the last lines of the *Eclogue*, hence that it is "Ammenlatein" that we hear, is an old story. Seventeen years ago this view was clearly enunciated by W. Warde Fowler in his well-known essay entitled "The Child of the Poem," printed first in *Harvard Studies*, XIV

(1903), 26 f., and afterward included in the little volume, *Virgil's Messianic Eclogue* (London, 1907). The credit for this idea belongs, as Fowler properly acknowledges, to the paper of Seaton. Says Professor Fowler: "The *vates* turns to the new-born infant, and, dropping the character of prophet, speaks to it in the *language and in the tender tones of an Italian nurse*."<sup>1</sup> Rediscovery of the ideas of previous commentators is an event likely to fall to the lot of any student of Vergil. In such a case confession is good for the soul and profit to the reader, as Professor Fowler realized when he found that his explanation of line 63, to quote his words, is "practically the one" proposed by Scaliger. Those who are familiar with Fowler's essay will recall that he went to Roman religion for the interpretation of the last line in the *Eclogue*, and identified *deus* and *dea* respectively with the male genius or Hercules, and the female genius or Juno, the *di coniugales* who were concerned in the birth of every child. "The child that will not smile on his mother," explains Professor Fowler, "is not worthy of notice from the deities who preside over his parents' union." As the basis for this conclusion a note in the *Servius* of Daniel was utilized: *proinde nobilibus pueris editis in atrio domus Iunoni lectus, Herculi mensa ponebatur*. The pertinency of this comment as an index to the meaning of the cryptic line Professor Fowler regarded at first as his own discovery, only to find out that, in most essentials, he had been anticipated by Scaliger.

I hope it will not seem a superfluous breach of amenity to point out that Professor Fowler's<sup>2</sup> estimate of the significance of Scaliger's contribution to our topic is decidedly in need of modification. Leyden's great philologist, in a note to Catullus lxi. 212 (Ellis), 219 (Friedrich), *dulce rideat ad patrem*, contained in his edition of Catullus, Tibullus, Propertius, published in 1577, reprinted in 1600 and thereafter, declared for the reading *qui non risere parentes* in the *Eclogue*, and, apropos of the last line, observed:

Nascentibus putabant adesse, mari Genium, qui est deus mensae, feminae Iunonem, quae est dea cubilis. Qui, inquit, non risere ad parentes, nec Genius illum accipit mensa, nec dea hanc cubili.

<sup>1</sup> The italics are mine; see pp. 69 and 70 of Fowler's essay.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 77.

Professor Fowler, in a laudable desire to render unto Scaliger that which was Scaliger's, bestows upon him praise for originality beyond his deserts in the treatment of the line of the *Eclogue*. Scaliger was not, as Professor Fowler assumes, the first to dismiss the Servian explanation, derived from the myth of Juno's displeasure at the unlovely appearance of the young Vulcan, and to adopt a ritualistic interpretation in lieu of the mythological. The *Liber miscellaneorum* of Angelo Politian, published in 1489 and hence antedating Scaliger's *Castigationes in Catullum* by nearly ninety years, gives utterance to a scornful rejection of the comment of Servius. Indeed, Politian accuses Servius of having, with malice aforethought, warped the mythological data to make them suit his purpose. How justly Politian deserves the compliments paid to Scaliger by Professor Fowler, the following extract from the *Miscellanea*<sup>1</sup> will most clearly demonstrate:

Nec Genius nec Iuno vitalibus auris dignum putavere hunc ex illis qui non risere. . . . Credebatur enim habere quisque suum deum suamque deam, hoc est, suum Genium suamque Iunonem vitae praesides. Hos igitur indicavit Maro katexochen. Mensa enim Genio convenit: ut "Funde merum genio," Iunoni lectus.

The hint for this interpretation Politian derived from the comment of Philargyrius on *Eclogue* iv. 63. This note is practically identical with the comment in the *Servius Auctus* which was cited above.

Professor Fowler believes that Scaliger regarded the genius merely as a *numen mensae*. I am not so sure that this is a correct assumption. It is possible that the brevity of Scaliger's Latin disguised his knowledge. He was undoubtedly acquainted with Politian's discussion, and the latter, while, as La Rue remarks in his note on the lines of the *Eclogue*, he went astray in assigning both a genius and a Juno to every human being without reference to the sex distinction, had at least a clear conception of the two divinities in their capacities as male and female guardian *numina* of mortal life. This is indicated not only by the extract from the *Miscellanea* quoted above, but by the citation of apposite passages with which the chapter concludes. Perhaps Scaliger's *deus mensae* conceals what Politian's *mensa* . . . *convenit*, etc., expresses more lucidly,

<sup>1</sup>C. 89.

viz., that *mensa* concords as a symbol with the genius, the couch with the Juno. Politian, I may add, also broke a lance for the nominative *qui*. But in respect to his proposal to take *parentes* as a vocative, he suffers in comparison with Scaliger.

From this, I trust not wholly futile, excursus on some of the points that have emerged from the history of the scholarship elicited by our problem, I turn again to the view of Crusius that, in the last four verses of the *Eclogue*, Vergil intended to make the new-born regenerator of the age behave as no ordinary infant could, and thus to raise him at once into the sphere of the miraculous. The precocious smile is thus to be regarded as a type of the prodigies which popular belief in all ages and in all lands attached to the birth of children destined to a great future.<sup>1</sup> With the exception of the context from Pliny, the analogies which Crusius cited are taken from modern superstition and folk-lore. Nevertheless, there are forthcoming from ancient literature various more or less apposite parallels which it has always been a source of wonder to me that Crusius did not take pains to search out. It would seem to be patent that his explanation, based as it is on a folk superstition, gains in cogency the more prevalent in ancient tale and legend the notion that wonderchildren laugh or smile at birth can be shown to be. For some years subsequent to my first acquaintance with Crusius' article I have made, as opportunity offered, some effort to collect data on this point. The most impressive array of parallels that has been published is to be found in R. C. Kukula's book, *Römische Säkularpoesie* (Leipzig and Berlin, 1911, pp. 63-66).<sup>2</sup> The author's erudition yielded most, though, as we shall see, not all, of the inevitable parallels, such as the Homeric *Hymn to Pan* 35, where the epithet ἡδόμενος is applied to the new-born god; Catullus lxi. 216 f., since Scaliger's time often quoted in this connection;

<sup>1</sup> For some specimens from the voluminous chronicles of such legends, see W. Croke, "The Legends of Krishna," *Folk-lore*, XI (1900), 9 f.

<sup>2</sup> The merits of Kukula's theory that ll. 60-63 are to be transposed to a place succeeding l. 25 and that the poem is a genethliakon, constructed along orthodox rhetorical lines and glorifying the youthful Octavius, need not concern us here. This view has not gained acceptance; see Beltrami, *Riv. di filol.*, XL (1912), 303-13; Lejay, *Rev. de philol.*, XXXVI (1912), 26 f.; Rasi, "Bibl. Virg.," *Atti e Mem. d. r. Accad. di Mantova*, V (1912), 161; Prickard, *CR*, XXVI (1912), 226 f.



Theocritus xxiv. 31, cited at least as early as Voss (see I, 172), and referring to the nursling Herakles as αἰὲν ἄδακρυς. I have implied above that these analogies are not equal in point of applicability if they are scrutinized by a severe critic. Thus it might plausibly be urged that the epithet ἡδύγελας is naturally pertinent to the description of an infant god destined to figure as a kind of tricky sprite and *farceur* in many a legend from his birth on. The *vagitus*, a conventional feature in the legends of the birth of Zeus,<sup>1</sup> could be cited as proof positive that myth-mongers might sacrifice the miraculous for the realistic in portraying the birth of a god. Catullus' picture of *Torquatus parvulus, porrigens teneras manus*, would surely indicate that the poet had in mind a child some weeks<sup>2</sup> or even some months old, unless we are to suppose that, consciously or unconsciously, physiological facts were neglected for the sake of an appealing touch. The child Herakles, "who never cried under the nurse's care," is more to the point; Kukula indeed saw in the characterization of Herakliskos the actual model which Vergil followed in making the child of the *Eclogue* greet his mother with a smile of recognition in line 60, which, by the way, is as far as Kukula believes the allusion to a smile on the part of the child extends. In his interpretation of lines 62-63 he follows the time-honored reading *cui non risere parentes*.

There are some additions to be made to the parallels cited by Kukula. The new-born Dionysus was also represented by the poets and mythographers as greeting the world with a smile. The accidents of literary survival have decreed that instances are to be found in the later poetic tradition only, which, nevertheless, we know was a replica of the treatment of the legend of Dionysus by the older poets. Hence there is no reason to suppose that the motive of the smile was merely an invention of such writers as

<sup>1</sup> See, e.g., Callimachus *Elis Δία* 54; Lucretius ii. 634; Ovid *Fasti* iv. 207; Hyginus *Fab.* 139; Statius *Theb.* iv. 786; Servius on *Aen.* iii. 104; etc.

<sup>2</sup> Lejay also points out the obvious fact that "Catulle ne parle pas de la naissance de l'enfant"; *Rev. de philol.*, XXXVI (1912), 8-9. As to Lejay's mathematical interpretation of *decem . . . menses* (l. 61) and his consequent theory that the smile of the babe was thought of as occurring forty days after birth, and not partaking of the miraculous, I shall merely remark that the conclusions of this paper would show that, whatever Vergil's own conception may have been, the critics of the first century A.D. attached the value of a prodigy to the smile.

Dionysius Periegetes and Nonnus. As early as Hesiod's *Theogony* the geniality naturally attached to such a divine personality as that of Bacchus found expression in the epithet πολυγηθής; *Theog.* 941.

In Dionysius Periegetes we read how the infant Bacchus dons the fawnskin and the ivy wreath, and brandishes the thyrsus,

μειδίων, καὶ πολλὸν ἐπ' ἀνδράσιν ὄλβον ἔχενεν [949].

Compare the free rendition of this passage in Avienus *Descriptio Orbis* 1117-31, especially 1117-19:

Vera fides, illic femoris sub imagine partus  
Disrupisse Iovem penetralia; proderet ortus  
Ut sacer aetheria fulgentem fronte Lyaeum,

and 1130-31:

Attollit thyrsos, et blandi luminis igne  
Os hilarat, totaque celer diffunditur aethra.

Nonnus *Dionys.* ix. 25-26 is just as explicit:

καὶ μιν ἀχτυλώτοιο διαίσσοντα λοχείης  
πήχει κούρον ἄδακρυν ἐκούφισε σύγγονος Ἑρμῆς.

Cf. also ix. 35-36:

καὶ πόλον ἐσκοπίαζεν ἀθήνα, θαμβαλῆος δὲ  
πατρῶν ἐγέλασσαν ἵπνυν δεδοκημένος ἀστρων.

Elsewhere in Nonnus *ἀδάκρυτος* is a conventional epithet of Dionysus, e.g. xi. 208; xii. 138; xxx. 110. In the description of the birth of Bacchus given by Philostratus, *Eikones* i. 14, a similar touch is found: ὁ δὲ Διόνυσος τῆς μὲν μητρὸς ἐκθρώσκει βαγείσης τὴν γαστέρα, τὸ δὲ πῦρ ἀχλυῶδες ἐργάζεται φαιδρὸς (φαιδρὸν) αὐτὸς, οἷον ἀστήρ τις, ἀστράπτων. The celestial effulgence of the babe implies a radiant countenance, whether we prefer *φαιδρὸν* or *φαιδρὸς* of the manuscripts.<sup>1</sup>

The propriety of utilizing these portrayals of the "shining morning face" of the infant Dionysus as suggestive of Vergil's intention in connection with his description of the demeanor of the child in the *Eclogue*, is comparatively immune from criticism akin to the possible objection mentioned above in the case of Pan. Bacchus, of

<sup>1</sup> I have not included with these references the pretty *genre* picture which Calpurnius (Nemesianus), *Ecl.* x, gives of the infant Bacchus under the tender ministrations of Silenus, esp. l. 29, *et vocat* (Silenus) *ad risum digito*, because nothing is said as to the age of the nursing.

course, belongs in the category of genial divinities, and, as poets have sung for all ages, is an *archegetes* in frolic and mirth. It needs no words to emphasize the absurdity of coupling the child of Vergil's poem, *incrementum Iovis*, and the god Pan either in respect to divine characteristics or the effect of their advent on the world. In this latter respect, however, there is a striking similitude between Dionysus and the child of the *Eclogue*. The points of contact between Vergil's description of the golden age renewed on earth at the coming of the *puer* and keeping pace with his increasing years, and the stories told about the spontaneous response from its bounty by which the nature of things manifests its felicity at the birth and the epiphanies of Bacchus, are so many and so real that certain critics have gone to the length of seeking in these resemblances the explanation of the identity of the child in the poem. Thus, forty years ago, Th. Plüss<sup>1</sup> followed this line of argument and arrived at the conclusion that the expected child was a son of Bacchus. More recently Salomon Reinach<sup>2</sup> advanced the view that Vergil was announcing the coming of a new Dionysus, the son of Jupiter. These theories have been relegated by the consensus of criticism to the limbo of unsuccessful attempts to solve the problem of the *Eclogue*. I do not purpose to resuscitate them; they are mentioned merely to show how potent are the analogies existing between Vergil's new paradise on earth and the details of the advent of Dionysus. Reinach has little to say concerning these likenesses. Plüss devotes the major portion of his article to presenting them, but mostly without references to their provenience. Other scholars who have discussed the *Eclogue* have made allusion in passing to those features of lines 18 f. that recall the poetic traditions clustering about the life-history of the young Dionysus.<sup>3</sup> Hence we may dispense with repeating the data here. To admit the kinship between the setting in which Vergil stages his miraculous child and that in

<sup>1</sup> *Fleckeisens Jahrb.*, CXV (1877), 69 f.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*

<sup>3</sup> Marx, *Neue Jahrb.*, I (1898), 114, notes that elements in the passage are reminiscent of the myths dealing with the births of gods; as parallels to *errantis hederas*, l. 19, and to the spontaneous bounty of the earth are quoted Euripides *Phoen.* 649 and the account of the birth of Dionysus in Dion. Peri. 935 f. See also Sudhaus, *RhM*, LVI (1901), 43 f.; Fowler, *op. cit.*, pp. 64 f. On other phenomena attendant on the epiphanies of Dionysus and reflected in Vergil, consult Usener, "Milch und Honig," *Kleine Schriften*, IV, 398 f., esp. 399.

which the god Dionysus appears, is not, of course, to admit that the child of the *Eclogue* is either Dionysus or a son of Dionysus. The point which I am urging is as follows: In respect to what their births and their visitations to earth mean for terrestrial felicity, and in respect to the fashion in which nature responds to their sojourns, Dionysus and the child of the *Eclogue* are closely bracketed. They belong to the same type of beneficent, superhuman personality at whose coming, to quote the words of the hymn, "Heaven and nature sing." For one of these good angels tradition, with an understandable deference to the proprieties of fable, decreed that a smiling countenance at birth was the meet concomitant.<sup>1</sup> We should not hesitate, therefore, to push the existing parallelism between the two a step farther, and to consider the poetic intention of Vergil in his portrayal of his wonderchild against this background. It seems strange that the peculiar applicability of this element in the legend of Dionysus should have escaped Kukula's notice.

Another apt parallel which I have treasured because neither Kukula nor any other writer had cited it until recently is Lucian, *Θεῶν Διάλ.* vii. 1: where Hephaestus says of the new-born Hermes: *ἑώρακας, ὦ Ἀπολλων, τὸ τῆς Μάϊας βρέφος τὸ ἄρτι τεχθέν; ὡς καλὸν τε ἔστι καὶ προσμειδᾷ πᾶσι καὶ δηλοῖ ἤδη μέγα τι ἀγαθὸν ἀποβησόμενον.* Vain pride in exclusive possession, however, was dissipated by the perusal of Birt's article. This passage is one of the three that he cites to show that a smile is a traditional attribute of the new-born infant prodigy. The second is the context from Catullus, the relevancy of which I have, I believe, justly disparaged on a previous page. The third parallel is new, and is also from Lucian, viz., *Ἐναλ. Διάλ.* xii. 2, where the babe Perseus, afloat with Danaë, smiles undauntedly at the waves: *τὸ (βρέφος) δὲ ὑπ' ἀγνοίας τῶν κακῶν ὑπεμειδία πρὸς τὴν θάλατταν.* Perseus certainly belongs in the roster of wonderchildren. Here, to be sure, Lucian does not expressly, as he does in the case of Hermes, attach to the smile of the new-born babe any significance as a presage of

<sup>1</sup> The one exception that I have found is Oppian *Cyneg.* iv. 247-48 where the nurses of the infant Bacchus are represented as beating tympana and clashing cymbals to conceal the weeping of the child. This is a detail arbitrarily imported from the Zeus legend.



supermanhood. Nevertheless, if we contemplate the passage not in isolation, but in comparison with the other, in which Lucian treats the smile as an omen of the extraordinary potentiality of the infant Hermes, doubt is scarcely permissible that the author, when he wrote these words about Perseus, had in mind something more than the thought of painting, as a foil to the mother's terror and grief, the engaging artlessness of babyhood in the face of unrealized danger.

If, then, we call the roll of the divine or the semidivine personages in the legends of whose births what we might call the smile motive indisputably figures, to wit, Hercules, Hermes, Bacchus, Perseus, and Zoroaster; if we recall that according to Herodotus v. 92 it was a smile evoked *θελὴ τῶχῃ* that saved the future tyrant Cypselus from the committee of ten detailed to murder him<sup>1</sup> and that Cyrus the Great<sup>1</sup> is said to have won the heart of the shepherd's wife in a similar way, *quem (Cyrum parvulum) ubi in manum mulier accepit, veluti ad notam adlusit, tantusque in illo vigor et dulcis quidam blandientis risus apparuit ut pastorem ultro rogaret uxor, et seq.*, Justinus i. 4. 12, we are brought to realize that we have to do with a *topos* that was widely disseminated in ancient folk-tale.<sup>2</sup> In the light of this fact, it is difficult not to believe that Vergil, adept as he was in lore and legend, intended to portray the deportment of the new hope of the world in conformity with one of the mythical conventions attached to descriptions of the birth of children of destiny. Any future editor of the *Eclogues* who fails to do justice to these data and their bearing on iv. 60-63 will leave a serious gap in his commentary. Reference to the child's smiling is imperatively called for somewhere in this passage. The few remaining critics who cling to the old view that *risu* in line 60 is to be understood of the mother's smile, and, at the same time, prefer the reading *cui non risere parentes* in line 62, shut their eyes to the probabilities.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Derived from Kukula.

<sup>2</sup> In *CR*, XXXIII (1919), 67, Professor Fowler quotes an informant to the effect that among the Russians the first smile and the first tear are eagerly awaited as harbingers of reason. Herein, of course, is no analogy to a precocious smile.

<sup>3</sup> Among modern critics who maintain this view, now generally relinquished, are Beltrami, *Riv. di filol.*, XL (1912), 312, and Rasi, *Stud. ital. di filol. class.*, IX (1901), 291; *Atti d. Accad. di Mantova*, VIII, Part II (1915), 91 and notes; *Riv. di filol.*, XLV (1917), 190.

However, appreciation of the cogency of the evidence to be gleaned from folk-lore leaves one question still unanswered: Are the analogies furnished by legends dealing with the births of heroic children so appealing as necessarily to be applied to the last two lines, and thus be made to form an argument for the rejection of the traditional reading *cui non risere parentes*? At least it has been possible for exegetes to admit the force of the parallels as a decisive reason for taking *risu* in line 60 as the child's smile at the mother and, retaining the vulgate reading in lines 62-63, to seek for a corresponding explanation of what underlay the poet's words. This is the procedure adopted by Servius in his treatment of the passage. Among modern critics it is the line followed by Kukula. Neither Crusius nor Birt took cognizance of this possible circumscription of the validity of parallels; but it is plainly essential to reckon with such an objection.

We come to another step in our discussion. Strangely enough, the one passage in all ancient literature the claim of which to citation by any critic who seeks to solve the problem of the *Eclogue* by projecting upon it the evidence of folk belief is most urgent, has been all but completely overlooked. In the Suetonian *Life of Vergil* the infant Vergil himself is stated to have exhibited the tearless and serene countenance appropriate to the child born for great achievements. The passage reads (Brummer, ll. 12-14): *Ferunt infantem ut sit editus neque vagisse et adeo miti vultu fuisse ut haud dubiam spem prosperioris geniturae iam tum daret*. The failure of Crusius, Kukula, and Birt to utilize this passage is stern proof of how easy it is to be engrossed in the remote and to overlook the contiguous in philological research. I believe that I am correct in saying that Professor Fowler is the only one of those who have attacked the problem who has cited the context from the *Vita*. I discovered the reference in his essay in the course of an extended search to determine whether the point had been wholly neglected. Professor Fowler refers to it (p. 71, n. 2) in passing as a parallel and says that he has not seen it mentioned by previous investigators in this field.

A parallel it certainly is. Perhaps the only one comparable to it in respect to pertinency and to concreteness of testimony as to

the portent inhering in the smile of a new-born babe is Lucian Θεῶν Διάλ. quoted above. But in my eyes it is something far more significant than a parallel. Rightly appraised, it yields further evidence, corroborative of the corrected text of Quintilian and heartening to the partisans of his reading, that in the first century A.D. *qui non risere parentes* was the accepted version. The likelihood that this is what Vergil wrote is thus correspondingly enhanced. The passage in the *Life*, as I measure it, is not to be ranged with the other parallels and rated as another independent example of a feature of popular legend. There is a relation existing between the lines of the *Eclogue* and the words of the biographer, a relation definable as that of stem and offshoot. In other words, I hold that the *praesagium* of future greatness which was attached by the biographical tradition to the birth of Vergil was suggested originally and solely by the poet's "baby talk," with its wheedling warning of the inglorious consequences of the failure on the part of the *puer* to "make its calling and election" to greatness "sure" by conforming to the etiquette fixed by old wives' tales for such interesting occasions, as Dickens might say.

This theory, as will be recognized by those who have followed the recent movements in the criticism of ancient biographical composition in general, and of the Suetonian *Life* in particular, involves no novelty in method. How the ancient biographers of literary men worked, has become, thanks chiefly to Leo, an open book. Inferences based on the writings of their subjects, reconstruction of the intellectual life of men of letters, of their personalities, of the actual events of their careers in such a way as to motivate the content and spirit of their works, were devices constantly resorted to by the authors. Rationalistic study of the Suetonian *Life of Vergil* has demonstrated, in certain instances with certainty, in others with great plausibility, that exegesis and ἀξίησις of passages in the writings of the poet, especially in the *Eclogues* and the *Georgics* where his ego may be most readily postulated, lie at the root of dogmatic assertions. The most famous example is of course the treatment of the story of the eviction. To catalogue the other statements in the *Vita*, the genesis of which is susceptible of the same explanation, would involve a superfluous résumé of convictions

expressed by various scholars in the last twenty years. The claim of the present writer is that this criterion, the validity of which has become an article of faith, should be invoked in this additional case.

Hazardous though it may appear to endeavor to establish rhyme or reason among the workings of credulity and the imaginative, we may, I think, legitimately indulge in certain observations concerning the prodigies that were reputed to precede and accompany Vergil's nativity. Comparetti, *Virgil in the Middle Ages* (Eng. trans., p. 138),<sup>1</sup> rightly asserts that the inclusion of these tokens of future greatness is quite after the manner of Suetonius. Nettleship, *Ancient Lives of Vergil* (p. 9), and Koertge, "In Suetonii de viris illustribus libros inquisitionum capita tria" (*Diss. Philol. Halens.*, XIV [1901], 221), take the same attitude. There is no evidence making for the assumption that Donatus has applied an interpolating hand to this passage, hence we may dismiss that possibility from our calculations.

The first and the third of the portents, i.e., the mother's dream of the laurel tree and the miraculous growth of the poplar shoot, have an especial appositeness that easily accounts for their presence in the Vergilian legend. In the origin of each, aside from the standing of the tree in the paraphernalia of prodigies,<sup>2</sup> the etymological fancy, *Virgilius—virga*, was doubtless one efficient cause. Prenatal dreams by the mother of a child who is fated to play a great part, or sometimes by the father or some kinsman, are well-nigh prescribed by the amenities of legend. The dream of Vergil's mother is merely an obvious variant of a common type. It is almost unnecessary to recall the firebrand of Hecuba; Mandane's vine, which seemed to overrun all Asia, Herodotus i. 108 (cf. the similar motive in the dream of Astyages, i. 107); the dreams of Atia and Octavius, the parents of Augustus, Suetonius *Aug.* 94; Rhea Silvia's dream of the two palm trees, Ovid *Fasti* iii. 31.

. . . ex illis altera maior erat  
et gravibus ramis totum protexerat orbem.

<sup>1</sup> *Virgilio nel medio evo*, p. 183.

<sup>2</sup> Among many examples may be cited Suet. *Aug.* 94; *Vesp.* 5 (two); Livy xliii. 13. 5.

To the same class belong the dream of Clytaemnestra, Sophocles *Elec.* 417 f., in which she seems to behold, sprouting from the scepter of Agamemnon, a vigorous shoot "wherewith the whole land of Mycenae was overshadowed," and also Xerxes' dream of the olive branches that spread over the earth, Herodotus vii. 19, although in these two cases the portents foreshadow events other than the deeds of an unborn child. In the Suetonian *Life* the details of this canonical dream are merely altered to suit the career of one who is to be a great poet, not a conqueror or a potentate. It is self-evident that the laurel, the tree of Apollo and the Muses, with an assured position in the alphabet of omen and prophecy, should serve to symbolize the bard and the flowers of his poetry. The inventive faculty of the original mythographer, whoever he was, was as irrevocably committed to the choice of this tree as was Vergil to the choice of a grove of laurel for the Elysian habitat of his *pii vates* in *Aeneid* vi. 662.<sup>1</sup> As the preceding references show, the instantaneous or rapid growth to maturity to which the visioned laurel and the material poplar sapling are supposed to respond, is likewise a prescribed adjunct to such stories.

As a matter of fact, there are only two items in the story of the poplar shoot which can fairly arouse suspicion that the chronicler may have drawn somewhat too liberally on his imagination. The miraculous growth may well have been in the mind's eye; the statement *eodem loco*, necessitating as it does the assumption that the narrator felt that a nativity occurring in an ordinary environment was inappropriate for one of the world's great figures, may bear a romantic coloring. On the other hand, what would seem a *contretemps* to the sophisticated and the tender-minded, lies often in the course of nature for simpler ages and peoples. However this may be, the actual planting of the poplar belongs not to the Cockaigne of the imagination, but to the *terra firma* of authenticated folkway, viz., the superstition of the life-tree. The doctrine that a tree, planted at the birth of an infant, is a replica or symbol of the child's

<sup>1</sup> So the verities of romance demanded that Hesiod be fed on laurel from Helicon, a story later rationalized into a dream of the poet himself: ἐδῆλου δὲ τὸ θναρὶ πάντως ὡς πικρίας καὶ πόνων μετεσχηκὼς τῆς παιδείσεως λειβαλὴ γενήσκει ποιήματα; see Πρόκλου γένος Ἡσιόδου, Westermann, *Vit. script. Graec.*, pp. 45-46. Compare the allegorical value of *pomis et floribus* in the Suetonian *Life*.

life has been a tenet of popular belief in different ages and in many lands.<sup>1</sup> If the tree flourishes, the child will thrive, and vice versa. Mannhardt<sup>2</sup> long since pointed out the value of this passage in the *Life* of Vergil as an actual example of the usage, but this fact has not yet insinuated itself into the exegetical literature connected with Vergil. In the case of the third prodigy, therefore, we find that we are dealing with historicity which has been garnished only slightly with fiction by Suetonius or his informant. The elaborations are natural and explicable.

Returning to the prodigy which directly concerns us, we must acknowledge that here it was emphatically not true that the machine of imagination was operating in its customary grooves. The story is one that lacks the obviousness of both its fellows, the reality of one of them. The explanation of its presence in the corpus of tradition is by no means so self-evident. The original sponsor or sponsors, to whom it should be noted the *ferunt* of Suetonius looks back, transcended the limits set by convention for the legends associated with the births and infancies of poets. How influential commonplace and precedent were in controlling the choice of such marvels in the case of poets, is aptly illustrated in the *Genethliakon Lucani*, Statius *Silv.* ii. 7. 36-38. So far as the behavior of the infant is concerned, even the eulogist's partiality did not cause him to flout the norm of human realism. It was enough, by way of betokening the future poet, to describe the first cries of the child as "dulcet sounds," so to speak:

Natum protinus atque humum per ipsam  
Primo murmure dulce vagientem  
Blando Calliope sinu recepit.

A similar docility toward the code is revealed in the *Vita* of Lucan attributed to Vacca (Reifferscheid, *Suetonii praeter Caesarum libros reliquiae*, 76, l. 15-77, l. 3 = J. Endt, *Adnotationes super Lucanum*, p. 1, ll. 19-21):

Octavum enim mensem agens Romam translatus est. Ac ne dispar eventus in eo narraretur eius qui in Hesiodo refertur, cum opinio tunc (hunc

<sup>1</sup> For numerous references and full discussion, see Mannhardt, *Wald- und Feldkulte*, I, 32 f.; II, 23 f.; Fraser, *Golden Bough* (3d ed.), xi. 160 f. On the possible connection of the idea with the lover's custom, oft mentioned in ancient romance, elegy, and other erotic literature, of carving the name of his lady on the bark of trees, see Skutsch, *Gallus und Vergil*, pp. 164-65.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, II, 23 f.



Reiffer.) non dissimilis maneret cunas infantis, quibus ferebatur apes circumvolarent, osque insidere complures, aut dulcem iam tum spiritum eius haurientes aut facundum et qualem nunc aestimamus, futurum significantes.

It is immaterial for my argument whether, as Glaeser<sup>1</sup> presents evidence to show, this story was an element present in Suetonius' *Vita Lucani*, from which we know the *Vita Vaccae* derived some data, or whether, as Koertge<sup>2</sup> holds, it was an addition of a later biographer, Vacca, or some predecessor. In any case it furnishes further illustration of the deference paid to legendary convention by the ancient biographers of poets. That bees should swarm about a poet in his infancy or about some other future master of language, should perhaps nourish him with honey, were especially favored prodigies. Thus, the legend had been connected with Pindar and with Plato.<sup>3</sup> It is suggestive to note that Focas, in his poetic version of the Suetonian *Life of Vergil*, added this marvel to the others; see lines 21 f. He seems to have regarded the absence of the prodigy from his original as a lost opportunity, if not as a breach of good form.

In sum: Suetonius related of the infant Vergil a story which neither legendary convention by itself nor inherent reasons would have been likely to recommend to a chronicler, desirous of investing with a halo a great personage, as one of the stock omens appropriate to the birth of a poet. But if we take as the germ of the suggestion the concluding lines of the *Eclogue*, the impulse which moved the inventor of the tale, whoever he was, to stray from the beaten path becomes entirely luminous. Familiar as he and all the world were with Vergil's own maxim as to the way in which a child that was to become one of the great worthies of the earth should act when it first saw the light, it would seem to him felicitous and proper to assume that the infant Vergil must in like manner have given earnest of immortality *per ora virâm*. Such processes of elaboration and combination have left their marks everywhere in

<sup>1</sup> Fr. Glaeser, *Quaestiones Suetonianae de vitis Persii, Lucani, Horatii* (Ratisbon 1911), pp. 43-44.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 227.

<sup>3</sup> Westermann, *Biog. Graec.*, pp. 93; 97; 382. For numerous passages connecting poets and their activities with bees and honey, see Usener, *op. cit.*, 400-401 and notes.

the ancient biographies of men of letters, in scholia and ancient commentary also.

To me it is not credible that the biographical tradition would have reacted to the passage in the *Eclogue* after the fashion predicated herewith, had the sole allusion to the child's smile been contained in *risu cognoscere*. Vergil's intent to characterize the smile as a presage of future greatness would have been too cryptic, if he had left his purpose to be subserved by words the ambiguity of which was a stumbling-block even to those who thought in Latin, to inspire the concrete significance of the words in the *Life*, *ut haud dubiam spem prosperioris geniturae iam tum daret*. What is this clause but an echo of the definite assertion which exegetical tradition had first heard uttered in the words of the *Eclogue*:

. . . . qui non risere parentes  
nec deus hunc mensa, dea nec dignata cubili est?

I have previously remarked on the patent fact that the *serunt* of Suetonius shows that the projection of Vergil's own words upon the child Vergil had been effected by oral or written tradition prior to the time at which Suetonius composed his biographies of the poets; i.e., according to the accepted view of the chronology of the works of Suetonius, prior to the first decade and a half of the second century A.D. How long before, we cannot say. At all events, if the considerations which I have presented are valid, we obtain evidence corroborative of Quintilian that, to put the matter with extreme conservatism, in the closing years of the first century the last lines of the *Fourth Eclogue* were read as they have been printed above.

Discussion of the significance of the precocious smile as an omen would surely have accompanied any attempt that had been made to determine the identity of the child. Under such conditions the question was bound to arise whether a claimant had in his early infancy exhibited the qualification demanded for a brilliant future. The often-quoted statement of Asconius Pedianus (*Servius Auctus* on *Ecl.* iv. 11) in which that author asserts that he had had verbal, though scarcely modest, assurance from Asinius Gallus that he himself was the child glorified in the *Eclogue*, shows that the controversy which has dragged its weary length through two millennia was

afoot in the first quarter of the first century. For Asinius died in the year 33 A.D. To the same period may well belong the origin of what would be called *Americane* the "boom" in favor of the perhaps not apocryphal Saloniinus,<sup>1</sup> a son of Pollio, who died in infancy. That the smile motive figured in this rather unlovely debate as to which scion of the House of Pollio was the object of Vergil's eulogy, is indicated by the note of Servius on line 1, although with that tantalizing inconsistency so befogging to the modern seeker after truth the portent is here given an unpropitious significance at variance with the content of the notes on line 60 and on *Aeneid* vi. 862.

More germane to our problem is this fact, to which we can pin our faith. The transfer of the omen to the birth of Vergil must have been made by a biographer or critic whose bias to the poet was friendly. In the Suetonian *Life* we have ample testimony as to the literary feud of which the name and the fame of Vergil were the center, even in his lifetime. The vestiges of sympathetic and apologetic writers who dealt with the career of the poet are here crossed by many traces of critics hostile to his work and slanderous of his character. Among friendly critics we must place, of course, Varius, who, as Quintilian *Inst.* x. 3. 8 proves, treated in some formal way biographical facts pertaining to Vergil. Eros, the secretary of Vergil in the poet's declining years (Brummer, ll. 114 f.), would presumably have only praise of his master to relate. Last, but not least among champions of Vergil, must be mentioned Asconius Pedianus. When we meditate upon the number of possibilities latent in the reference of Aulus Gellius xvii. 10. 2 to *amici . . . familiaresque P. Vergilii in his quae de ingenio moribusque eius tradiderunt*, to try to localize exactly the agent responsible for the application of the lines of the *Eclogue* to the poet himself would seem to be sheer Alexandrianism. Suffice it to say that, if we canvass plausibilities, Asconius Pedianus would present the strongest claims. The passage from Servius alluded to above shows that Asconius busied himself prayerfully with the problem of the identity of the *puer*. He

<sup>1</sup> Marx, *Neue Jahrb.*, I (1898), 106, regards Servius' information about Saloniinus as authentic and based on documentary sources. See Klebs, *Prosop.*, I, 169, No. 1038; K. Kunst, *BPhw.*, XL (1920), 694 f.

cannot have failed to be alive to the value of the omen as prophetic of future greatness. His book entitled *Contra obtrectatores Vergilii* may well have had a formal *vita* prefixed to it, as had been the practice in connection with treatises on literary subjects and *genres* from the time of Aristotle on. Certainly it incorporated biographical data; the apologetic tenor of Asconius' version of the tittle-tattle concerning a *liaison* between Vergil and Plotia Hieria points straight to a work conceived in a spirit of rehabilitation. Hence the source of the citation in the Suetonian *Life* (Brummer, ll. 32 f.) can hardly have lain elsewhere than in the *Contra obtrectatores*. The apologist, because of the very pressure exercised upon him by the disparagements and the aspersions to which he undertakes to put the quietus, develops a keen eye for data usable as a counterblast. No shred of evidence was too tenuous for the ancient encomiast or apologist to turn to his own ends in the effort to portray his hero as *teres atque rotundus*. When there was a dearth of facts, imagination could supply them, and commit no breach of literary ethics. To those detractors of Vergil who had assailed his personal character, harped on his alleged literary crimes, and branded his works as the productions of a botcher, destitute of real claim to greatness, what answer would be more in point than the assurance that in his face at birth had shone the sign that he was made of more than common clay?

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## EGO EMPHATIC AND UNEMPHATIC, IN RISES AND FALLS OF OLD LATIN DRAMATIC VERSE

By E. A. SONNENSCHN

It is commonly believed that the pronouns *ego*, *tu*, etc., are only expressed when emphatic; and this dogma has recently been made one of the foundation stones of a doctrine of "recessive words" in OL. verse by Professor Phillimore in the *Classical Review*. My object here is not to criticize Professor Phillimore's doctrine as a whole; but the present inquiry was suggested to me by his "Terentiana," and it has resulted in convincing me that the dogma that *ego* is always and necessarily emphatic is a mere *a priori* assumption.<sup>1</sup> This is, indeed, a paradox; but "the time shall give it proof." In this article I have made only a beginning of the demonstration. *Ego* occurs over two thousand times in Plautus alone. But I have examined all the Plautine and Terentian instances in which it is used with the common verbs *eo*, *eam*, *ibo*, *abeo*, *abeam*, and a great many of those with verbs of "knowing," "perceiving," and the like (e.g., *scio*, *nescio*, *novi*, *audio*, *video*), and a few with *sum*. My examination has been conducted entirely without prejudice; I have included all examples as they came to hand. If anyone is sceptical, let him experiment with *ego facio* or *ego* with a verb of "saying."

But I have attempted more than the making of a list of emphatic and unemphatic instances; I have classified them in such a way as to show the relation of emphasis and non-emphasis to the "rise" and the "fall" of the foot. It is commonly asserted that Plautus and Terence tried to secure in every foot coincidence of word-accent or sentence-accent with the so-called "ictus" of the verse. But, as Professor Housman said to me last summer, if they aimed at this, how is it that they were not more successful? I cannot, of course, deal with this big question here; but my instances will provide material for considering to what extent the Ritschlian doctrine is true in

<sup>1</sup> *Classical Review*, XXXIV, 62: "We know that these are only expressed when emphatic; otherwise the inflexion of the verb is sufficient to indicate the person." (Italics mine.)

a limited (very limited) field.<sup>1</sup> Whether there was actually any such thing as "ictus" in the delivery of OL. verse is immaterial to my present argument. I avoid the term and its implications altogether. By the "rise" of the foot I mean the part which is commonly called the "arsis" in this country and the "thesis" in America. It will readily be conceded that this is the more prominent part of the foot, whether stressed with an "ictus" or not. By the "fall" I mean the other part (the "thesis" or "arsis"), i.e., the less prominent part. For my present purposes iambic and trochaic meters can be treated side by side; it makes no difference whether the rise precedes the fall, or vice versa. Thus my instances include trochaic lines like *Persa* 198: PAE. *Eo ego*. TO. *I sane: ego domum ibo*. *Face rem hanc cum cura geras* (where the first *ego* is unemphatic and the second emphatic); and iambic lines like *Stich*, 731: *Ego tú sum, tú's ego; unianimi sumus* (where both the *ego's*, though they stand in the fall, are emphatic, like the *tú's*). I also include some anapaestic, bacchiac, and cretic lines.

Emphasis is a matter of the sense of the passage, and must be considered altogether apart from the structure of the verse. But there is one difficulty which must be faced at once; opinions will differ as to whether an *ego* is emphatic or not. I cannot expect my readers to agree with me in all cases; indeed many instances occur in which I am not sure myself. These I enter under the heading "doubtful." Some of them will probably be regarded as emphatic. But making allowances for considerable differences of opinion on this point, I venture to think that I have established many clear cases both of emphasis and of the total absence of emphasis. In the writing of verse a non-significant *ego* is an obvious convenience, of which modern emenders have not been slow to avail themselves, and sometimes with excellent results, e.g., in *Asin.* 869, *Cist.* 510, *Men.* 471, 961.

The word *ego* may stand in four different relations to the rise and fall:

1. The first syllable (e-) may begin a disyllabic rise, as in *ego do/mum ibo*, *Persa* 198 tr. (quoted above), and *Ego eo in/tro*, *Ad.* 706

<sup>1</sup> The word *ego* like other disyllabic words (Quintilian i.5.31), had an accent on the first syllable, whether it was emphatic or not. When it was emphatic, that accent was, I imagine, intensified in pronunciation. An unemphatic *ego* was probably pronounced with as light an accent as was possible.



tr.<sup>1</sup> This, the first half of the rise, I call "the place of honour," because it is the most prominent position which the syllable can occupy. The rise as a whole is more prominent than the fall; and of the rise the first *mora* is the more prominent part. This is generally recognized in the doctrine that it was on this part of the rise that the "ictus" fell—if there was an ictus.

2. The first syllable (e-) may form the second half of a disyllabic rise, as in *Eo ego: i sane, Persa* 198 tr.; *Quō ego e|am?* *Men.* 115 cretic.

3. The first syllable (e-) may form a monosyllabic fall, as in *Intro ego hinc eo, Amph.* 1039 tr., or the first half of a disyllabic fall, as in *Ego eo ad forum, Asin.* 108 ia. These two cases are not worth separating.

4. The first syllable (e-) may form the second half of a disyllabic fall, as in *Sed quid e|go hic in lamentando, Merc.* 218 tr.

#### CLASSIFICATION OF INSTANCES<sup>2</sup>

1. e- at the beginning of a rise (as in the common formula *Ēgone? Tūne, Capt.* 857, *Epid.* 575, *Mil.* 439, *Most.* 955, *Stich.* 635, *Trin.* 634): (a) Emphatic: **Amph. 1035, Asin. 378, Bacch. 78** (or, with hiatus at change of speakers, under heading (2), **Curc. 553, Epid. 550** (middle of line), **Merc. 453** (middle of line), **Mil. 478, Persa 198, 217** (middle of line; *eo* supplied by Ritschl)<sup>3</sup> **588, Peon. 592, Pseud. 979, Rud. 967, 1174; Truc. 848**; Terence, **Ad. 706, Eun. 216, 970.** (b) Unemphatic: *Epid. 550* (beginning of line), *635, Mil. 299, Pseud. 1196, Stich. 66.* (c) Doubtful: *Bacch. 1055, Cas. 773, Cist. 148, Curc. 588, Merc. 147, 453* (beginning of line), *Mil. 478, Pseud. 391, 914, 1252, Rud. 956, Stich. 23, Truc. 98, 302, Terence Eun. 807.*

<sup>1</sup> tr. = trochaic; ia. = iambic. In this line of Terence (*Ad.* 706) we have the only departure from the rule of Plautine usage observed by Seyffert (*Berl. Phil. Woch.*, p. 343, 1889) that the order of words in the expression meaning "I go" is *Eo ego* at the beginning of trochaic lines and *Ego eo* at the beginning of iambic lines.

<sup>2</sup> As emphatic, unemphatic, or doubtful, arranged under the foregoing headings, 1, 2, 3, 4. In the list which follows examples with verbs of 'going' are printed in heavy type, those with verbs of 'perceiving' or 'knowing' in italics and those with the verb *sum* in small capitals.

<sup>3</sup> This *eo* is abandoned in the *ed. min.*, but with questionable propriety, for the editors have admitted a line with an unrhythmical fifth rise. See my article in *Class. Rev.*, XX, 156 ff., and my note on *Mostellaria* 656 in the 2d ed. of that play (Oxford Univ. Press, 1907).

2. *e-* at the end of a rise: (a) Emphatic: *Asin.* 300 (beginning of line), *Aul.* 743, *Cas.* 355 (here the verbs are also emphatic, more so than *ego*), *Mil.* 259, *Most.* 362, *Poen.* 1330, *Pseud.* 12, *Rud.* 964, 1174, *Stich.* 567. (b) Unemphatic: *Amph.* 781,<sup>1</sup> *Aul.* 734, 616, 822, *Epid.* 44, 246, 458, *Men.* 115, 1062, 1070, *Merc.* 6, 385, *Mil.* 289, 331, 1281, 1325, *Most.* 365, *Persa* 198, 217 (beginning of line), 616, *Poen.* 1122, 1296, *Pseud.* 347, *Rud.* 333, 450, 739, *Stich.* 79, 474, *Trin.* 639. *Truc.* 296, 421, 484, 811; Terence *Haut.* 586. (c) Doubtful: *Capt.* 326, *Most.* 334 (here both the reading and the emphasis are uncertain), *Persa* 276, *Poen.* 1208.

3. *e-* at the beginning of a fall or forming the whole fall: (a) Emphatic: *Men.* 996, *Poen.* 123, *Pseud.* 1327, *Rud.* 1173 ("I am he who begot you"), *Stich.* 731, *Trin.* 81, Terence *Ad.* 277, *Eun.* 494. (b) Unemphatic: *Amph.* 263, 264, 792, 1039, *Asin.* 108 (B: *Eo ego* CD), 116, 131, 300 (middle of line), 869, *Aul.* 89, 104, 796, 812 (*bis*), *Bacch.* 623, *Capt.* 317, *Cas.* 167 (*hic* emphatic), 303, 790, *Curc.* 229, *Epid.* 4, 634, *Men.* 96, 471, 852, 1001, *Merc.* 598, *Mil.* 236, 1012, 1279, 1345, *Persa* 75, 615, *Poen.* 190, 1046, *Pseud.* 607, 908, 977, *Rud.* 403, 958, 963, 1013 (beginning of line),<sup>2</sup> 1056 ("I am that man," not "I am that man"), 1184, *Stich.* 250, 537, *Trin.* 582, 996, *Truc.* 322; Terence *Ad.* 435 ("Yes indeed, I will get out of this place"; there is no contrast between the speaker and any other person; cf. *Cic. Att.* xiii. 43: "Yes, my friend, you are right; I will avail myself of the postponement"; see Purser's translation, *Correspondence of Cic.* V, 157), *ibid.* 604 ("Oh no, I will go with you; cf. ll. 598 ff.: not "I on the contrary"), *Eun.* 580. (c) Doubtful: *Aul.* 579, *Bacch.* 348 (*eo* supplied by Ritschl), 1060, *Capt.* 126, 325, 919, *Cas.* 526, *Epid.* 147, 153, *Men.* 636, *Mil.* 456, *Poen.* 379, *Pseud.* 169, 959, 978, *Stich.* 74, *Trin.* 283; Terence, *Haut.* 211. The reading is uncertain in *Mil.* 812, *Most.* 853 (*Ego abeo* A).

<sup>1</sup> In questions like this and several of the following instances the unemphatic character of the *ego* is specially clear.

<sup>2</sup> This is the only instance in Plautus of this order of words (*Abeo ego*); elsewhere the *ego* always precedes the *abeo*. But I am not inclined to standardize the line by reading here *Ego abeo*, as has been suggested by Seyffert and others. The usual order is determined by purely metrical reasons; but where the second syllable of *ego* is elided and the word is unemphatic, the order *Abeo ego* is justified. The second *ego* in this line is emphatic, but hardly the first.

4. *e-* at the end of a fall: (a) Emphatic: **Pseud. 561**; Terence, **Phorm. 209** (*abeo* understood). (b) Unemphatic: *Epid. 537*, **Merc. 218**, **Pseud. 239 b**, *962*, **Trin. 818**.<sup>1</sup>

SUMMARY<sup>2</sup>

Even if all the doubtful instances be counted as emphatic, the unemphatic would stand to the emphatic as 95:74. A modest induction, then, is that the unemphatic *ego* is distinctly commoner than the emphatic *ego* in Plautus and Terence.

As to the illustration of these instances (neglecting the doubtful ones), I have found that of the 37 emphatic *ego*'s 18 occur in the place of honor (1) and 19 in the other places (2, 3, 4). Now if these 37 were distributed evenly among the four places, without preference for any one place over any other, we should get an average of about 9 for each place. Instead of that we find that the emphatic *ego* occurs about twice as often in the place of honor as we should expect it to occur if no preference for this place existed in the mind of the poet. Again, of the 95 unemphatic *ego*'s 90 occur in the non-prominent places (2, 3, 4) and only 5 in the place of honor (1). The average number for each place, if the 95 were evenly distributed, would be 23.75. But we actually find that the unemphatic *ego* occurs nearly 3.8 times as often in the non-prominent places as it would be expected to occur if there were no preference in the mind of the poets. Or, if we compare the occurrences of the emphatic with those of the unemphatic *ego* in the place of honor, we find that they stand as 18:5. And on the same principle the occurrences of the unemphatic *ego* stand to those of the emphatic *ego* in the non-prominent places as 90:19. My inference is that Plautus and Terence had a distinct preference for putting an emphatic *ego* into the most prominent position, and for relegating an unemphatic *ego* to a position which was less prominent, so far as the exigencies of the meter permitted. (I have made no attempt at comparing the three positions 2, 3, 4 with one another in respect of their prominence or attraction

<sup>1</sup> To be read with hiatus at the change of speakers. This is the only line of Plautus in which the order *eo ego* appears in an iambic line (in the second foot; cf. above, p. 233, note 1). Note also that both the pronoun and the verb stand in the fall, but the pronoun after the verb—probably because of the complete absence of emphasis.

<sup>2</sup> Out of 169 instances, 37 emphatic, 95 unemphatic, 37 doubtful.

for an emphatic *ego*: so far as I see, there is no marked difference between them in this respect.)

How about other Latin writers? Kühner-Stegmann (*Syntax*, I, 596 f.) mentions among exceptions to the ordinary rule the following examples from the "Umgangssprache" Cic. *Att.* vi. 9. 4, *Fam.* viii. 10. 3, and some instances where *ego* is used for the sake of "Deutlichkeit." It is curious how little even the big grammars have to say on the subject. During the course of my investigation I consulted Dr. Mackail as to his general impression on the matter, but without telling him of my results. In reply he referred me to the following passages of Horace's *Odes*. I will insert his comments in quotation marks: "no emphasis": i.16.25; i.18.11; iii.14.27; iii.19.21; "almost redundant": i.20.2; "little or no emphasis": ii.27.7; iii.27.18; "little if any emphasis": iii.14.14; "slight emphasis": i.23.9; "some emphasis": ii.7.26; "high rhetorical emphasis": iii.5.18. On ii.20.1 ff. he remarks "rather rhetorical variation than emphasis; for in *non ferar*, where the stress to be laid on the speaker's identity is the same, no *ego* was used or needed." On iii.30.7 he remarks "a very interesting case, because the whole ode is emphatically personal, and there is no *ego* attached to *exegi*, *moriar*, *dicar*, only to *crescam*. This *ego* is a stylistic variation: certainly it does not mean that more stress is laid on the personal note in *crescam* than in the other verbs." I may add that in all these instances the *ego* comes into a non-prominent part of the verse.

My general impression is that, not only in popular speech but also in the earliest literary Latin that we have, a usage had grown up in which the pronoun was added to the finite verb merely for the sake of explicitness, and without any intention of expressing emphasis. This usage was probably due in some degree to blunting of the feeling for significance in the verbal inflexions, and to it is to be traced the origin of the unemphatic French *je*.<sup>1</sup> It is noteworthy that late Latin, from the first century A.D. onward, shows a growth in the usage of *ego*, *tu*, and *ille* with a finite verb, and this usage must have become widespread by the time French was developed out of Latin.

<sup>1</sup> In Italian and Spanish, on the other hand, the subject-pronoun is as a rule unexpressed when it is unemphatic and when the meaning is clear from the context. These two languages are able to distinguish the persons by the verb-inflexions more clearly than French.

The history of the pronouns in the Germanic languages is the same; they started, like Sanskrit and the other members of the Indo-European family, with the usage which is preserved in Gothic (e.g. *gwitha* = λέγω), but gradually the pronouns came in (e.g. *ik gwitha* = ἐγὼ λέγω, Matt. 5:22; here the *ik* is emphatic; see Grimm, *Deutsche Gram.*, IV, 201 f.). In the later Germanic dialects, such as Old High German and Anglo-Saxon, the use of the pronoun, sometimes for emphasis but generally without emphasis, became the rule (with certain exceptions, and survivals of the older usage). The history of the Latin usage seems to be in general quite analogous to this: here too a usage sprang up in which there was no more difference in meaning between (say) *eo* and *eo ego* or *ego eo* than there is in modern English between "Thank you" and "I thank you" (which differs only in being slightly more formal), or between "would that" and "I would that," "Pray heaven" and "I pray heaven," etc.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Professor Housman, after seeing the foregoing article, says, "I have not gone through your examples to see whether I agree with you in particular cases, but I do agree that the nominative of the personal pronoun is used without emphasis. This is clearest where *tu* is found with the indefinite second person subjunctive, as in Ovid *Met.* iv. 400: *quod tu nec tenebras nec posses dicere lucem*."

## THE MEGARIAN DECREES

BY ROBERT J. BONNER

The earlier discussions of the Megarian decrees were confined mainly to the question of their date, number, and authorship. The results of these investigations have been conveniently summarized by Busolt<sup>1</sup> whose conservative conclusions regarding the questions at issue have been generally accepted. More recently the recognition of the importance of economic factors in ancient history has aroused fresh interest in the commercial policy of Athens as a contributing cause of the Peloponnesian War.<sup>2</sup> In the main Busolt's verdicts are sound, but in two instances he has accepted views not warranted by the available evidence.

The period during which the decrees could have been in operation falls into three divisions, beginning respectively with the secession of Megara in 446, Athenian intervention in Corcyra in 433, and the opening of the Peloponnesian War in 431. No ancient source definitely records any steps taken by Athens to put economic pressure upon Megara during the first period. Duncker<sup>3</sup> was the first to suggest that Aristophanes refers to this period in *Acharnians* 515-23:

ἡμῶν γὰρ ἄνδρες, οὐχὶ τὴν πόλιν λέγω,  
μέμνησθε τοῦθ', ὅτι οὐχὶ τὴν πόλιν λέγω,  
ἀλλ' ἀνδράρια μοχθηρά, παρακεκομμένα,  
ἄτιμα καὶ παράσημα καὶ παράξενα,  
ἐσφυοφάντει Μεγαρίων τὰ χλανίσκια·  
κεῖ που σίκυον ἴδοιεν ἢ λαγῶδιον  
ἢ χοιρίδιον ἢ σκόροδον ἢ χόνδρους ἅλας,  
ταῦτ' ἦν Μεγαρικὰ κάππερατ' αὐθημερόν  
καὶ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ σμικρὰ κάπιχώρια.

<sup>1</sup> *Griechische Geschichte*, III (1904), 2, p. 811; Thieme (*Quaestionum comicarum ad Periclem pertinentium capita tria* [1908], pp. 30 ff.) gives a fuller bibliography.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Cornford, *Thucydides Mythistoricus* (1907); Grundy, *Thucydides and His History* (1911); Ferguson, "Economic Causes of Wars in Ancient Greece," *The Military Historian and Economist*, I (1916), 141-52. Hugo Grotius (*Mare liberum* [1609]) regarded the Megarian legislation as the cause of the war.

<sup>3</sup> *Geschichte des Alterthums*, IX, 329, 350.



Two different explanations of the situation pictured by Aristophanes have been advanced. Klett,<sup>1</sup> developing Duncker's suggestion, argues that immediately after the secession the Megarians were excluded from the Attic market; the exclusion from the harbors of the empire occurred in the second period. Busolt accepts this view with a slight modification as to the time. Instead of "immediately after the events of 446" he puts the exclusion from the Attic market "some time before the summer of 433." This view has been generally accepted by recent editors of the *Acharnians*. Others see only a stringent enforcement of the regular customs laws in the hostile spirit engendered by the Megarian defection.

The references to this period found in Thucydides are not of much assistance in deciding between these rival views. The Corinthian who appeared before the Athenian assembly in July, 433, to urge them to reject the proffered Corcyraean alliance, must have had in mind Athenian policy toward Megara during this period when he says: "It would be, rather, the prudent course to remove something of the suspicion (*ὑποψία*) which has heretofore existed on account of the Megarians" (i. 42. 2). Perhaps also the *ἑτερα οὐκ ὀλίγα διάφορα* (i. 67. 4) mentioned by the Megarians at the first Spartan congress may include grievances growing out of Athenian commercial policy toward Megara. *ὑποψία* would seem to be too mild a term even for Corinthians to use if the Megarians had actually been excluded from the Athenian market by discriminatory legislation. But the Corinthians speak softly, for they are asking a favor. On the other hand, however, why should Corinth take umbrage at the strict enforcement of the regular Athenian customs laws? The answer lies ready to hand in Thucydides' narrative. When Megara joined the Athenian confederacy in 459, Thucydides remarks: "It was chiefly on this account that the vehement hatred of the Corinthians for the Athenians first arose." The Corinthian speaker at the first Spartan congress says: "We know too by what methods the Athenians move against their neighbors—that it is here a little and there a little" (i. 69. 3). Being in this frame of mind, it is not impossible that the Corinthians should have viewed with grave concern the

<sup>1</sup> "Das megarische Psephisma," *Korrespondenzblatt für die Schulen Württembergs*, XXXVIII, 357 ff.

harsh and vexatious enforcement of the customs regulations lest the Megarians might be induced again to desert the Peloponnesian confederacy in order to have fair, if not favored, treatment in such a convenient market. While the Corinthian attitude is more intelligible if there was an embargo upon Megarian trade with Athens, it is still not incompatible with the other theory.

Against the embargo theory there are several arguments that are not to be lightly rejected. Aristophanes expressly urges that the city is not to be blamed for the state of affairs he has described, but certain despicable persons, sycophants such as he brings upon the stage in a subsequent scene.<sup>1</sup> This would seem to imply very clearly that there was no legislative enactment regarding Megarian trade.<sup>2</sup> To the same effect is the statement that, bad as the situation was, it was just what one might expect in Athens (*ἐπιχώρια*)<sup>3</sup> and trivial in comparison with the anti-Megarian legislation which followed:

ἐνταῦθεν ὀργῇ Περικλῆς οὐλύμπιος  
 ἐτίθει νόμους<sup>4</sup> ὥσπερ σκόλια γεγραμμένους,  
 ὡς χρὴ Μεγαρέας μήτε γῇ μήτ' ἐν ἀγορᾷ  
 μήτ' ἐν θαλάττῃ μήτ' ἐν οὐρανῷ μένειν.

Infringements of customs laws were dealt with by means of *φάσις*.<sup>5</sup> The property involved was sold and the informer received one half of the proceeds. This is precisely what happened in the case of Megarian offenders. The situation described in lines 515-23 can be quite satisfactorily explained without assuming special legislation. Indeed, much of the effectiveness of the attack on Pericles is lost if he merely put through additional legislation.

<sup>1</sup> When the Megarian (ll. 820-21) comes to the market of Dicæopolis and sees the sycophant, he exclaims: "The same old story. Here comes the beginning of our woes." The audience would naturally regard this scene as an illustration of ll. 515-23.

<sup>2</sup> Thieme believes there was no special law, but sees no support for his view in this statement which he regards as a comic exaggeration.

<sup>3</sup> In a subsequent scene (l. 900) the Boeotian asks in exchange for his wares something peculiar to Athens, *ὅ τι γ' ἔστ' Ἀθήναις, ἐν Βοιωτοῖσιν δὲ μὴ*, i.e., something *ἐπιχώριον* in Athens, a sycophant.

<sup>4</sup> There is no significance in the plural *νόμους*; a few lines below the same legislation is described as *τὸ ψήφισμα, τὸ διὰ τὰς λαικαστρας*. Thieme thinks the plural refers to the different sections of the law. It is mere exaggeration.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Lipsius, *Das attische Recht*, p. 310.

The decree of Charinus as reported by Plutarch<sup>1</sup> provided for (a) truceless war against Megara, (b) semi-annual invasions, (c) the exclusion of Megarians from Attica on pain of death, (d) the burial of the herald Anthemocritus at the Thriasian gate. Holzapfel<sup>2</sup> argued that the decree was spurious because, while the exclusion could only have been decreed during peace, other provisions are war measures. He believed that this is really the Periclean decree excluding Megarians from the market of Attica and the ports of the empire. At a later time someone added to the original decree provisions to explain the semi-annual invasions, and intensified the exclusion clause on the basis of the vigorous language of Aristophanes (*Acharnians* 533-34). This theory was not received with much favor. The prevailing view now is that the Charinus decree is distinct from the exclusion decree and was passed at the instance of Pericles between the attack on Plataea and the invasion of Attica.<sup>3</sup>

Thieme has revived Holzapfel's theory and attempted to prove that the clause which forbade Megarians on pain of death to set foot on Attic soil could not have been in force when the *Acharnians* was produced (424 B.C.) because the sycophant denounces the Megarian and his goods as of enemy origin<sup>4</sup> exactly as the second sycophant does in the case of the Boeotian, instead of haling him off to death under the law of Charinus. Moreover, such a proceeding would in Thieme's opinion have reached the height of comic humor.<sup>5</sup> If regular legal procedure is to be insisted upon it may be pointed out that in real life *φάσις* would certainly not be the normal procedure to be adopted in the case of the Boeotian, an enemy alien found within the gates. But naturally in both cases the sycophant chose the

<sup>1</sup> *Pericles* xxx. 2: ἀσπονδον μὲν εἶναι καὶ ἀκήρυκτον ἔχθραν, ὃς δ' ἂν ἐπιβῇ τῆς Ἀττικῆς Μεγαρέων θανάτῳ ζημιουῦσθαι.

<sup>2</sup> *Griechische Geschichte* 489-413, pp. 176 ff.; *Berliner Studien*, VII, 89 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Busolt, *op. cit.*, III, 2, p. 814, n. 4.

<sup>4</sup> τὰ χοιρίδια τοῖνον ἐγὼ φανῶ ταῖ  
πολέμια καὶ σέ. [*Achar.* 818 f.]

. . . ἐγὼ τοῖνον ὀδὶ  
φαίνω πολέμια πανταγί.

καὶ σέ γε φανῶ πρὸς τοῖσδε. [*Ibid.*, 911 f.]

<sup>5</sup> "Nam summa vi comica hos versus instruxisset si Megarensem . . . morte multatum iri significasset ob id solum quod intravit Atticam."—*Op. cit.*, p. 42.

more lucrative process in preference to summary arrest (ἀπαγωγή). He would share in the confiscated property to the extent of one half; but the death of the poor, starved Megarian would have profited him nothing. Aristophanes was not primarily concerned with the realities of the situation he imagined; he was interested first and foremost in amusing his audience. And I fancy most of his readers will be thankful that he did not indulge in the type of humor which Thieme approves.

Thieme develops the suggestion of Holzapfel that part of the Charinus decree might have been drawn from Aristophanes:

Sed quae de implacabili bello et de necandis iis Megarensibus legimus, qui intraverint Atticam, idem Holzapfel iam diu recte intellexit fortasse nata esse, si quis perperam explicavit Aristophanis Acharensium haec verba

... μήτε γῇ μήτ' ἐν ἀγορᾷ  
μήτ' ἐν θαλάττῃ μήτ' ἐν οὐρανῷ μένειν.

It is impossible to treat seriously a suggestion that any Athenian could have misunderstood the exuberant exaggeration of the comedian even if he did not catch the echo of Timocreon's<sup>1</sup> popular drinking-song:

ὠφελὲν σ', ὦ τυφλὲ Πλοῦτε,  
μήτε γῇ μήτ' ἐν θαλάσσῃ  
μήτ' ἐν οὐρανῷ φανῆμεν,  
ἀλλὰ Ταρταρόν τε ναίειν  
καὶ Ἀχέροντα· διὰ σὲ γὰρ πάντ'  
ἔστ' ἐν ἀνθρώποις κακά.

The text of the exclusion decree has not been preserved, but Thucydides is in all probability quoting from it when he says the Megarians were ordered *μη χρῆσθαι τοῖς λιμέσι τοῖς ἐν τῇ Ἀθηναίων ἀρχῇ μηδὲ τῇ Ἀττικῇ ἀγορᾷ* (i. 139). They were not even allowed to enter the ports for any purpose. The effect of this provision was literally to close the Aegean to them, for without a single friendly port in the islands or littoral the Megarians could not venture far afield; they would be confined to coasting voyages about the Peloponnesus. Pseudo-Xenophon<sup>2</sup> is right when he says that those who oppose Athens *οὐ χρῆσονται τῇ θαλάττῃ*.

<sup>1</sup> Scholiast on *Acharnians* 532.

<sup>2</sup> *Polity of the Athenians* ii. 12; cf. Thuc. iii. 6: *καὶ τῆς μὲν θαλάσσης εἶργον μὴ χρῆσθαι τοῖς Μνυτιηναίοις*.

The ostensible reason for this stringent decree was that the Megarians had "harbored runaway slaves and cultivated sacred and disputed land."<sup>1</sup> But the real purpose was to coerce them into joining the Athenian empire again.<sup>2</sup> A passage in Isocrates (viii. 36) contains a clear statement of the policy back of the Megarian decrees. Complaining of the activities of pernicious politicians who accept bribes to stir up war, he says: "They have the assurance to tell us that we ought to imitate our ancestors and not permit those who are unwilling to pay tribute to sail the seas." Isocrates certainly has the Megarian policy in mind when he inquires: "Are these men advising us to imitate those who controlled the city before the Decelean War? If so, they are advising us to run the risk of annihilation." The continuous military and diplomatic<sup>3</sup> efforts of Athens against Megara throughout the Ten Years' War show that she was pursuing a definite policy of annexation. In the peace conference at the end of the *Lysistrata* (l. 1170), produced in 411, the Athenian demand for *τὰ Μεγαρικά σκέλη* is a malicious reference to this persistent but now wholly unrealizable war aim to which Aristophanes had always been opposed.

The Megarians claimed that their exclusion from the Attic market and the ports of the empire was contrary to the Thirty Years' Truce; Pericles denied their contention categorically. Krüger<sup>4</sup> believes that the Megarians had in mind a specific

<sup>1</sup> Thuc. i. 139.

<sup>2</sup> Grundy, *op. cit.*, p. 78, 5: "To a state situated as Megara the decree meant starvation; to her colleagues in the Peloponnesian league it meant that Athens aimed at getting control of the isthmus by forcing Megara into submission."

<sup>3</sup> The close blockade by a squadron based on Salamis (Thuc. ii. 93); the semi-annual invasions; the capture of Nicaea, the Aegean port of Megara; the major offensive in 424-423; the demand for both ports in the abortive peace negotiations of 425; and the retention of Nicaea according to the terms of the peace of Nicias. An interesting example of the use of economic pressure to secure political results occurs in our own history. It was expected that the withdrawal from the reciprocity treaty with Great Britain in 1865 would force Canada to join the Union.

<sup>4</sup> *Historisch-philologische Studien*, p. 195. Busolt (*op. cit.*, III, 2, p. 833, n. 1) gives the views of the other historians. He himself goes so far as to maintain that the treaty contained a provision guaranteeing "freien Handelsverkehr" (III, 1, 437). Grundy (*op. cit.*, p. 325) says: "There seems to have been a clause in the Thirty Years' Peace of 446 which stipulated for free access to the Athenian market for states of the Peloponnesian League." In support of this position he cites only the Megarian claim that their treatment was contrary to the treaty.

provision covering this point and accounts for Pericles' position by supposing that the provision was indefinite, "eine Bestimmung, vielleicht nur eine ganz allgemeine, z.B. die, dass in Beziehung auf diesen Punkt das sonst in Friedenszeiten unter den Hellenen übliche Völkerrecht Geltung haben sollte." In support of this view he cites Plutarch's statement that the Megarians claimed that their exclusion was *παρὰ τὰ κοινὰ δίκαια καὶ τοὺς γεγενημένους ὄρκους τοῖς Ἕλλησιν*.<sup>1</sup> It is strange that no clause of this character is found in other treaties of the period. Thucydides gives the text of three treaties.<sup>2</sup> Not one of them contains a clause even remotely resembling the provision assumed by Krüger. Another objection to this theory lies in the Spartan *ξηλασία*. In the Athenian assembly Pericles rejects the Megarian claim, saying: "We will permit the Megarians to use our market and harbors if the Lacedaemonians on their part will cease putting in force their alien exclusion act in the case of us and our allies (for nothing in the treaty forbids either our action or theirs) (i. 144, Smith's translation). A statement of Xenophon<sup>3</sup> seems to indicate that the law had fallen into desuetude, and there are indications that it was not rigorously enforced. It was rather in the nature of a police regulation used by the Ephors at their discretion to rid the city of undesirable aliens. At any rate, the Athenian populace believed that the law was in full force.<sup>4</sup> And the tone of Pericles' reference to it in the funeral oration (ii. 39) suggests a measure of resentment: "We throw open our city to the whole world and never by deportations debar anyone from learning and seeing anything." Under these circumstances it is beyond belief that the Athenians consented to a provision which could be construed as a guaranty of "gegenseitigen Verkehr der Hauptstaaten" without reciprocity on the part of Sparta.

<sup>1</sup> *Pericles* xxix.

<sup>2</sup> The Peace of Nicias, Thuc. v. 18 ff.; the Athenian, Argive, and Mantinean alliance, v. 47; the Argive and Spartan Peace, v. 79. A clause in the Peace of Nicias guarantees to all the right to visit the common temples by sea and land.

<sup>3</sup> *Const. of Sparta* xiv. 2. See Daremberg et Saglio, *Dictionnaire des antiquités*, *ξηλασία*.

<sup>4</sup> Aristophanes *Birds* 1014.



An Athenian decree<sup>1</sup> of the year 428 discloses a situation which has several features in common with the Megarian dispute. Perdiccas, king of Macedonia, had excluded the people of Methone from Macedonia and set limits to their coastwise sailing. As Perdiccas was in alliance with Athens, and Methone was a subject city, Athens undertook to mediate and sent an embassy εἰπεῖν Περδίκκαι, ὅτι δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι ἔαν Μεθωναίους τῇ θαλάττῃ χρῆσθαι, μηδὲ ἐχσεῖναι ὀρίσασθαι, καὶ ἔαν εἰσεμπορεύεσθαι καθάπερ τέως ἐς τὴν χώραν. The Athenians base their protest on exactly the same grounds as do the Megarians. The action of Perdiccas is not δίκαιον, i.e., it is παρὰ τὰ κοινὰ δίκαια, "contrary to common justice." Consequently there is no need to assume a provision in the treaty as a basis for the protest. Anybody who had a grievance against a neighbor could make it. No one would think of stipulating in a treaty the observance of τὰ κοινὰ δίκαια or τὸ καθεστὸς τοῖς Ἕλλησι νόμιμον (Thuc. iii. 9.)

There is, however, a sense in which the policy of Athens was a violation of the treaty. It is known that in the Thirty Years' Truce as in the other treaties of the period there was a clause requiring the contracting parties to submit their differences to arbitration. In accordance with this provision Athens should have arbitrated her alleged grievances against Megara instead of resorting to reprisals. There is no evidence that the Megarians ever formulated their protest with reference to this particular clause. If they did, Pericles must have evaded the issue by wilfully misunderstanding the Megarian point of view and obscuring it in the Athenian assembly by comparing it with the Spartan exclusion act.

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<sup>1</sup> CIA, I, 40; Hicks and Hill, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, No. 60, ll. 18 ff.

## UTI LEGASSIT

By W. H. KIRK

The fact that the Roman jurists were not in the habit of going back of the *Twelve Tables* sufficiently explains why they found the base of testamentary succession in *Twelve Tables* v. 3, "uti legassit suae rei ita ius esto." Modern writers agree that the wills made *calatis comitiis* and *in procinctu* were older than the code; they disagree as to the purpose of this clause, which does not implicitly recognize an existing institution (as the ancient right of the *suus heres* is recognized in v. 4, "si intestato moritur cui suus heres nec escit"), but enacts a new rule.

One view is thus expressed by Girard, *Droit romain*, page 804:

C'est une disposition qui a établi la liberté dans le testament primitivement soumis au contrôle des comices. . . . Antérieurement c'était le peuple qui *legabat*, qui *legem dicebat* sur la *res* du testateur. . . . Désormais c'est le testateur qui fait sur tout cela une *lex* dont la soumission au peuple n'est plus que de pure forme.

One objection to this I find in the word by which "having made no will" is expressed in v. 4. If in 450 B.C. *legare* was the technical term for "make a will," and if down to that year the act was regarded as a *lex*, not as a *testamentum*, some form of *lex* or *legare* with a negative might be expected in place of *intestato*. That compound cannot have been used in this sense until *testari* was well established as the technical term for the act in question and therefore not until the assembled citizens had come to be regarded as mere witnesses. Its employment in the *Twelve Tables* proves that the will, if it ever was an act of legislation, had ceased to be such long before the code was drawn up.

Another difficulty I find in the etymology attributed to *legare*. The derivation of this verb from *lex* is as old at least as Ulpian (*Reg.* 24.1) and has been repeated by many modern writers from Brisson down. But the primitive sense postulated by this derivation does not agree with the sense of the compounds. These all mean "send," *delegare* also "commit"—significations not easily or naturally

developed from an original *legem dicere*.<sup>1</sup> I have no other etymology to offer; but if, setting aside the question of derivation, we look only at the sense, it is, I think, possible to conclude that the uses of the simple verb and its compounds are consistent with the assumption of a *legare* originally synonymous with *mittere*.

The two verbs stand side by side in *Lex Iul. munic.* 150, "per legatos quos . . . legarei mitti censuerint," as their derivatives do in *Cic. Verr.* iii. 73, "dimisso atque ablegato consilio." No doubt at this period the simple *legare* was already used only of sending in an official capacity, as in *Sall. Iug.* 21. 4 and 25. 4. There is apparently a contrast between an unofficial and an official negotiator in *Cic. Att.* x. 1. 4, "filium Brundisium de pace misit . . . me legatum iri non arbitror"; *Fam.* iii. 8. 4, "privatae rei causa legari," seems to be ironical. The substantive *legatus* is like Gallo-Latin *missus*; *Sall. Iug.* 83. 1, "legatos ad Bocchum mittit," is paralleled by *Greg. Tur. H. Fr.* ii. 27, "missos ad regem dirigit," except that Gregory uses *mittere* as freely as *dirigere*. With a dative *legare* denotes "send for the benefit of" and consequently "appoint as aide to"; the primary sense, still distinguishable in *Manil.* 57, "ne legaretur A. Gabinius Cn. Pompeio" (Pompey was abroad and the appointment was to be made by the senate), is quite lost in *Fam.* vi. 6. 10, "Cassium sibi legavit."

In the private law of the same period *legare* is apparently a synonym of *dare*: *Lex Falcid.*, "ut eam pecuniam easque res quibusque dare legare volet," *ibid.*, "quibus quid ita datum legatumve erit"; and two centuries later Gaius, ii. 193, giving *do lego* as the formula for creating a legacy *per vindicationem*, adds: "sed et si alterum verbum positum sit, veluti 'do' aut 'lego,' aequè per vindicationem legatum est." That this was the oldest form of legacy seems proved (Karlowa, *Privatrecht*, p. 916) by the name *legatum*,<sup>2</sup> derived from this formula and extended to other bequests made by other words. The formula itself is evidently drawn from the *nuncupatio* of the testator who was making a will *per aes et libram*, *Gai.* ii. 104,

<sup>1</sup> Or *legem ferre*, as Jhering, *Geist d. röm. Rechts*, I, 146, interprets the verb. Vanček, *Etymol. Wörterb.*, gives as the primary meaning "etwas gesetzlich verfügen oder thun."

<sup>2</sup> Perhaps, also, by the fact that this form of legacy was confined to objects belonging to the testator *ex iure Quiritium* (*Gai.* ii. 196); the *Twelve Tables* said *suae rei*.

"ita do, ita lego, ita testor, itaque vos Quirites testimonium mihi perhibetote." But here the words *do* and *lego* cannot be synonyms, else we should have *ita do lego*; each of the clauses introduced by *ita* denotes a different act. What *lego* means, appears from Plaut. *Cas.* 100, "quin potius quod legatumst tibi negotium id curas?" cf. Cic. *Fam.* xiii. 26. 2, "quibus ea negotia mandavimus," Cael. *Fam.* viii. 1. 1, "hunc laborem alteri delegavi." Gaius in his account of the oral will *per aes et libram*, says ii. 102, "amico familiam suam . . . mancipio dabat eumque rogabat quid cuique post mortem suam dari vellet, [103] familiae emptor . . . heredis locum optinebat et ob id ei mandabat testator quid," etc. In the testator's *nuncupatio* the word *lego* corresponds to the *rogabat* and *mandabat* of Gaius. *Ita do*, "thus I give," expresses the conveyance of the property to the beneficiaries; *ita lego*, "thus I commit," expresses the charge laid upon the executor of consummating the conveyance; the execution of the will was a *negotium quod legatum fuit*. The verb *legare* has here, as in Plaut. *Cas. loc. cit.*, a sense belonging not to the simple *mittere*, but to its compound *committere* and to the compound *delegare*.

In the earlier, purely oral, will the executor was the *familiae emptor*; his formal appointment was made by the words which he himself uttered in effecting the mancipation, Gai. ii. 104, "familiam pecuniamque tuam endo mandatela tua custodelaque mea<sup>1</sup> esse aio eaque, quo tu iure testamentum facere possis secundum legem publicam, hoc aere . . . esto mihi empta." When the written will was introduced, the testator appointed the real executor by the words *ille heres esto*. Thus the commission which had previously been given to the *familiae emptor* was now given to the heir; the nuncupatory formula referred not to the preceding oral declarations, the fuller *nuncupatio* (Karlowa, p. 855, Girard, p. 809 n. 2), of the testator, but to the document which he exhibited to the witnesses. Into this document the words *do lego* were introduced, so that the

<sup>1</sup> This reading of Seckel and Kübler seems to me preferable to that of Krüger and Studemund, *endo mandatelam custodelamque meam*. But it is important to note that, as Girard says, "qu'on admette une restitution ou l'autre, la formule atteste toujours que le *familiae emptor* n'est pas destiné à conserver l'hérédité." Also with either reading the phrase constitutes, as Karlowa and Sohm both say, an acknowledgment by the *familiae emptor* that he is the mandatary of the testator.

vesting of title in beneficiaries other than the heir<sup>1</sup> was effected by the same words as before. It is probable that the word *lego* alike in the *nuncupatio* and in the *tabulae testamenti* was at first understood as referring to the heir; it may have been still so understood in the time of Plautus. When the verb had ceased to be used, as Plautus could still use it, in the sense of *mandare*, *do lego* became merely a traditional formula; finally the second verb was understood as synonymous with the first.

I have said that *ita do* expressed a conveyance of ownership to the beneficiaries; Maine, *Ancient Law*, chapter vi, and Sohm, *Institutes*, page 544 (Eng. tr.), call the *familiae emptor* owner of the estate which was mancipated to him. But the words *do* and *lego* can hardly have been used otherwise in the oral than in the written will; and in the latter they vested ownership in the legatee (Gai. ii. 194), not in the heir. Moreover the words of mancipation show that the *familiae emptor* did not become owner. In the mancipation of a child the purchaser and intending manumitter claimed the child as his (Gai. i. 119, "meum esse aio"); he had to acquire ownership, because he could not manumit or remancipate one who was not his own. But the *familiae emptor* claimed only that the estate was in his custody to act as the testator's agent<sup>2</sup> and make the latter's gift effective by conveying possession. The rule of the *Twelve Tables* vi. 1, "cum nexum faciet mancipiumque uti lingua nuncupassit ita ius esto," applies here. The law will recognize in the person receiving by mancipation ownership or merely custody, according as he claims the one or the other.

The comital will and that made *in procinctu* were founded in ancient custom. The will *per aes et libram* (in its first form really an imperfect conveyance *inter vivos*, to be perfected, after the death of the conveyor, by his agent) must have been in its inception

<sup>1</sup> Of course the heir was at this time not necessarily a beneficiary; the *data legata* might include the whole property. Only if the testator instituted as heir a person whom he desired to benefit, would the latter be residuary legatee as well as executor.

<sup>2</sup> It is true that, as Sohm says, p. 543, "the mandatum and the transfer of ownership are not mutually incompatible"; they were combined in the *fideicommissum*. But if *do lego* had meant *Titio do*, *Titio lego reddat restituat* (Gai. ii. 250), the formula could not have given to the legatee a *rei vindicatio*, but only a personal action such as was given him by the words *heres meus dare damnas esto* (Gai. ii. 201, 204).

extra-legal. We need not suppose an *insignis quorundam perfidia* (*Inst.* ii. 23. 1; cf. *Cic. Fin.* ii. 55) to account for the fact that, being recognized as desirable, it was formally legalized; the question might well arise whether dispositions made by a man at the point of death should be allowed to defeat expectations based on the ancient rules of intestate succession. The code, by the clause *uti legassit*, decided the question in favor of the dying man; thereafter a decedent, when saying *ita lego*, felt assured that his mandate was legally valid.

There remains the question how this interpretation accords with the form in which Ulpian quotes *Twelve Tables* v. 3: "*uti legassit super pecunia tutelave suae rei<sup>1</sup> ita ius esto.*" A guardian was appointed by the word *do* (*Gai.* i. 149), not *do lego* or *lego*; and it is not to be supposed that the *familiae emptor* any more than his successor, the heir, was charged with any responsibility in the matter. But compare Papin. *Dig.* xxvi. 2. 26. pr., "*tutela communium liberorum matri testamento patris frustra mandatur,*" 28. pr., "*qui tutelam testamento mandatam excusationis iure suscipere noluit,*" Ulp. *Dig.* xxvi. 7. 3. 3, "*ei potissimum se tutelam commissurum praetor dicat cui testator delegavit.*" The formal acceptance of the mandate by the *familiae emptor* was an indispensable element in the making of a will by civil law; the *datio tutoris*, as a clause in the will, contained only the offer of a mandate which might or might not be accepted. But the guardianship was a *negotium mandatum*, *delegatum*, or, as Plautus has it, *legatum*; the clause *uti legassit* covered the case of both mandataries, of the one who declared his acceptance in presence of the testator, and of the one whose acceptance or refusal was formally signified only after the testator's death.

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<sup>1</sup> A double complement, prepositional phrase and legal genitive, as in *Lex Cornelia de sicariis*: "*cui sorte obveniret quaestio de sicariis eius quod in urbe . . . factum erit.*"



## THE INVENTORY OF NICCOLÒ NICCOLI

BY RODNEY P. ROBINSON

The Florentine monk, Ambrogio Traversari, in a letter to Niccolò Niccoli dated July 8, 1431, mentions an inventory of manuscripts which the latter had given to the cardinals Giuliano Cesarini and Niccolò Albergati, with the request that they search for the volumes listed therein in their travels through Germany and France respectively.<sup>1</sup> What is apparently a copy of this inventory has in recent years come to light, appended to a manuscript containing some philosophical works of Cicero. In 1913 the inventory was published in its entirety in Catalog XII (pp. 14-16, MS 10) of the Florentine book-dealers, T. de Marinis & Co., at the end of their description of the Cicero manuscript. The attention of the philological world was first brought to the matter by E. Jacobs, *Wochenschr. f. klass. Philol.*, 1913, 701-2.<sup>2</sup> R. Sabbadini, *Storia e critica di testi latini*, Catania, 1914, has republished the text of the de Marinis catalogue in full.

The above-mentioned manuscript is now in New York in the private library of Mr. Pierpont Morgan. Through the generosity of the Department of the Classics of the University of Illinois and the courtesy of Miss Ada Thurston of the Morgan library, photographs of the pages containing the inventory were secured for my use in the preparation of my Doctor's dissertation.<sup>3</sup> A collation of the text in the de Marinis catalogue with the manuscript reveals about twenty typographical errors, with a larger number of inaccuracies. Since this text has hitherto been the only one available for the study of this most valuable document, an accurate copy made directly from the photographs of the manuscript is herewith submitted.

<sup>1</sup> *Traversarii epistolae*, ed. Petrus Cannelus, VIII, 2, p. 353; also in Sabbadini, *Storia e critica*, p. 2: . . . *Quod indicem dederis voluminum inquirendorum cum Iuliano nostro cardinali S. Angeli tum cardinali S. Crucis, Germaniam omnem omnemque Galliam diverso itinere peragaturis, fecisti tu studiose et ingenio tuo digne. . . .*

<sup>2</sup> See also A. Gudeman, *ibid.*, 1913, 929-33; W. Aly, *Rhein. Mus.*, LXVIII, 636-37.

<sup>3</sup> *De fragmenti Suetoniani de grammaticis et rhetoribus codicum nexu et fide*, to be published in the "University of Illinois Studies in Language and Literature."

The more serious errors in the de Marinis text are as follows:<sup>1</sup>  
 l. 3, *in latus*, without mention of the fact that the letter *s* is written above the line, a circumstance which readily explains the error in the manuscript for *in lacu*; l. 6, *at alpibus* for *ab alpibus*; l. 17, *instingent* for *instigent*; l. 27, *antiquatus* for *antiquitus*; ll. 60–62, *carthaginensis* . . . . *Tertulliani* omitted; l. 63, *aduersus indacos* for *aduersus mdacos* (a corruption of *Aduersus Iudaeos*); l. 69, *Deo octo* for *De octo*; l. 119, *inuiorem* for *iuniorem*; ll. 122–23 omitted; l. 126, *Ad C. Pansam* for *Ad Pansam*; l. 128, *decades* for *decados*; l. 129, *uetustissima* for *uetustissimis*; l. 138, *Extat non integre* printed as though in body of inventory. As the *compendia* are the usual ones, I have not attempted to reproduce them. In the manuscript *ae* appears as the *e caudata*.

COMMENTARIVM NICOLAI NICO/LI IN PEREGRINATIONE GERMANIE:—

- |           |  |          |
|-----------|--|----------|
| Reperta.  | In Monasterio sancti Marci quod est in latus <sup>2</sup> constantie sunt Com/mentaria Donati grammatici in litteris uetustissimis in libros octo/Eneidos Virgilii.  | 5        |
|           | In Monasterio hispildensi haud procul ab alpibus continentur haec/opuscula. videlicet.   |          |
| Repertus. | Iulii Frontini De aquae ductis quae in vrbem inducunt liber .j. Incipit/sic. PERSECVTVS ea quae de modulis dici fuit necessarium./ Nunc ponam quemadmodum queque aqua ut principium commentariis/comprehensum est usque ad nostram curam habere uisa sit &c. Con/tinet hic liber xij.  | 10       |
| Repertus. | Item eiusdem frontini liber incipit sic. Cum omnis res ab imperatore dele/gata interiorum exigat & curam, & me seu naturalis sollicitudo seu/ fides sedula, non ad diligentiam modo, uerum ad morem commisse rei instigent, sitque mihi nunc ab nerua augusto, nescio diligentiore an aman/tiore rei .p. imperatore aquarum iniunctum officium & ad usum &c. Con/tinet .xi. folia. | 15       |
| Repertus. | Cornelii taciti de origine & situ germanorum liber incipit sic. Ger/mania omnis a galiis <sup>3</sup> rhetisque & pannoniis reno & danubio flumi/nibus a sarmatis datisque & mutuo metu a montibus separatur etc./ Continet autem xij folia:—Item in eodem codice:—  | 20<br>25 |

<sup>1</sup> The numbering of the lines is that of the reproduction here given.

<sup>2</sup> *s* is added above the line.

<sup>3</sup> Second *i* is expunctuated.

Repertus.	Cornelii taciti De uita Iulii agricole Incipit sic. Clarorum uirorum/ facta moresque posteris tradere antiquitus usitatum, ne nostris quidem/ temporibus, quamquam uniuersa suorum etas obmisit. <sup>1</sup> Qui liber continet .xiiij./ folia. Item in eodem codice:—	30
Repertus.	Dialogus De oratoribus qui incipit sic. Sepe ex me requiris iuste fabi, cur/ cum priora secula tot eminentium oratorum ingeniis, <sup>2</sup> gloria, floruerint:/ nostra potissimum etas deserta & laude eloquentiae orbata: qui liber con-/tinet xviiij. folia. Item in eodem codice continetur liber—	35
Repertus.	Suetonii Tranquilli De grammaticis & rhetoribus, qui incipit sic./ Grammatica romae ne in usu quidem olim nedum in honore ullo &c./ Continet hic liber folia vij.	40
Reperti.	Ammiani Marcellini rerum gestarum libri xviiij. Qui peruenerunt usque ad obi/tum Valentis imperatoris: qui est finis hystoriae.	
Repertus.	IN Monasterio suldulensi continentur infrascripti libri. Hyginus de astrologia, qui incipit sic: Hyginus de Astrologia <sup>3</sup> .M. Fabio/ .pl. Sal. Dicit. Etsi te studio grammaticae artis inductum &c.	45
Repertus.	Iulius Frontinus celso de agrorum qualitate: qui liber est multis figuris/ pictus. Incipit sic: Notum est omnibus celse praeneste studiorum nostrorum/ manere summam &c.	50
Repertum.	Saeculi Fracci de conditionibus agrorum, opus etiam figuris pictum.	
Repertus.	Aepitii de compositis libri octo, opus medicinale et optimum.	55
	Marcellus vir illustris ex magno officio theodosii, <sup>4</sup> seu filiis suis Sal. D./ Incipit sic. Secutus opera studiosorum virorum: qui licet alieni fuerint/ ab institutione medicinae, opus egregium:—	
Reperti.	Septimi Tertulliani carthaginensis presbyteri aduersus Marcionem hereticum/ libri duo in uersibus:—	60
Repertum.	Eiusdem Tertulliani apologeticum, preclarum opus	
Repertus.	Eiusdem Tertulliani aduersus mdacos liber magnus ut boetius de consolatione.	

<sup>1</sup> b is expunctuated.<sup>2</sup> The letters *ii* are added above the line.<sup>3</sup> The words *de Astrologia* are expunctuated.<sup>4</sup> s is expunctuated and *z* written above.

	.M. Tullii Ciceronis uolumen epistolarum ad acticum, quod incipit: Cum haec scri/bebam res existimatur &c. finit: Cicero captoni.	65
Reperta.	Ars Probi eruditissimi grammatici, grande opus.	
Reperta.	Ars Aspri peritissimi grammatici De octo partibus ora- tionis.	70
	Secunda editio eiusdem Donati Vrbis romae.	
Repertus.	Phocas grammaticus De arte metrica liber.	
Repertum.	Prisciani grammatici opus in uersibus quod dicitur perigesis, hoc est descriptio or-/bis terrae:—	
	In ecclesia cathedrali colonie sunt due bibliothecae, quarum poggius noster uidit/ illam quae est uulgatior, in qua repperit quosdam Ciceronis orationes: aliam uero/ quae est penitus recondita uidere non potuit propter absentiam custodis illius: De/ hac ipsa audiuit multa miranda:—	75
	Summa ergo uigilantia perscrutanda sunt antiquissima monasteria, & ecclesiae/ cathedrales: in quibus iacent in sterquilino <sup>1</sup> infinita uolumina, suis possessoribus/ ignota & inuisa:—	80
	De opusculis Ciceronis, quibus caremus, quae in meam notitiam uene-/runt haec sunt	85
	De re .p. libri .vj.	
	Dialogus ortensii <sup>2</sup>	
	De gloria libri .ij.	
	De consolatione filie.	90
Pars extat.	De achademicis libri quatuor. Cicero in pronosticis.	

## ORATIONES.

Reperta.	Pro .M. Scauro.	
Reperta.	Pro eodem Scauro, secunda.	95
Reperta.	Pro uareno.	
Reperta.	Pro fundanio <sup>3</sup>	
Reperta.	Pro .M. Tullio Cicero in orthographia.	
Repertus.	Cicero de imperio .GN. Pompeii libro .V. Cicero contra metellum. Cicero ad pansam in primo De antiocho Cicero in libro quem de consiliis suis scripsit.	100

<sup>1</sup> Changed into *sterquilinio*.<sup>2</sup> Corrected to *hortensii*.<sup>3</sup> *i* expunctuated.

(.Oratio in- uenitur:)	Pro Cornelio libro iiii°.	
	Cicero in egia.	105
	Cicero in pompeiana	
	Cicero in contione Metelli	
	Cicero pro gallo	
Reper.	Cicero pro .L. Fonteio.	
	Translationes quas fecit ex libris grecis	110
	Translatio Protagorae Platonis.	
	Translatio Timei Platonis	
	Translatio phoenomanae arati	
	Translatio economici Xenophontis.	
Prologus in- uenitur	Translatio duarum pulcherrimarum orationum Eschinis et Demosthenis, sed/ adinuicem fulminantium.	115
	Ciceronis uolumina epistolarum, quibus caremus hec sunt.	
	Ad Cesarem dictatorem, uolumina.	
	Ad Cesarem iuniorem uolumina.	
	Ad filium suum uolumina.	120
	Ad Cornelium nepotem uolumina.	
	Ad matium uolumina.	
	Ad Cornelium Balbum uolumina.	
	Ad .A. hircium uolumina.	
	Ad .C. oppidum uolumina.	125
	Ad Pansam uolumina.	
	In quodam Monasterio dacie ex ordine cistersiensium sunt, ut multi af/firment .x. decados .T. liuii in quinque codicibus uetustissimis ex litte-/ris longobardis:—	
	Curandum est summa uigilantia: ut illa preclara uolumina in lucem pro-/deant, relinquantque illam imperitam <sup>1</sup> incultam barbariem. Excitanda/ sunt ab inferis .M.	130
	Varronis clarissima opera:—Item:—	
	Hystoriae Cornelii nepotis	
	Hystoriae festenellanae.	135
	Hystoriae Plinii Secundi de gestis germaniae libri .x. & romanarum rerum libri xxx. Item.	
extat non/ integre.	Hystoriae Cornelii taciti libri xxx. Praeterea:—	
Reperitur in medicina <sup>2</sup>	Cornelii Celsi preclara opera, & de agricultura, et in rhetorica, & de re/ militari, & in medicina, & pene in omni genere litteraturae.	140
	Catonis Censorii de originibus & innumerabiles alii, quos si prosequi ue-/lim, multis uoluminibus opus est:—	

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<sup>1</sup> Corrected from *imperitam*.<sup>2</sup> In right margin of manuscript.

## CAESAR AND THE AMBRONES

(Suetonius *Iulius* ix. 3)

BY MONROE E. DEUTSCH

In connection with the *superior coniuratio* of 66-65 B.C., Suetonius gives us on the authority of the elder Curio and Marcus Actorius Naso certain details of the plots made by Gnaeus Piso and Caesar. Suetonius' account (*Iulius* ix. 3) closes as follows: *pactumque ut simul foris ille* (i.e. Piso), *ipse* (i.e. Caesar) *Romae ad res novas consurgerent, per †Ambranos et Transpadanos; destitutum utriusque consilium morte Pisonis.*<sup>1</sup>

The tribes from which aid was expected in this revolution were the people beyond the Po and the *Ambrani*.<sup>2</sup> Scholars have struggled with the latter name for centuries. If the manuscripts have preserved the correct spelling, all we can say is that we have here a tribe mentioned, as far as we know, nowhere else in classical literature, and the connection of which with Caesar or Piso or both is, of course, equally unknown. If we are content with this, the problem is solved.

But scholars have not been content, and as a result a long list of conjectures for *Ambranos* has seen the light of day. Among these are the following:

*Lambranos* *Sabellicus* (the vulgate reading)<sup>3</sup>  
*Ambrones* *Ed. Bonon.* 1488, *Beroaldus*  
*Ambronas* *Oudendorp*  
*Ambarros* *Urlichs*  
*Arvernos* *Mommsen*  
*Campanos* *Madvig*  
*Umbros* *Burmman*

<sup>1</sup> Text of Ihm.

<sup>2</sup> *Ambranos* appears in all important MSS; certain MSS, referred to by Torentius and Oudendorp, read *Ambrones*.

<sup>3</sup> All editions up to and including the year 1802 to which I have had access read *Lambranos*, save that Oudendorp (1751) has in his text *Ambranos*, though he strongly advocates the reading *Ambronas*; *Ambranos* is also found in Roth, Preud'homme, and Rolfe. Ihm in both editions daggars *Ambranos*. Baumgarten-Crusius (followed by the Delphin classics and the *Bibliotheca Classica*) and Bremi read *Ambronas*. Other readings mentioned as appearing in early editions are *Umbranos* and *Lubranos*. For discussions of the passage see: Halbertsmae *Adversaria Critica*, p. 168; Madvig, *Adversaria Critica*, II, 571; Mommsen, *Römische Geschichte*, III<sup>F</sup>, 179; L. Urlichs, *Zu Suetonius Iul. 9 in Eos*, II (1866), 181; F. A. Wolf, *Kleine Schriften*, I, 112.



The main argument (in some instances, the only argument) for most of these proposals is the fact that they are easy paleographically. *Lambranos*, for example, does not exist as the name of a tribe, but is manufactured from the name of the river Lambrus.

The simplest suggestion is that of Beroaldus, *Ambrones*, or, better still, the other form *Ambronas*.<sup>1</sup> Paleographically it is excellent; the *a* and the *o* are merely interchanged, and the change is the easier through the influence of the ending *-anos* in *Transpadanos*.

Who then were the Ambrones?<sup>2</sup> They were a tribe whose previous abode is unknown, which participated in the southern expedition of the Cimbri and the Teutons, and in alliance with them fought against the Romans. They defeated Manlius and Caepio in 105 B.C., but were overwhelmingly defeated in their turn by Marius at Aquae Sextiae three years later. The sources are: Livy *Epitome* 68; Strabo iv. 183; Festus ep. 17; Vegetius *de re Militari* iii. 10; Orosius v. 16; Plutarch *Marius* 15, 19, and 20; Dio xlv. 42 and l. 24; Eutropius v. 1.<sup>3</sup>

All the sources quoted agree in joining them with the Cimbri or Teutons or both in the warfare against the Romans; their defeat and destruction are clearly set forth. Who, then, would these Ambrones in the passage in Suetonius be, and why should they be linked with Caesar in this conspiracy? In answer Oudendorp says: "vix ullum mihi est dubium, quin transpositis modo litteris legi debeat *Ambronas*, reliquias latrocinantium Gallorum, quos Marius delevit." To be sure, there may have been *reliquiae* of this tribe in Caesar's day; we recall, however, that the defeat at Aquae Sextiae was a crushing one, and the loss of life was heavy. Indeed, nowhere are any *reliquiae* mentioned.

Paleographically, the substitution of *Ambronas* is admirable, but the difficulty lies, first, in finding any tribe of this name in existence after the battle of Aquae Sextiae and, second, in seeing a connection between it and Caesar.

<sup>1</sup> *Ambronas* is the form of the accusative in the only Latin passage where the accusative is used, Orosius v. 16. 1; it is interesting to note that, in this passage in Orosius, MS D, has *ambranus* for *Ambronas*.

<sup>2</sup> The *o* is long in Plutarch *Marius* 15 (*bis*), 19 (*ter*), and 20 (*bis*), and in Strabo iv. 183; it is short in Dio xlv. 42. 4 and l. 24. 4.

<sup>3</sup> Pauly-Wissowa, I (1894), 1808.

The solution is to be found, I believe, in Plutarch *Marius* 19. There we are told that at the opening of the battle of Aquae Sextiae the Ambrones, more than thirty thousand in number and the most warlike part of the army opposing the Romans, advanced to the fray, shouting often in unison "Ambrones," the name of their tribe, either in order to give one another encouragement or to frighten the enemy. The first of the Roman army to go against them were the Ligurians, and when they understood what it was the Ambrones were shouting, ἀντεφώνουν καὶ αὐτοὶ τὴν πατριὸν ἐπικλησιν αὐτῶν εἶναι· σφᾶς γὰρ αὐτοὺς οὕτως κατὰ γένος ὀνομάζουσι Λίγυες. And again and again the combatants on each side, Plutarch tells us, shouted back the name "Ambrones" at their antagonists.

In other words, the name Ambrones was used not only by the allies of the Cimbri and the Teutons, who were destroyed by Marius, but was also used by the Ligurians, the allies of Marius in this sweeping victory, and it is of the latter that I believe Suetonius is speaking. We do not need to have recourse to hypothetical *reliquiae*, for these Ambrones were the victors, and we are speaking of a time a little less than forty years after this victory.

The question, whether the statement concerning the relationship of the Ligurians and the Ambrones is true, does not concern us. It was apparently a tradition accepted by the Ligurians, and it therefore affected them precisely as if it were true.

Why, it will be asked, should these Ligurians have been ready to unite with Caesar in this plot? Because Caesar was by marriage Marius' nephew<sup>1</sup> and assumed the rôle of his "political heir."<sup>2</sup> It would then be highly natural for them to link themselves most closely with the kinsman and successor of their victorious leader of forty years before.

It was, indeed, during these very years that Caesar was stressing his relationship to Marius.<sup>3</sup> During his quaestorship (68 or 67 B.C.),

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch *Caesar* 1; Dio xliii. 4. 2; *Bell. Afr.* 32. 3. Velleius Paterculus ii. 41. 2 speaks of Caesar as *C. Mario sanguine coniunctissimus*, and Nicolaus of Damascus (14) says: προσήπτετο γὰρ τὸ γένος τὸ Καίσαρός τε καὶ τὸ Μαρίου. . . .

<sup>2</sup> Sihler, *Annals of Caesar*, p. 62; cf. Plut. *Caes.* 6: ταύτην (i.e. the Marian party) ἀναρρῶσαι καὶ προσαγαγέσθαι βουλόμενος ("wishing to revive it and attach it to himself"). Note also Plutarch *Marius* 6.

<sup>3</sup> We remember that Caesar's start in public life was given him by Marius and Cinna in 86 B.C. when through their influence Caesar was chosen as *flamen dialis* (Vell. Pat. ii. 43; Suet. *Iul.* 1).

it will be recalled, he delivered the funeral oration of his aunt, Marius' widow,<sup>1</sup> and *περὶ τὴν ἐκφορὰν ἐτόλμησεν εἰκόνας Μαρίου προθέσθαι, τότε πρῶτον ὀφθείσας μετὰ τὴν ἐπὶ Σύλλα πολιτείαν. . . .*<sup>2</sup> During his aedileship (65 B.C.) *tropaea Gai Mari de Iugurtha deque Cimbris atque Teutonis olim a Sulla disiecta restituit*;<sup>3</sup> Plutarch tells us that many shed tears of joy at the sight, *καὶ μέγας ἦν ὁ Καῖσαρ ἐγκωμίοις αἰρόμενος, ὥς ἀντὶ πάντων ἄξιος [εἶη ὁ] ἀνὴρ τῆς Μαρίου συγγενείας.*<sup>4</sup>

What more natural than that, at the very time when Caesar was stressing his position as Marius' relative and successor, a people which had fought successfully with Marius in one of his greatest battles should feel enthusiasm for Caesar and be ready to follow him in his plots? What, moreover, more natural than that they should be spoken of by the name which recalled the victory and the tie with Marius?

*Ambronas* is therefore, in my opinion, the correct reading; it refers, however, not to the tribe allied with the Cimbri and Teutons, but to the Ligurians who fought with Marius in that great battle.

Oudendorp, Baumgarten-Crusius, and Mommsen in their discussions of the passage mention, in passing, the fact that the name *Ambrones* was also used by the Ligurians, but none of them pauses to consider whether it may not be this people that Suetonius refers to in telling of the plans of the conspirators.

The reading *Ambronas* is not only an easy one paleographically, but gives us the clue to the tie which linked these Ligurians to Caesar.

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<sup>1</sup> Suet. *Iul.* vi. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Plut. *Caes.* 5.

<sup>3</sup> Suet. *Iul.* xi. See also Plut. *Caes.* 6 and Vell. Pat. ii. 43. 4.

<sup>4</sup> Plut. *Caes.* 6.

## STUDIES IN GREEK NOUN-FORMATION

Based in part upon material collected by the late A. W. Stratton<sup>1</sup>

### DENTAL TERMINATIONS II. 2

#### WORDS IN -ων, -οντος<sup>2</sup>

BY CARL D. BUCK

The words in -ων, -οντος are nearly all of participial formation, but isolated from the verb-system in form or use or both; a few are the result of transfer from *ν*-stems. They comprise a number of simple nouns and adjectives, a group of adjective compounds with participial form as second member, and numerous proper names.

1. *Simple nouns and adjectives*.—The oldest of these, in point of isolation from the verb is ὀδούς, which represents a form that is in origin a participle of *ed*- 'eat,' but had already become an ordinary noun 'tooth' in the parent-speech. (cf. Skt. *dant*-, Lat *dēns*, Goth. *tunþus*, etc.). The nominative ὀδούς, parallel to διδούς from \*διδόντς, preserves the normal IE. nominative formation for stems in -*ont*-, while all the other words to be mentioned accord with the usual Greek inflection of thematic participles with nominative in -ων (probably a Greek innovation due to the influence of *ν*-stems). The latter occurs in the Ionic form ὀδών (Hdt., Hippoc.), and in the compounds χαυλιόδων, etc.,<sup>3</sup> which as adjectives, though often

<sup>1</sup> See Introductory Note, CP. 5. 323 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Exclusive of ordinary participles belonging to the regular verb-system. Included are also ὀδοίς, ὀδόντος, words with gen. -ωντος, and feminines in -ουσα.

<sup>3</sup> The modern lexicons and grammars give -όδους as the normal form of compounds, -όδων as the exceptional. The discussion in Lobeck, *Paralip.* 248, so commonly cited, gives no adequate picture of the facts. A recent comment on ἀργιόδων, Ap. Rh. 2. 820, states that "ἀργιόδους is the Hom. form." But as a matter of fact the two Homeric compounds of this kind, ἀργιόδοντ- and καρχαρόδοντ-, occur only in the oblique cases; likewise τριόδοντ- in Pindar, μονόδοντ- in Aeschylus. The earliest quotable nominative singular form is χαυλιόδων Hes. Sh. 387 (also in Hdn. 2. 730. 16), and the next is κυνόδων Epich. 29 Kaibel. Eight of these compounds occur frequently in Aristotle, but the only nominative singular forms are συνόδων H.A. 591b 5, 9; 598a 10 (with variants συνόδων, συνώδων), and καρχαρόδων H.A. 501a 22 (so to be read, with C<sup>9</sup>). From later times we have καρχαρόδων Theocr. 24. 85, ἀργιόδων Ap. Rh. 2. 820, ἐριόδων Hesych., ἀμφόδων and κρατερόδων Hdn. 2. 730. 15, and the significant

used substantively, were more especially influenced by the participles.

γέρων agrees precisely with Skt. *jarant-* 'decayed, infirm, old, an old man' (cf. also Avest. *zaurvan-* 'old age'), which is in origin a participle of *jar-* 'waste away,' but shows the specialized meaning already in the Veda, where *jarant-* is contrasted with *yuvan-* 'young.' ἐκών is in origin a participle of the root seen in Skt. *vac-* 'be eager, will.' Hom. ἀκέων, used like the adverb ἀκῆν 'softly, silently,' and sometimes indeclinably with feminine or plural subject, is formed to ἀκῆν after the analogy of participles, as if from a verb ἀκέω (ἀκέως in Ap. Rh. 1. 175 is only an artificial back-formation from Hom. ἀκέων). Similarly Hom. ἐγρηγορόων to ἐγρήγορα, as if from a present in -άω.

Original *ν*-stems, with transfer to *ντ*-declension are: λέων (cf. fem. λέαινα), ἄκων 'javelin' (cf. ἄκαινα 'thorn'), θεραπείων (cf. θεραπείαινα), and δράκων (cf. δράκαινα). κρέων, Hom. κρείων, would be a further example, if taken as an original comparative = Skt. *creyas-* 'fairer, better, distinguished.' But against this see Osthoff, *Morph. Unt.* 6. 94, who assumes rather a participle of the same root, namely

statement of Eustathius, 854. 13 ff., who, after mentioning ὁδοί, proceeds: εὐρηται δὲ καὶ ὁδών, ἐξ οὗ καὶ προόδων . . . , καὶ ὁ χαυλιόδων καὶ ἀμφόδων καὶ ὁ χαλκόδων καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. Over against this evidence for -ων, we have τριόδους Ath. 454d, μυριόδους Anth. P. 9. 285. 2, Monodus Festus 135, σινόδους Hesych., μεγαλόδους E.M., προόδους Poll. 2. 96 (where Bethe now reads προόδων); further μονόδους, κυνόδους, etc. Ps. Hdn. Epim. 208, under the canon that such compounds end in -όδους or -ώδων. This canon of unknown authorship, unsupported by any other grammarian, and obviously false in its elimination of -όδων, has been handed down to modern times. The facts show clearly enough that -όδους is only a late form due to the influence of the simplex. This led further to nom. -acc. neut. -όδουν beside the normal -όδον, the former a frequent MS variant in Aristot. H.A., but one to be rejected. Cf. also Solmsen, *Beitr. zur griech. Wortforschung* 30.

As regards forms in -ώδωντ-, the most certain is ἀμφώδωντ-, frequent in Aristot. H.A. with consensus of MSS, while these vary between τριώδωντ- and τετρώδωντ-, and similarly for other compounds. Cf. also ἀμφώδων, κρατερώδων Hdn. 2. 730. 15, ἱριώδων, χαλκώδωντ Hesych., πρῶδων Bekker Anec. 58. Apart from ἀμφώδων, which on account of ἄμφω is a special case, these are less usual and later than forms in -όδων. While they are examples of the well-known lengthening in composition (Wackernagel, *Dehnungsgesetz der griech. Composita*), they are not on a par with the compounds that show early and uniform lengthening, like those of δνυξ or δογμα (always -ώνυξ, -ώνυμος from Homer on). They belong rather to the later stratum of imitative lengthening, which is also recognized by Wackernagel, *op. cit.* 54. Wackernagel, it is true, finds evidence of early lengthening in Χαλκώδων, whence Hom. Χαλκώδορτιάδης. But the derivation of this name from ὁδοί is far from obvious semantically, still less so that of the river name Θερμώδων.

\**κρεῖ-ουτ-*, whence *κρέων*, while Hom. *κρείων* would be a case of metrical lengthening like *πνείων*, etc.

Hom. *μεδών* 'ruler' is isolated in form as well as in use, likewise Hom. *μέδων* inasmuch as only the middle *μέδομαι* is in use in Homer. So also *τένων* 'tendon,' from a simple thematic \**τένω*, not the actual *τείνω*. *κελέοντες* 'beams of the loom' is of uncertain origin, but perhaps 'risers,' from the root seen in Lith. *kelti* 'raise' and the derivatives *κολωνός*, Lat. *collis*, etc. *κνώδων* 'edge of the sword,' though called a compound by the ancient grammarians and no doubt popularly associated with *ἀμφώδων*, etc., is from a \**κνώδω* 'scratch, bite,' cf. *κνώδαλος* and *κναδάλλεται· κνήθεται* Hesych.

Various other words are in form normal participles of existing Greek verbs, and are isolated only by their specialized use, as *αἴθουσα* (*αἴθω*), *ἄγχουσα*, *ἔγχουσα* name of a plant (*ἄγχω*, but the application is not apparent), *ἐπισείων* 'streamer of a ship' (*ἐπισείω*), *πρέπων* name of a fish (*πρέπω* 'be conspicuous'?), *ἄρχων* (*ἄρχω*), *ὀρίζων* (*ὀρίζω*). There is of course no clear line between the last-mentioned words and many other participles which may be used substantively in special senses, e.g. *ὑποτείνουσα* 'hypotenuse,' *τέκοντες* 'parents,' etc. But I have included in the word-list only the most conspicuous cases, such as are generally given a separate place in the lexicons.

2. *Compounds like δολοφρονέων*.—Compounds in which the second element is an active participle represent a type that is not common in the earlier stages of the Indo-European languages and is probably not inherited from the parent-speech. In Sanskrit, compounds are formed freely from the passive participle in *-ta-*, but "other participles only seldom occur as finals of compounds" (Whitney, *Skt. Gram.*, § 1273d). The R̥gveda has some examples with adverbial first element, as *su-vidvāṇs-* 'knowing,' while those with a noun as first element, like *brahma-vidvāṇs-* 'Brahman-knowing,' *divi-spr̥ṣant-* 'touching the sky,' occur later, and become frequent in the epic. Cf. Wackernagel, *Altind. Gram.* 2, 193 ff., Delbrück, *Altind. Syntax* 76. In Latin, *frugiferens* (Lucr.) beside usual *frugifer*, *arqui-tenens* (Naev., Acc.), *suavi-loquens*, *signi-tenens* (Enn.), and others (cf. Stolz, *Hist. Gram.* 423, Grenier, *Étude sur la formation des composés nominaux dans le latin archaïque*, 133 ff.) are poetical formations. In most of the Germanic languages the type is rare



in the early period. It is virtually unknown in Gothic, for *bloparinnandei* is a direct transfer of *αἰμο-ροῦσα*, and in the often cited *garda-waldands* 'οἰκοδεσπότης' the second element is a substantivized participle like *gibands* 'δότης' (not 'διδούς') and others that are distinguished from the true participles by their strong inflection. It is only occasionally found in Old Norse, Old High German, and Old Saxon. But it is very common in Old English poetry, e.g. *helm-berend* 'helmeted,' *rond-hæbbend* 'shield-bearer,' *sæ-līpēnd* 'sea-farer,' etc. (cf. Grimm, *Deutsche Gram.* 2. 580 ff.); and it has now become commonplace in German (*heil-bringend*, *hals-brechend*, etc.), as in English (*fruit-bearing*, *blood-curdling*, etc.). In general, then, we have to do with a secondary type, in which the participle has replaced the agent-noun of the inherited type. At first there was some difference in feeling, the participle indicating action or condition at a particular time rather than a general characteristic. But this distinction was not maintained. Cf. Jacobi, *Compositum und Nebensatz* 22 ff., Delbrück, *Vergl. Syntax* 3. 156 ff.<sup>1</sup>

In Greek this type was never widely productive, and, apart from proper names, is virtually confined to poetry. But it is one that should be recognized, however doubtful we may be in individual cases.<sup>1</sup> The more probable Homeric examples are: *καρηκομῶντες*

<sup>1</sup> Both Jacobi and Delbrück in their discussion of the type are reluctant to recognize its existence in Greek. Jacobi says: "Ausser *καρη-κομῶντες*, einer Zusammenrückung, und *νοῦν-εχόντως*, offenbar zu älterem *νοῦν-εχής* gebildet, finden wir nur part. der Denom. von *καρποφόρος*, *ποντοπόρος*, etc. Erst im Lateinischen und Deutschen werden Comp. mit dem Part. praes. häufiger." Delbrück disposes of *δολοφρονέων* as the participle of a denominative from *δόλοφρων*, and mentions *κάρη κομῶντες*, *δάκρυ χέων*, as written by Nauck, under "Participia in unechter Komposition." But the so-called "unechte Komposition" may be just as genuine, only of a less primitive type than that of the stem compounds, and it is well that Brugmann in the *Grundriß* has dropped the term. There is of course the important practical difference from stem compounds that the compounds which rest upon fixed juxtaposition are not so readily distinguishable from phrases not yet fully unified. Hence the disagreement, among both ancient and modern commentators and in the manuscripts, as to *καρηκομῶντες* vs. *κάρη κομῶντες*. But, while there is definite reason to prefer *δάκρυ χέων*, since we find also *δάκρυα χέων*, *κατὰ δάκρυ χέουσα*, there is every probability that the fixed *καρηκομῶντες* and several others were actually felt as compounds and should be so written (as they are in Ludwig's text). In the case of *δολοφρονέων*, etc. the ambiguity is a different one, but composition with *-φρονέων* is on the whole more probable than derivation from *-φρων* (in which case, however, they would not necessarily imply actual derivative verbs, but would belong under 3, below), unless one rejects on principle this type of composition in Greek. Whereas, there is ample corroborative evidence for it in the numerous proper names in *-φών* and others to be discussed below.

Stolz, *Wien. Stud.* 25. 236 ff., defends the recognition of this type of Homeric compounds and especially the analysis *εὐ-φρονέων*, *δολο-φρονέων*, etc. But he goes too far in including, as if containing actual participles, *ὀλιγοφρονέων*, *ὀλιγοφρονέων*, which are to be understood quite otherwise. See under 3, below.

(whence *εὐκομόντα* Q. Sm.), *πασιμέλουσα*, *λιγυπνέων*, *εὐρυρέων*, *ἀνάων*, *ἐναιετάων*, and *ἀ-, ἄλλο-, εὐ-, δολο-, χαλι-φρονέων*. From later poets: *πυριφλέγων* Eur. (cf. *Πυριφλεγέθων* Hom.), *πυρπνέων* Eur., *ἀειζώνων* Callim., *ἔκτυπών* Q. Sm., *ὑψιθέων* Anth. P., *τρωγλοδύων* Batr. Further, despite the substantive use of *κρείων* and *μέδων*, their compounds belong here in feeling, as *εὐρυκρείων* Hom., *θεμισκρέων* Pind., *ἀλικρέων* Eust., *ὑψιμέδων* Hes., *ἀλιμέδων* Aristoph., etc. The late *βαθυρρείων* Ap. Rh., *ἔρρειων* Christod. are artificial substitutes for *βαθύρροος*, *ἔρρης* under the influence of Hom. *-κρείων*, *-πνέων*. Plutarch has *δυσανιδῶν* (*ἀνιδῶν*).

3. *Compounds (apparent) like δυσμενέων*.—These represent a quite different type from the preceding. They are neither compounds of actual participles nor participles of existing derivatives of compounds. They are formed from, and as convenient variants of, adjective compounds, without the intervention of derivative verbs, but directly, after the analogy of participles which do belong to actual derivative verbs. They are nearly all Homeric words, with a few imitations in later writers. Thus (Homeric, unless otherwise noted): *δυσμενέων*, *ὑπερμενέων* beside *δυσμενής*, *ὑπερμενής*, *θυμηγερέων* beside *θυμηγερής*, *περισθενέων* = *περισθενής* (so *ὀλιγοσθενέων* Bacch. 5. 152), *ὑπερηγορέων* (also Aristoph.; *ἀγνηγορέων* Nonn.) = *ὑπερήνωρ*, *ὑπερηφανέων* (finite forms in later writers) = *ὑπερήφανος*, *ὀλιγοδρανέων* = *ὀλιγοδρανής*, *ὀλιγηπελέων* (whence *κακηπελέων* Nic.) = \**ὀλιγοπελής* or \**ὀλιγήπελος*,<sup>1</sup> *θεοπροπέων* (also Pind.) = adj. *θεοπρόπος*, *οἰνοβαρείων* (whence *οἰνοβαρέω* Theogn.) = *οἰνοβαρής*.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *ἀμηπελιγ' ἀσθένεια* Hesych., *νηπελιέω* 'be powerless' Hippoc. Formed with composition lengthening from an \**ἄπελος*, cognate with ON. *afl* 'strength.' Prellwitz, *BzB.* 24. 291, Brugmann, *Grd.* 2. 1. 363.

<sup>2</sup> A few of the adjective compounds compared are not quotable from Homer, namely (apart from *ὑπερήνωρ*, which occurs as a proper name, and the assumed \**ὀλιγήπελος* *περισθενής* (Pind.), *ὑπερήφανος* (Hes.), *ὀλιγοδρανής* (Aristoph.). But this does not prove that they are later formations, and I cannot agree with the position of Stolz, *Wien. Stud.* 25. 237, who asserts that, for example, *ὀλιγοδρανής* is an abstraction from Hom. *ὀλιγοδρανέων*.

There are other participial forms in Homer for which finite forms are lacking in Homer but common enough elsewhere, e.g., *πυρπολέων*. It is possible that some of these also belong here, the finite forms being actually of later origin and not accidentally lacking in Homer. But I have included only those in which the isolation or priority of the participle is beyond doubt.

Like the preceding, only formed after the analogy of participles of verbs in -άω, are Hom. παμφανών, ἀκροκελαυνίω, ἀματροχών. Cf. ἐγρηγορόν, above, p. 261.

4. *Personal names.*—The chief contingents are furnished by the compounds in -μέδων, -λέων, -κρέων, and -φών. The thirty-odd in -μέδων (or -μέδουσα) comprise both legendary and historical names. Of the latter, some are popular names, as Λαο-, Ἴππο-, Κλέο-, Διο-μέδων, but the majority are of infrequent occurrence. A few are applied to foreigners, as Θηρομέδων a Scythian, Ὀρομέδων a Cilician, or are isolated poetical creations, as Ναυμέδων (Lyc.), Ὀδρομέδουσα (Batan.).

Those in -λέων include some fifteen historical Greek names (a few of these also legendary), further the comic Ἐρεβινθολέων (Alciphron), and the semi-Greek name of the Paeonian king Αὐδωλέων (so *IG.* 2. 312, 313, and on coins), which appears as Αὐτολέων in Plutarch. Ἐπιλέων, only *Schol.* Ap. Rh. 1. 156, is regarded as an error for Ἐπίλαος, though in type it is unobjectionable (cf. Ἀντιλέων). Λυκολέων *Aristot. Rhet.* 3. 10, doubted by Pape, is confirmed by *IG.* 5. 2. 274. 23.

There are some twenty-five names in -κρέων, all but three (Δεξι-, Πρωτο-, Ὑψι-) historical. These occur in the Aegean islands and Asia Minor (also Abdera, Byzantium), but rarely, if at all, in continental Greece. The regular form is -κρέων. The Homeric -κρείων occurs in Πολυκρείων *IG.* 12. 5. 571. 8, if the reading is correct (see editor's note). The contracted -κρῶν is rare and late. Apart from Δεξικρῶν, Ἐρμοκρῶν *Hdn.* 2. 735. 28, it is attested in late Rhodian, as Ἐρμοκρῶν<sup>1</sup> *IG.* 12. 1. 46. 219; 107. 20, *IG.* 12. 3. 50 (Telos, where the dialect was Rhodian), Ἀγησικρῶν *IG.* 12. 1. 632, Ἀστυκρῶν *IG.* 11. 714 (also a Rhodian), all with gen. -ωντος by analogy of the nominative and of -φών, -φώντος. For the curious nominatives Ἐρμοκρην, Τιμοκρην *IG.* 12. 3. 34. 25–28, cf. *SGDI.* 3488 note. Rhod. Ἐρμακρέων

<sup>1</sup> Bechtel, *SGDI.* 3488, asserts that -κρων is shortened from -κράτης and has nothing to do with -κρέων; likewise in his *Hist. Personennamen*, p. 164, he gives Ἐρμόκρων (*sic*) "ohne erkennbare Beziehung." But there is no sufficient reason to doubt the identity of the Rhodian name with the Ἐρμοκρῶν attested by Herodian. Bechtel is probably right, however, in regard to Καλλικρῶν in a fourth-century Boeotian inscription, *IG.* 7. 3206 (nom. only; ed. -κρῶν), for here -κρέων could only appear as -κρίων, and furthermore names in -κρέων are unknown in Boeotian.

(Cic. *Inv.* 1. 30) = usual 'Ερμοκρέων is parallel to 'Ερμακράτης, Τιμακράτης, etc. (CP. 13. 82).

There are over seventy names in -φῶν (-φάων, -φῶων), all historical (Δημο-, Λαο- also legendary), a popular type in all parts of Greece. They are formed with the participle of φά(φ)ω, related to φα(φ)ος and directly attested in φάε Hom. *Od.* 14. 502. A form with the *f* was seen by Priscian on an ancient tripod at Constantinople (*Gram. Lat.* 1. 17. 15, 1. 254. 2), namely ΔΗΜΟΦΑΦΟΝ or ΔΑΜΟΦΑΦΟΝ. The uncontracted -φάων is seen in Δεῖμοφάων Kretschmer, *Gr. Vaseninschr.* 142, Λαφάων Iambl. *v. Pyth.* 267, and is the regular Boeotian form, e.g. Καλλιφάων IG. 7. 1888c, 2787, Καφισσάων *ibid.* 585, Εύρυφάων *ibid.* 21. 3173, Εύρουφάοντα *ibid.* 4177, Δαμοφάοντος *ibid.* 1744, 2115, 2446. The form with epic distraction, -φῶων, -φῶωντος (like Hom. ὀρόων, ὀρόωντος) is seen in Δημοφῶων *h. Hom.* 4. 234, 249, Q. Sm. 12. 325, Callim. ap. Hdn. 2. 311. 31, Λαοφῶωντι Q. Sm. 6. 549, Ξενοφῶων Timon ap. Diog. L. 2. 6. 10, Χαιρεφῶων Matro. ap. Ath. 134e. Otherwise we find only the contracted -φῶν, the normal prose form except in Boeotian.

Corresponding feminine forms are rare: 'Αριστοφῶσα IG. 2. 3503, Κλειφῶσσα in an inscription of Melos, *Hermes* 43. 175, 'Ιοφῶσσα Pherec. ap. Hesych., *Schol. Ap. Rh.* 2. 1123. The form to be expected is of course -φῶσα, like τιμῶσα. For Κλειφῶσσα Bechtel, *loc. cit.*, compares Elean ἀνταποδιδῶσσα. But such doubling of intervocalic σ is extremely rare, and since 'Ιοφῶσσα is also the traditional reading (though corrected by Lobeck, *Path.* 41), there is probably something else involved, namely the influence of the feminines in or from -εσσα. Cf. the contracted place-names Τιλφῶσσα, Κηλῶσσα, Σκοτοῦσσα, etc. in which σσ is the proper spelling but interchanges with σ—and also the following.

An older type of feminine to -φάων appears in the legendary Εύρυφάεσσα, Πασιφάεσσα, Τηλεφάεσσα. These are from an unthematic participial form -φάασσα like 'Επίασσα = 'Επιούσα, with -ασσα replaced by -εσσα after the analogy of the type χαρίεσσα. Cf. Ehrlich, *KZ.* 39. 563.

The troublesome Εύρυπῶν is explained by Bechtel, *Hermes* 51. 308, as a corruption of Εύρυφῶν which is the reading of Hdt. 8. 131. Βελλεροφῶν, Theocr. 15. 92, is mentioned here only because this

shortened form of *Βελλεροφόντης* was perhaps induced, certainly its accent as given, by the frequency of the names in *-φών*.

There are five legendary names in *-κών*, namely *Δηι-*, *Δημο-*, *Εὔρυ-*, *Ἰππο-*, *Λαο-κών* (cf. *ΛΑΦΟΚΟΦΟΝ* Priscian *Gram. Lat.* 1. 17. 15).<sup>1</sup> Two of these occur also as historical names, namely Boeot. *Λακῶν* *BCH.* 25. 360. 20, *Λακῶν* *IG.* 7. 585. 11 (ed. *Λάκων*), Chian *Λεωκῶν*, *Ἀθηνᾶ* 20. 216, and from Olbia *Δημοκῶν* *Ditt. Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 495. 19.<sup>2</sup> (Contracted forms, *Ἰπποκῶν*, etc., also given in *Hdn.* 2. 629. 4; 915. 10. 15.) Cf. also the related *ἀμνοκῶν* *Aristoph. Eq.* 264, and *εὔρυκῶσα* *Euphor.* in *Et. M.*, *Hesych.* These names are commonly, and I believe correctly, connected with *κοῦω*, here in the sense of 'watching over, guarding.'<sup>3</sup> But the question of the precise formal relation has not been plainly stated. For *-κῶν*, *-κῶντος* cannot be the participle of *κοῦω*, and even from a collateral *κοᾶω* (cf. *Hesych.* *κοᾶ*, *κοᾶσαι*) the participle would be properly *κοᾶων*, *κοῶν*, or with epic distraction *κοῶν* (cf. *Hom.* *βοῶν* and *βοῶων*, *βοῶντα*). Since the names in *-κῶν* belong to the epic tradition, they may possibly rest on *-κοῶν*, with hyphaeresis in the second number of the compound (cf. *βοηθός* from *βοηθός*). But more probably they come from *κοῶν* with the same shift of arrest that is familiar in *Εὐμένης* beside *εὐμενής* and many others.

There are other occasional forms in *-κων*, *-ωντος* which have nothing to do with the preceding, but are the result of transfer, to the *ντ*-inflection, of hypocoristics like the frequent *Ἡράκων*, *-ωνος*.<sup>4</sup> Thus *Ἡράκων*, *-ωντος*<sup>5</sup> *IG.* 2. 469. 123, *IG.* 12. 3. 175, 177, *Ἐξάκων*,

<sup>1</sup> Of doubtful affinity to this group is *Κιλλικῶν* quoted from Callimachus in the scholia on *Κιλλικῶν* *Aristoph. Pax* 363, with *Καλλικῶν*, evidently referring to the same notorious traitor, in a quotation from *Euphorion*, *Hdn.* 2. 915. 20. It is likely that the true form of the name, among its several variants, was *Κιλλικων* and *-κων* only a poetical fiction, favored by *Λαοκῶν*, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Also *Ἀρτικῶν* (nom. only) *Oest. Jhrh.* 12. 118 (Olbia). Or a hypocoristic *Ἀρτικων*, like *Καλλικων*, *-ωνος*, etc. (see below, footnote 4).

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *Curtius, Gr. Etym.*<sup>5</sup> 152, and especially *Usener, Rh. M.* 53. 354. *Miss Macurdy, JHS.* 39. 66, thinks of the Lydian *καυεις* 'priestess.'

<sup>4</sup> Other such are: *Ἐξάκων*, *Ξενάκων*, *Δεινάκων*, *Εὐδαιμάκων*, *Πασάκων*, *Πεδάκων*, *Σιμάκων*, *Τειμάκων*, *Φιλάκων*,—*Ἀθηνικων*, *Ἀπελλικων*, *Θαρρικων*, *Ἰππικων*, *Ἰστικων*, *Καλλικων*, *Ματρικων*, *Πουθικων*, *Φιλικων*.

<sup>5</sup> Most editors accent, e.g., *Ἡρακῶν*, *Ἡρακῶντος*, in contrast to *Ἡράκων*, *Ἡράκωνος*. But there is no authority for this, apart from the doubtful *Ἀθηνακῶν*, and it is unlikely that the sporadic transfer to *ντ*-inflection was accompanied by a shift of accent. *Bechtel* accents as above.

-ωντος IG. 2. 465. 32, IG. 12. 9. 839. 2, *Delphin in Milet.* 38 b 5 (beside 'Εξάκωνος *ibid.* bb, ee), Ξενάκων, -ωντος IG. 12. 8. 180, Σιμάκων, -ωντος BCH. 5. 482. 11, Πυθίκων, -ωντος SGDI. 5692 a 19, Νηρίκων, -ωντος IG. 7. 4149, 'Απελλίκων, -ωντος Strabo 609. 'Αθηνακῶν Hdn. 2. 915. 11 is doubtful (cf. Lobeck, *Path.* 316). Similarly, 'Επιτρόφων, -ωντος IG. 11. 110. 7; 287. 1 (ed. -ῶν, -ῶντος) is probably a secondary form of an 'Επιτρόφων, -ωνος.

The legendary 'Ιπποθῶν, -θῶντος may contain the participle of a \*θοάω (cf. θοάζω), in which case the formal relation is the same as in the names in -κῶν. The contracted form 'Ιπποθῶν occurs also as an historical name *Delphin. in Milet.* 123. 8., *Ins. Br. Mus.* 415. 19, also Νικοθῶν *Ins. Br. Mus.* 1154. 32, Δειθῶν IG. 2. 803 f 17.

Πολυσῶν IG. 7. 2435. II. 19 (but Σάωνος SGDI. 2138) is formed with the participle of \*σάφω (whence σάος, σαῶω). Likewise, with contraction, Δημοσῶν IG. 11. 113. 4, etc. (a frequent Delian name), IG. 12. 1. 607, IG. 12. 8. 277. 107; 278. 65, Συλοσῶν Hdt., Strabo, etc. (accent attested Hdn. 2. 915. 9), 'Ιεροσῶν *Inscr. Pont. Eux.* 1. 2. 26. 78, 183, 'Ηροσῶν *ibid.* 1. 114. 49.<sup>1</sup>

Other names compounded of a participle are the legendary Μητιάδουσα (φαδοντ-, to ἀνδάνω), Οὐκαλέγων, Πυριφλεγέθων, the historical Πολυπρέπων, Πολυ(σ)πέρχων (σπέρχω; on the variant forms, cf. Ditt. *Syll. Orient.* 1, p. 12), and Alciphron's fictitious Ζωμεκπνέων, Γυμνοχαίρων, Οἰνοχαίρων, Στεμφυλοχαίρων (his Πατελλοχαίρων, Τραπεζοχαίρων are similar in feeling, but influenced by the compounds in -χαρής; cf. also οἰνοχαίρων *Anth. P.* 11. 12=οἰνοχαρής, but with a play on Χάρων).

Besides the compound names, such as have been thus far discussed, there are others belonging to the class of originally simple names (as distinguished from the shortened forms of compound names, that is the "hypocoristics"). In the first place, several of the substantives mentioned above, under 1, occur also as personal names, namely Ἀρχων, Γέρων, Δράκων, Θεράπων, Κρέων, Λέων, Μέδων. But there is also a special class, of growing frequency, culminating

<sup>1</sup> Other names included in this group by Fick-Bechtel 259 and Bechtel, *Hist. Personennamen* 397, are rather hypocoristics in -σων, -σωνος, parallel to Τελέσων, Θεμισών, etc. So certainly Boeot. Φιλόσων, -ωνος IG. 7. 2466, Ἀντίσων IG. 7. 1725 (for -σάων remains uncontracted in Boeotian), and probably Rhod. Μεγάσων IG. 12. 1. 705. 13.



in the Roman period, which takes the form of simple participles not otherwise current as substantives. Like other simple names based upon appellative substantives or adjectives, they started as epithets or nicknames, and occur occasionally from the earliest period. Thus *Φαέθων*, *Φαέθουσα*, *Ἀρέθουσα* in Homer, further the legendary *Τελέων*, the planet *Στίλβων*, the ships' names *Ἀγρεύουσα*, *Ἐπιπηδῶσα*, *Εὐφραίνουσα*, *Ἰοῦσα*, *Κρατοῦσα* (also *Ναυκρατοῦσα*), *Νικῶσα*, *Στεφανοῦσα*, *Στίλβουσα*, *Σώζουσα*, *Τρυφῶσα* (*IG.* 2, Index, p. 84), the dogs' names *Βρέμων*, *Φλέγων* (Xen.), *Θέων* (Ael.), the witch *Ἐμπούσα*,<sup>1</sup> the hetaera *Θάλλουσα* in the Middle Comedy (Ath. 587f). They often occur as names of slaves, as *Παρμένων* *IG.* 1. 324 and often in comedy, *Ἀνθοῦσα*, *Πρέπουσα*, *Συμφέρουσα* in Delphian manumission decrees, *Ἐπιτυγχάνων*, *Συμφέρων*, *Ἀρέσκουσα* in Thessalian manumission decrees, *Βρίουσα*, *Θάλλουσα* in Attic epitaphs, etc. But it is not true, as is sometimes inferred, that names of this type, apart from individual cases, are predominantly slave names, even in the pre-Roman period. Only a small proportion of all the occurrences refer to slaves. As names of the citizen class we find *Παρμένων* from the fifth century (e.g. Aeschin. 1. 157) on frequently, *Παρμένουσα* *IG.* 12. 8. 267. 8 (fourth cent.), *Εὐάγων* in Hippocrates, *Ἀρτιφέρων* and *Ἰγυαίων* in Aristotle (*Ἰγυαίων* also *IG.* 12. 9. 249 A 250 [fourth cent.]), *Κρατύνων* *IG.* 2. 873 (fourth cent.), *Θρασύνων* *IG.* 12. 9. 246 A 148 (fourth cent.), *Θαρρύνων* *IG.* 2. 324 (275 B.C.), *Θαρσύνων* archon in Delos 261 B.C., *Ἀρκέων* frequent in Delos, as *IG.* 11. 114 (268 B.C.), and so on with increasing frequency down to the Roman period, when names like *Ἀρέσκων*, *Ἀρέσκουσα* were commonplace in the citizen nomenclature of Athens. Without distinguishing further between slave and citizen names, the remarkable growth of this type in Roman Imperial times may be seen from the fact that in *IG.* 2 there are only about fourteen occurrences (of which half fall to *Παρμένων*), while in *IG.* 3 there are more than a hundred.

<sup>1</sup> *Ἐμπούσα* Aristoph. *Frogs* 293, etc. Perhaps the 'busy-body,' from an *\*ἔμπω* beside *ἐμπαίζω*. Cf. Dem. *de Cor.* 130 where Aeschines' mother is said to be nicknamed *Ἐμπούσα*, ἐκ τοῦ πάντα ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν καὶ γίγνεσθαι. Lagercrantz' discussion of *ἐμπαίζομαι* *KZ.* 34. 396 ff., in which an *\*ἔμπω* is also inferred, makes no mention of *Ἐμπούσα*, or of the probably related Elean forms *ἐμπῶι*, *ἐπενπῶι* from *ἐμπῶ*.

The examples of such personal names which I have noted in inscriptions, with the addition of a few from literary sources, are as follows:<sup>1</sup>

- 'Αμφέρων 'Αρχ. 'Εφ. 1908. 200. 2. ('Ελπιζων) IG. 12. 3. 1238.  
 'Ανθοῦσα IG. 2. 3463, IG. 14. 1697, 'Ελπιζουσα IG. 12. 2. 894.  
     SGDI. 2338. 'Εμπρέπων IG. 12. 1. 764. 93, 926. 9,  
     Ath. Mitt. 9. 261.  
 'Αντιμένων Ins. Br. Mus. 460. 'Επιών SGDI. 3549. 138, etc.  
 'Αντιφέρων IG. 12. 9. 1189. 25, 'Επιμένων IG. 12. 1. 49. 49, IG. 12.  
     Aristot. de Mem. 1. 9. 243. 9, 246 A 132.  
 'Αρέσκων IG. 3 passim, IG. 5. 1. 'Επιτυγχάνων IG. 3 passim, IG.  
     1398. 24, IG. 7. 2808. 15, IG. 9. 2. 921, IG. 12. 5. 372, 880. 10,  
     9. 2. 1344. 11. Tū. As. Min. 10, BCH. 35. 233.  
 'Αρέσκουσα IG. 3 passim, IG. 7. Εὐαίων IG. 7. 345, 346.  
     3450, IG. 9. 2. 15, 19, IG. 14. Εὐάγων Hippoc. Epid. 1. 20, SGDI.  
     1624, Ins. Pont. Eux. 236, 254. 5144 (Οὐάγοντος).  
 'Αρκέων IG. 11 passim, SGDI. 5692 Εὐέλθων IG. 2. 432e, IG. 11. 110.  
     a 48, Ins. Br. Mus. 377. 21. 11, 115. 6, 601-3, IG. 12. 9. 241.  
 'Ατιτάλλων Hdn. 2. 734. 30. 55, 246 A 25, Εδέλθων coins of  
 Αἰζάνων Papers Am. School 3. 380, Ephesus.  
     407 (cf. Hdn. 2. 735. 15). Εὐπλόων BCH. 29. 525. 20.  
 (Βλέπων) IG. 12. 9. 56. 32. Cf. Εὐπρέπων IG. 12. 8. 26a.  
     Βλεποντίδας IG. 7. 865. Εὐτυχοῦσα IG. 3. 1357.  
 Βρέμων IG. 3. 1542, Q. Sm. 11. 41. 2. Εὐφέρων IG. 12. 9. 245 A 310.  
 Βρυνουσα IG. 2. 3562.

<sup>1</sup> It has seemed worth while to give this list here, however incomplete it must be, to show the scope of a type which receives no distinct recognition as such and comparatively slight representation in Fick-Bechtel and in Bechtel's *Hist. Personennamen*. In the latter work this is partly due to the chronological limits set. But those names which are mentioned, such as Κρατῶνων, Θρασῶνων, are mostly given in the first part ("Vollnamen und Kosenamen"), and not in the second part, where they certainly belong and would find suitable place under the various subheads.

Names like 'Επιμένων, representing the participle of a compound verb, and likewise those like Εὐφέρων, even though a corresponding verbal compound does not exist, clearly belong to this type, rather than with the old compound names both parts of which are regular name words.

Owing to the parallelism with names in -ων, -ωνος, on which see below, p. 273, it is unsafe to include names which are quotable only in the nominative, e.g. Εὐδράων IG. 2. 803, Μέλπων IG. 3. 1197, 3271, early Attic Τρέμπων IG. 1. 432a15, Περιφύγων IG. 1. 434. 12, early Euboean Στένω, Τρίβων IG. 12. 9. 56. 374, 398, and the archaic Thera 'Εθελών IG. 12. 3. 569. For most of these the probability is in favor of -ων, -ωνος. Even the presence of a corresponding feminine in -ουσα is not wholly conclusive, cf. Μένουσα, but (usually) Μένων, -ωνος, Βρίουσα but Βρίων, -ωνος (at least once, otherwise nom. only). The few forms which I have nevertheless included without directly quotable *vr*-forms, are inclosed in parentheses.

- Εὐφραίνων *IG.* 12. 5. 638, *IG.* 12. 9. 245 B 199, *IG.* 14. 580, *CIG.* 1969.  
 Εὐφραίνουσα *IG.* 12. 8. 484.  
 Ὀάλλουσα *IG.* 2. 3774, *IG.* 3. 1530, *IG.* 9. 2. 555. 4, 964, *IG.* 12. 5. 389. 6, *IG.* 12. 7. 383, *IG.* 14. 1644, 1761b, *SGDI.* 3729, *Ins. Br. Mus.* 180.  
 Θαρρύνων *IG.* 2. 324, 380, *IG.* 3. 1122, *IG.* 12. 9. 245 A 364, 246 B 17.  
 Θαρσύνων *IG.* 7. 307, *IG.* 11. 114. 1, etc., *IG.* 12. 5. 883. 20, 885. 8, *SGDI.* 3254, 5554, 5616. 11.  
 Θρασύνων *IG.* 12. 9. 246 A 148.  
 Ἰμείρων *IG.* 12. 3. 390.  
 Καθήκων *IG.* 5. 1. 71 b 49, 86, 676. 19.  
 Κρατύνων *IG.* 2. 873.  
 (Κυδαίνων) *IG.* 12. 3. 40. 6.  
 Λανθάνουσα *IG.* 14. 254.  
 Μένων *Q. Sm.* 10. 118. Cf. *Μενοντίδας* *SGDI.* 5149. 8. 55  
 Μένουσα *IG.* 12. 2. 352.  
 Νήφων *IG.* 3. 1130.  
 Παραβρύκων *Ath.* 4c.  
 Παραβάλλον *Paus.* 6. 6. 3.  
 Παραμένων *IG.* 12. 9. 56, 229, 319.  
 Παρμένων *IG.* 2. 836, 55, etc., *IG.* 7. 42. 25, etc., *IG.* 9. 1. 568, 924, *IG.* 9. 2. 157, etc., *IG.* 11. 144. 16, etc., *IG.* 12. 8. 355. 10. 390, *IG.* 12. 9. 56. 229, etc.  
 Παρμένουσα *IG.* 12. 8. 267. 8.  
 Πρέπων *IG.* 3 *passim*, *SGDI.* 3647. 5.  
 Πρέπουσα *IG.* 3. 2787, *SGDI.* 2192, 2210.  
 Σαίνων *IG.* 12. 3. 34. 12.  
 Σπένδων *IG.* 3 *passim*, *IG.* 9. 2. 30. 6, *IG.* 12. 5. 459, 908. *Inschr. v. Olymp.* 78. 3.  
 Σπένδουσα *IG.* 9. 2. 807, 967.  
 Συγχαίρων *Inschr. v. Olymp.* 110.  
 Συμφέρον *IG.* 3 *passim*, *IG.* 9. 2. 15. 12, *Ins. Br. Mus.* 1043.  
 Συμφέρουσα *IG.* 3 *passim*, *IG.* 9. 2. 21. 11, *IG.* 12. 8. 496. 4, *IG.* 14. 2119, *BCH.* 22. 121.  
 Σώζων *IG.* 3 *passim*, *IG.* 12. 5. 782.  
 Σώζουσα *IG.* 3. 3370.  
 Ὑγαιίνων *Aristot. Rhet.* 3. 15, *IG.* 12. 9. 249 A 250.  
 Τρυφῶσα *IG.* 9. 2. 766, 1297. 22, *IG.* 14. 2246.  
 Φέγγων *IG.* 12. 7. 126. 10.  
 Φιλοῦσα *IG.* 4. 613.  
 Φλέγων *IG.* 5. 1. 130, *Suidas.*  
 Φλέγουσα *IG.* 12. 9. 75.  
 Χαίρουσα *IG.* 14. 441.  
 Χαριτῶσα *IG.* 14. 824.

The preceding classification has left out of account certain legendary names the analysis of which is obscure, as Πελάγων (cf. πέλαγος), Κελάδων (cf. κέλαδος), Χαλκῶδων,<sup>1</sup> Παμπάδων *Hdn.* 2. 730. 13 (foreign?), Κορέθων *Apd.* 3. 83, Πτελέων *Apd.* 3. 153, Κυριάνων *Schol. Pind. Ol.* 1. 127. Likewise foreign names, as Etruscan Ἄρρων (Etrus. *Arnth*, Lat. *Aruns*, *Aruntis*), Lycian Σαρπήδων, Galatian Ὀρτιάγων, Bactrian Τενάγων (but nom. only, *Aesch. Pers.* 306), the probably Median Ἀρπάγων (*Hdn.* 2. 729. 8; cf. Ἄρπαγος), and those

<sup>1</sup> The legendary Χαλκῶδων, the place-name Θερωδῶδων, and the man's name ΚΟΚΟΔΩΝ *IG.* 12. 9. 56. 193, probably belong together, but the commonly assumed derivation from δῶος appears to me very doubtful.

in *-ῶν*, *-ῶντος* after the analogy of Greek names in *-φῶν*, etc., as *Χαρναβῶν*, king of the Getae, Hdn. 1. 23. 11, *Ῥαδαμψῶν* *Ins. Pont. Eux.* 50, 56, 58 (cf. *Ῥαδαμσάδιος*, *Ῥαδάμσας*, etc., all Iranian names), Egyptian *Θῶν* Hdn. 1. 395. 23; 2. 249. 4 ff., and *Πετεχῶν* frequent in the papyri.

5. *Place-names*.<sup>1</sup>—A number of personal names occur also as place-names, as *Γέρων*, *Δράκων*, *Λέων*, *Κελάδων*, *Πυριφλεγέθων*, *Ἀλκιμέδων*, *Ὠρομέδων*, *Κτησιφῶν*. *Ἡδυφῶν*, a river in Assyria (Strabo 744), appears to be a Greek name like *Κτησιφῶν*, though it is otherwise unknown and may be only a Hellenized form of a foreign name (cf. the wholly foreign *Βελσεφῶν*).

There are also place-names of the same type as the personal names *Ἀρέσκων*, etc., namely *Ἀρμόζων*, *Διάγων*, *Παράγων*, *Ἐλίσσων*,<sup>2</sup> *Ῥέων*, *Στέφων*, *Τψίζων*, *Ἀρέθουσα*, *Θάλλουσα*, *Περιρρέουσα*, *Στάζουσα*.<sup>3</sup>

Others are of obscure origin, as *Ἀχέρων*, *Ἀκίδων*, *Ἀκήδων* (Hdn. 2. 730. 58, perhaps = preceding), *Λέδων*, *Νέδων* (Fick compares Skt. *nadī* stream), *Καλάων*, *Μυλάων* (*Μυλδεις* Hesych.), *Θερμῶδων*.

6. *Interchange between ντ- and ν-inflection*.—The transfer from *ν-* to *ντ-* inflection in the case of *λέων*, etc. (above, p. 261) was prehistoric and complete. The occasional transfer in names like *Ἡράκων*, from *-ωνος* to *-ωντος*, has been mentioned above, page 267. The Lycian name *Σαρπήδων* has regularly *-ονος*, and the occasional *-οντος* in Homer is secondary. *σπάδων* is said by the grammarians (e.g. Choerob. 2. 397. 31) to vary between *-οντος* and *-ωνος*, and while in the sense of 'eunuch' *-οντος* is best attested (Philo *de mut. nom.* 173; Plut. *Demetr.* 25. 31; Artemid. 2. 69. 251), this is probably secondary.

<sup>1</sup> The only ethnica noted are *Γελίοντες*, one of the Ionic tribes (whence *Γελίων*, eponymous ancestor, and also epithet of Zeus, *IG.* 3. 2. 6), and the foreign *Ὀροντες*.

<sup>2</sup> Paus. 8. 27. 7; 8. 29. 5, usually accented *Ἐλίσσων*. Fick, *BzB.* 22. 51, points to the contrast between *Ἀκουμένος* and *Ἀκούμενος*. But no such shift in the names based on active participles is otherwise known, and the MSS accentuation here is not to be taken too seriously. It probably rests on the correction of scribes (so actually in the Leyden MS 8. 29. 5), who thought *Ἐλίσσων* violated a canon of the grammarians regarding the accent of place-names in *-σων*. Cf. the mechanical rules for the accent of words in *-σων* in Hdn. 1. 36. 1 ff., where *Ὀλοσσών* is given as typical for names of cities.

<sup>3</sup> There are other names in *-ουσα*, as *Τέλφουσα*, which are certainly or probably later forms of *-οῦσσα* and will be discussed in connection with words in *-δεis*.

The principal interchange is that due to the parallelism between proper names in *-ων, -οντος* and the still more numerous class in *-ων, -ωνος*. Names which properly belong to the former class may show forms in *-ωνος*, these being especially common in northern Greece, notably in Thessaly and Delphi.

*Λέων, -οντος*, and so in compounds, but also *Λέωνος IG. 12. 9. 1048*, *Λέωνος* and *Ἀκρολέωνος Ath. Mitt. 27. 334* (Acarnania), *Λέωνος* and *Ἀντιλέωνος SGDI. 2513* (*Ἀντιλέωνος* also 2508), *Ἀγρολέωνος IG. 9. 2. 216*, *Νικολέωνος IG. 9. 1. 360. 9*, *Πανταλέωνος IG. 9. 2, p. xi, No. 3*, *Τιμολέωνος SGDI. 2294 B, IG. 2. 550. 22* (this also a Delphian decree).

Names in *-κρέων, -οντος*, but *Δαμοκρέωνος IG. 12. 1. 1034. 7*.

Names in *-φῶν, -ῶντος*, but *Ξενοφῶνος IG. 4. 764. 4*, *Ἀλκιφῶνος IG. 9. 1. 487. 19*, *Δαμοφῶνος IG. 9. 2. 66*, *καλλιφῶνος BCH. 21. 288*, *Θευφῶνος, Τιμοφῶνος Jhb. Suppl. 10. 93*.

*Ἀρχων, -οντος* in Athens, *IG. 2 passim*, but *-ωνος* at Delphi (nearly thirty times in *SGDI*, also in the Delphian decree *IG. 2. 550. 24*), further *IG. 7. 2827, SGDI. 5018a 2, 5028 Ba 6, Polyb. 22. 13, etc.*

*Παρμένων, -οντος*, but *-ωνος IG. 9. 1. 61. 15*, also *-ονος IG. 9. 2. 224. 3 (-ΟΝΟΣ) IG. 12. 5. 354*.

*Ευέλθων, -οντος* (above, p. 270), but *-ωνος BCH. 35. 461. 24* (Delphi), *IG. 12. 1. 46. 298, 348*.

*Ευάγων, -οντος* (above, p. 270), but *-ωνος SGDI. 3758. 109, 120*.

*Πολυσάων, -οντος IG. 7. 2435 II 19*, but *-ωνος SGDI. 2138. 2*.

*Γέρων, -οντος SGDI. 5545. 26*, but *-ωνος SGDI. 5543*.

*Δράκων, -οντος*, but Aeol. *-ωνος Hdn. 2. 733. 16*.

*Στίλβων, -οντος Plut. Mor. 430*, but *-ωνος ibid. 1029*. Cf. *Στίλβουσα*, but Boeot. *Στιλβώνδας*.

*Νέδων, -οντος* a town, Strabo 360 (also *Νεδούσιος*), but *Νέδων, -ωνος*, a river, *ibid. 353, 360*.

*Μένων, -ωνος* regularly, but *-οντος Q. Sm. 18. 118*, and implied by *Μενοντίδας SGDI. 5149. 8. 55*. In this case the *ντ*-inflection is plainly secondary.

Besides these variations in the same name, note the divergence between such pairs as *Ἀρκέων, -οντος* in Delos, but *Φιλέων, -ωνος* in Melos *IG. 12. 3. 1157*, or *Παραβάλλων, -οντος Paus. 6. 6. 3*, but *Ῥπερβάλλων, -ωνος SGDI. 4961* (cf. *Ῥπερβαλλώνδας SGDI. 1954. 11*), or between *Μένων, Φέρων, Σάων* with *-ωνος* and *Ἀντιμένων, Ἀντιφέρων, Πολυσάων*, with *-οντος*.

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- Καλάων [p. 272.  
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 ἀενάων Hom., Hes. [p. 264.  
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 σπάδων Diod. + [p. 272.  
 ἀπο- Suid.  
 Λέδων [p. 272.  
 μέδων Hom. + [p. 262.  
 Μέδων, Μέδουσα [p. 268.  
 -μέδων, -μέδουσα<sup>1</sup> [pp. 264, 265.  
 Λα- *see* Λαο-  
 ἄλι- Aristoph.  
 Ἄλκι- (*m.*, *f.*)  
 Καλλι-  
 Ἐπι- (*f.*)  
 Ναυσι-  
 Ἀντι-  
 Ἴφι- (*m.*, *f.*)  
 Ἀμφι- (*m.*, *f.*)  
 ὕψι- Hes. +  
 -μέδων, -μέδουσα—  
 Λαο-, Λα-, Λεω-  
 Θεο-, Θευ-  
 Κλειο-  
 Διο-  
 Χαλκο- (*f.*)  
 Φυλο- (*f.*)  
 Φυμο- IG. 9. 2. 207c (cf. Nachr.  
 G. G. W. 1908, 575).  
 Ἴπο- (*m.*, *f.*)  
 ἰγρο- Nonn.  
 ὕδρο- (*f.*)  
 Θηρο-  
 Ἀκρο- IG. 9. 2. 217.  
 Κυπρο- JHS. 11. 68.  
 Προ-  
 ὦρο- IG. 12. 5. 893.  
 ὦρο-  
 Δωρο- Inscr. Pont. Eux. 2. 79.  
 add.  
 θαλασσο- (*m.*) Nonn., (*f.*) Alem.  
 ποντο- Pind. +  
 Ποντο- (*m.*, *f.*)  
 Ἀριστο-  
 Αὐτο- (*m.*, *f.*)  
 Ναυ-  
 Εὐ-  
 Θευ- *see* Θεο-  
 ἰχθυ- Marc. Sid.  
 Πολυ- Inscr. Pont. Eux. 1. 114.  
 I. 15.  
 Δορυ-  
 εὐρυ- Pind., Emped.  
 Εὐρυ- (*m.*, *f.*)  
 Θρασυ- IG. 2. 3255.  
 Ἀστυ- (*m.*, *f.*)  
 Λεω- *see* Λαο-  
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<sup>1</sup> Names in -μέδουσα indicated by (*f.*) parallel names in -μέδων and -μέδουσα by (*m.*, *f.*).

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 ἀργι- Hom., Ap. Rh.  
 χαυλι- Hes. +  
 ἔρι- Hesych.  
 τρι- Pind. +  
 μυρι- Anth. P. +  
 χαλκ- Hesych., Eust.  
 λυκ- Galen.  
 μεγαλ- E. M.  
 ἀγκυλ- Q. Sm. +  
 μυλ- Eust.  
 ἀν- Aristot.  
 σιν- Archestr., Antiph., Aristot.,  
 Hesych.  
 πυκν- Schol. Opp. (Th.)  
 μον- Aesch.  
 κυν- Epich., Aristot. +  
 συν- Epich. +  
 προ- Poll. +  
 καρχαρ- Hom. +  
 κρατερ- Hesych., Hdn.  
 πο(υ)λυ- Nic., Nonn.  
 ὄξυ- Nonn.  
 τραχυ- Apollon. Lex. Hom.  
 ἀμφ- Aristot. +  
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 κνώδων Soph. + [p. 262.  
 μεδέων Hom. + [p. 262.  
 παμ- Nonn. +  
 Μεδέων  
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Λέων [p. 268.  
 -λέων [pp. 265, 273.  
 Παντα-  
 Δαϊ- IG. 9. 2. 535, SGDI. 48. 33.  
 50, Ἀρχ. Ἐφ. 1915, 9, BCH.  
 30. 198.  
 χαμαι- Aristot. +  
 Χάμαι-  
 Δηϊ-  
 (Ἐπι-)  
 Χαρι- IG. 11. 161 A 10.  
 Ἀντι-  
 Ἀρχι- IG. 4. 1377.  
 Γοργο-  
 Ἐρεβινθο-  
 ὀσπριο- Geop.  
 μυρμηκο- Sept.  
 Νικο- IG. 9. 1. 360. 9.  
 Ἀρκο- Ath. Mitt. 27. 334. 20.  
 Λυκο-  
 Δημο-  
 Τιμο-  
 θυμο- Hom., Hes.  
 αἰνο- Theocr.  
 Δαινο- IG. 5. 2, p. xxxvii, l. 124.  
 μουννο- Anth. P.  
 Ἀγρο- IG. 9. 2. 216.  
 ἐχθρο- Kaibel, Epigr. gr. 96. 5.  
 Κηφισο- Ἀθηνᾶ 20. 209.  
 Παντο-  
 Ἀριστο-  
 (Αἰτο-)  
 Εὔρυ-  
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   ἀ- Hom. +  
   χαλι- Hom.  
   ἄλλο- Hom. +  
   δολο- Hom., Archil.  
   εὐ- Hom. +  
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   Ἔρμα-  
   Ἄνα-  
   Παγ-  
   Ἦγε- SGDI. 5711. 9.  
   Τελε-  
   ἀλι- Eust.  
   Πραξι- IG. 11. 150 a 14.  
   Δεξι-  
   Τιμασι- IG. 12. 2. 551.  
   Ἀγῃσι- IG. 12. 1. 632.  
   Παισι- IG. 12. 2. 646 a 15, 34.  
   Ἀντι- SGDI. 5104 c 7.  
   Υψι-  
   Λαο- IG. 12. 2. 646 c 49.  
   Ἀγλαο-  
   Ποσειδο-  
   Διο- Delphin. in Milet. 122 I 22,  
       110.  
   Νεο- IG. 12. 5. 608 c ([N]εο-, cf.  
       Νεοκροντιδης, or [Λ]εο- = Λαο-,  
       cf. Λεο-φῶν?).  
   Νικο-  
   Φιλο- IG. 12. 1. 50. 37.  
   Δᾶμο-  
   Τιμο-  
   Ἔρμο-  
   Ἀριστο-  
   Πρωτο-  
   θεμισ- Pind.  
   Πολυ-  
   εὐρυ- Hom.  
   Ἄστυ-  
 -πνείων *see* -πνέων  
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δράκων Hom.+[p. 261.

ἡμι- Greg. Naz.

πτερο- Byz.

χειρο- Eur.

Δράκων [p. 268.

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ἐκῶν Hom.+[p. 261.

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ὑψι- Ps.-Phocyl., Greg. Naz.

## -τένων—

χειρο- Batr.

μακρο- Anth. P.

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Δει-

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ἀκροκελαινιόνων, -ωντος Hom. [p. 265.

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Δηϊ-

Καλλι-

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Ἄρτι- Oest. Jhrh. 12. 118.

Λαο-, Λεω-

Λαοκόωσα

Δημο-

ἀμνοκῶν Aristoph.

Ἴππο-

Εὐρυ-

εὐρυκόωσα Euphor., Hesych.

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ἀρχι- Eust.

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 -γέρων  
 συγ- Babr.  
 ἡμι- Longus.  
 ἡρι- Theophr., Diosc.  
 τρι- Aesch.+  
 ἄρχι- Byz.  
 τυμβο- Com. Anon.  
 νωδο- Com. Anon.  
 παιδαριο- Eccl.  
 δημο- Hom.+  
 ὁμο- Luc.  
 ὠμο- Hom.+  
 μονο- A. B.  
 χρυσο- Byz.  
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 τυφο- Aristoph., Lys.  
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 -οντος [pp. 266, 273.  
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 Μενε Ἀρχ. Ἐφ. 1910, 78. 13. 4.  
 Χαιρε-  
 Καρτε- IG. 9. 2. 1191.  
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 109, IG. 12. 9. 244 B 17.  
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 Πασι-  
 Ἐρασι-  
 Στασι- IG. 12. 1. 42. 16.  
 Ἀγησι-  
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 Τιμησι- IG. 12. 7. 9.

-φών—

Μηρσι- Inser. Pont. Eux. 2. 295.

'Ονησι-, 'Ονασι-

Κτησι-

Λουσι- IG. 2. 809 a 170, IG. 7.

4254. 30, IG. 12. 5. 610. 14.

Σωσι- IG. 12. 7. 68. 5.

'Αντι-

Μυρσι- IG. 3. 1202 Π 129.

Παμ- Roy. Dan. Soc. 1905. 56.  
44, 102.

ἀμφι- Pherecr. +

Λαοφών, Λαφάων, Λαφών, Λεωφών  
IG. 2. 814 a A 21, Λεοφών Del-  
phin. in Milet. 147. 84, 92.

'Αγλαο-, 'Αγλω-

'Ροδο-

Θεο-

Κλεο-, Κλευ-

Καρνεο- IG. 12. 3. 278, 314.

Αγρεο- JHS. 10. 55, No. 6.

'Ιο-

'Ιοφῶσσα

Διο-

'Ηλιο- IG. 3. 2141.

Νικο-

Φιλο-

Δαμο-, Δημο-

Τιμο- IG. 2. 1850.

Χαρμο- SGDI. 5515. 22. 50.

'Ερμο- IG. 12. 5. 609. 254, Αθηνά  
20. 250.

Φανο- IG. 12. 5. 38. 3.

Ξενο-

Μηνο-

Οινο- IG. 2. 573.

Κλεινο- IG. 12. 9. 249 B 298,

Κλινο- IG. 12. 3. 129.

'Ιερο-, 'Ιαρο-

'Ιμερο-

'Ηρο-

-φών—

Χαιρο- IG. 12. 3. 36, 55.

Πατρο- IG. 12. 8. 18. 10 (cf.  
BCH. 36. 347).

Μητρο-

'Ισο- IG. 12. 5. 609. 199.

Κηφισο-

Πρατο- IG. 12. 1. 1446.

Στρατο-

Κλειτο-

Δικαστο- SGDI. 3590. 15.

Μναστο- IG. 12. 7. 67. 3.

'Αριστο-, 'Αριστοφῶσα IG. 2.  
3503

Αὐτο-

Παρ- IG. 12. 8. 299. 16.

'Ηδυ-

Κλευ- see Κλεο-

Εὔρυ-

Θρασυ-

Λεω- see Λαο-

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φιλ- Aristox.

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'Αρχων [p. 268.

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δειξῶων Callim., Nonn., Anth. P.  
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## NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

### Τύχη IN POLYBIUS

Homer's allegory of the Litai or prayers that limp tardily on the trail of Wrong among its many other applications symbolizes the relation of the unpopular monster Negative Criticism to the swift diffusion of Error. An eminent scholar has the happy thought that Aidōs is just our "social compunction." The reviewers single this fancy out as the most noteworthy thing in his book. Mr. Graham Wallas and Miss Jane Addams seize upon it as an anticipation of the social-settlement ideal in antiquity, and the thing is done. A generation which no longer reads Jebb or Tennyson, who knew better, is fixed in the formula that Aidōs is social compunction. The more common way is the uncritical acceptance by a brilliant English or French lecturer of the "results" of a German "investigation." This lends wings to misconceptions that might otherwise remain innocuously buried in the dusty archives of exchanged doctors' dissertations. Of the many available examples the one selected for this brief note is Professor Bury's adoption of Rudolph von Scala's thesis that Polybius, beginning with Demetrius of Phaleron's sentimental and rhetorical conception of the rôle of Fortune in human affairs, advanced to the stern scientific faith in causation which left no place for fortune or the gods in "pragmatic history,"<sup>1</sup> and that later interpolations in his text reveal this progress in his thought. It all sounds very learned and plausible in the exposition of Dr. von Scala and Professor Bury. There is but one objection to it: If you read Polybius you find that it isn't so. The matter is quite simple. The fundamental fallacy of the argument is the tacit assumption that we or any other critics possess a final and consistent philosophy of fate, fortune, and providence which we can apply as a canon to measure the deviations of earlier thinkers from perfect consistency. There is no example of such consistency except perhaps in a few Haeckels and La Mettries. Plato affirms as positively as Lucretius or as Polybius in his alleged later manner that nothing can happen without a cause. Yet in his *Laws* (709 A, B) he attributes a large part in human affairs to Tyche. And as if this were not enough, later in the same work he argues that the divine Providence extends to the minutest details. Dante, who in effect accepts the determinist argument that Buridan's ass would

<sup>1</sup> iii. 47. 8.

starve and whose faith in Providence is absolute, nevertheless personifies and almost deifies Fortune. The emperor Julian, for all his neo-Platonic mysticism an extremely rational thinker familiar with the Aristotelian and Democritean theories of causation, nevertheless acknowledges, as other great statesmen and generals have done, the incalculable part of fortune in human success and failure.<sup>1</sup> Renan, who repeatedly rejects the appeal in history to any causes save those cognizable by science, speaks of Sennacherib's defeat as the moment when the fortune and future of humanity turned on the throw of the dice. Of this general character are all the inconsistencies noted in Polybius. I have examined every passage in which the word Tyche or its synonyms occur, and not one raises a rational presumption of a radical change in his opinions. Polybius is always willing to dramatize or personify Fortune and moralize the lessons her vicissitudes teach in the rise and fall of empires.<sup>2</sup> It is for him the quality of a great soul to bear the strokes of Fortune bravely.<sup>3</sup> He shares that deepest and finest Greek moral feeling that derives from the instability of Fortune and the frailty of our human condition a warning against self-exaltation and ruthlessness to others.<sup>4</sup> He is always willing to speak with the vulgar of the power of Fortune in things that he cannot otherwise explain.<sup>5</sup> He recognizes the fact of accident<sup>6</sup> or spontaneity<sup>7</sup> and the appearance of Providence<sup>8</sup> in the fortunes of men and states. But where he has, or thinks he has, an explanation by traceable causes, he is always as contemptuous as is Thucydides of the cheap and easy resort to chance or supernatural intervention.<sup>9</sup> And in this connection he enunciates the commonplaces of ancient science that

<sup>1</sup> Polybius thinks this sentiment characteristic of men truly great, xxxix. 3. 7.

<sup>2</sup> Examples in von Scala, pp. 171-72, and cf. also xvi. 31. 5: μέμψαιτο τῇ τύχῃ; xx. 7. 2: ἄλλ' ὥσπερ ἐπίτηδες . . . ἡ τύχῃ; xxiv. 8. 2: δίκην ἢ τύχῃ βουλομένη λαβεῖν; fr. 78.

<sup>3</sup> i. 1. 2; vi. 1a 6.

<sup>4</sup> It is idle to try to trace this thought to one source, for it pervades all Greek literature. Cf. Polybius xv. 1. 8; xxxvii. 1g; xxxix. 3. 7; Herodotus i. 86; Isocrates i. 29; Demosthenes *De corona* 252; Sophocles *O.C.* 567.

<sup>5</sup> xxxvii. 9. Herod., pp. 100-101, collects the passages where *τύχῃ* is used loosely and is not to be pressed. Warde Fowler, "Polybius' Conception of *τύχῃ*," *Classical Review*, XVII, 445, quotes the Greek of many of them and discusses the whole question sensibly, but not trenchantly.

<sup>6</sup> x. 33. 4; x. 37. 4; x. 40. 6; xi. 2. 10; xi. 4. 4; xi. 4. 7; xi. 19. 6; xi. 24a 3; xv. 10. 5 (in a speech); xviii. 33. 7; xviii. 46. 15; xxiv. 9. 1-2; xxxviii 1b 5.

<sup>7</sup> ταῦτόματον xv. 16. 6; xv. 33. 1; xviii. 12. 2: ἐπὶ βραχὺ μὲν καὶ ταῦτόματου συνεργήσαντος.

<sup>8</sup> xi. 24. 8: θεός . . . τις; xxviii. 9. 4: δαίμονοβλάβειαν; so xxxvii in fine; xl. 13; in his own person he prays to all the gods and deprecates the φθόνος of *τύχῃ*.

<sup>9</sup> ii. 38. 5: φᾶλλον γὰρ; cf. x. 5. 8; x. 9. 2; xviii. 28. 4; xxii. 16. 4: πλὴν τελείως ὀλίγων; xxxvii. 4.

nothing happens without a cause and that chance is only a name for our ignorance.<sup>1</sup> In particular, he shares Kipling's distaste for those who attribute the achievements of successful men<sup>2</sup> solely to Fortune:

And I took the chance they wouldn't  
And now they're calling it luck.

There is a cause for the success of the Achaean League—its appeal to the principle of equality and true democracy.<sup>3</sup> And the main thesis of his book is that the Roman conquest of the world was not due to Fortune, but to Roman character and Roman institutions. Literal-minded criticism pronounces this grossly inconsistent with passages of sentimental reflection on the omnipotence of Fortune as revealed in the succession of world-empires and the rapid conquest of the world by Rome. But the contradiction on which von Scala and his followers chiefly rely disappears if we take into consideration the contexts. Polybius begins by announcing his intention to explain how and by what kind of polity the Romans reduced the whole habitable world under their dominion.<sup>4</sup> Secure in this main design, he allows himself to lapse into rhetoric and speaks of Fortune as reducing all things to unity, and of his work as intended to bring out this design of Fortune and the consequent lesson of the unity of world-history.<sup>5</sup> Yet again later in the same book<sup>6</sup> he avers that it was not by chance (Fortune), as some of the Greeks think, or by accident (*αἰτομάτως*) that the Romans not only attempted, but achieved universal hegemony. This is thought to be a flagrant contradiction of the other passage from the prooemium. But it seems so only because those who quote it omit the prefacing words by which Polybius reconciles the two. For his sentence begins: "From which it is plain that our original proposition was true that it was not by chance," etc. This is evidently intended as a reference to the statement in the prooemium of his design to show "how and by what kind of polity" the Romans, etc.<sup>7</sup> Polybius evidently is not troubled by the inconsistency of saying in one paragraph that it was not by chance that Rome, etc., and in another that Fortune in our day has displayed her wondrous power, etc. And there are probably many living writers who would cheerfully be guilty of the same inconsistency in writing of the world-war. That is not all. In the passage i. 63. 9 Polybius says that the Romans won their empire not by chance, *ἀλλὰ λίαν εἰκότως*. That also is an almost explicit quotation of the words of his prooemium *καὶ λίαν εὐλόγοις ἀφορμαῖς χρῆσάμενοι*.

<sup>1</sup> ii. 38. 5; fr. 84, *κενῶς*.

<sup>2</sup> E.g. Scipio x. 2; x. 3. 7; Philopoemen xi. 16. 4; Eumenes xx. 23. 4.

<sup>3</sup> ii. 38.

<sup>4</sup> i. 1. 5; i. 3. 7.

<sup>5</sup> i. 4. 1; i. 4. 5.

<sup>6</sup> i. 63. 9.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. vi. 1a, where he again emphasizes this original purpose almost in the same words.



There is, then, for a criticism that keeps the entire context in mind and is guided by flexible literary feeling no serious contradiction, and certainly none that justifies the desperate expedient of the assumption that the second passage was interpolated by Polybius himself after he had developed his later philosophy of causation which allowed no place to the action of Fortune. This is the strongest support of von Scala's theory. It would be wearisome and superfluous to go through the text of Polybius and explain away all the other alleged contradictions. It is enough to note that, as Herod points out,<sup>1</sup> the contradictory passages are so distributed that no theory of the composition of Polybius' history will account for them without resorting to the uncontrollable hypothesis of later insertions by the author. It is perhaps for this reason that Croiset, who is acquainted with von Scala's book, pays no attention to his hypothesis. Herod perhaps sufficiently refutes it together with the theory of Hirzel that Polybius' Tyche is a symbol of the Stoic *πρόνοια*. Herod's own explanation is that Polybius' popular language cannot be pinned down to philosophic consistency. To this I have added the definite argument that Polybius quotes his own prooemium and feels no inconsistency, and the further consideration that such consistency is no more to be expected in great writers than in popular usage. The "investigation," then, is merely an example of the kind of philology well characterized by Matthew Arnold long ago: "Things are naturally all of a piece and follow one uniform rule. . . . People do not vary. People do not contradict themselves, people do not have undercurrents of meaning, people do not divine."

One adjunct of the theory I have thus far passed over. It is the assumption that Polybius' earlier views were determined by Demetrius of Phaleron's treatise on Fortune, chiefly known to us by Plutarch's *Consolation*. Polybius quotes an impressive passage from Demetrius about the vicissitudes of Fortune in the fall of the Persian Empire and the conquests of Alexander.<sup>2</sup> And as often happens with other writers, we can trace elsewhere in his phrasing the influence of a passage which he knew well enough to quote. But many of the resemblances collected by von Scala and gravely arranged in parallel columns are the merest commonplaces of reflection on the mutability of Fortune that could be equally well paralleled in any literature. The most important parallel of all in this connection, he, and so far as I know all other writers on the subject, strangely enough omit. It is the great passage on Tyche in Demosthenes' *On the Crown*. That is obviously an anticipation if not the source of the Demetrius passage which is supposed to have been Polybius' chief inspiration.<sup>3</sup> And Polybius, as it would be easy to show, was not unacquainted with Demosthenes.

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<sup>1</sup> *La conception de l'histoire dans Polybe*, p. 113.

<sup>2</sup> xxix. 6c.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Dem. *De corona* 208, 252, 254, 271.

## ON A FRAGMENT OF GORGIAS

καὶ 'τὸ ἀγώνισμα' ἡμῶν κατὰ τὸν Λεοντίνον Γοργίαν 'διττῶν [δὲ] ἀρετῶν δέεται, τολμῆς καὶ σοφίας· τολμῆς μὲν τὸ κίνδυνον ὑπομείναι, σοφίας δὲ τὸ αἶνιγμα γνῶναι. ὁ γάρ τοι λόγος καθάπερ τὸ κήρυγμα' τὸ 'Ὀλυμπίασι 'καλεῖ μὲν τὸν βουλόμενον, στεφανοῖ δὲ τὸν δυνάμενον.' [Clement *Stromata* i. 11. 51: Stählin, Vol. II, p. 33, l. 18.]

<διττῶν> διττῶν δὲ Cobet. [δὲ] Wilamowitz, δὲ Bernays. τὸ κίνδυνον . . . τὸ αἶνιγμα (πλῖγμα Diels), τὸν κίνδυνον . . . τὰ αἶσμα (cf. *Iliad* xv. 207) Bernays, *Rheinisches Museum*, 1853, p. 432 = *Gesammelte Abhandlungen*, I, 121.

The text and apparatus are Stählin's; in Diels's *Vorsokratiker* the fragment is numbered 8 (Vol. II [3d ed.], p. 249). The latter has inserted πλῖγμα into his text, comparing the metaphor καταπλῖγσει which Aristophanes attributes to Thrasymachus (*Daitales*), if Dindorf's emendation is right.

These two sentences have been assigned to the 'Ὀλυμπικὸς λόγος of Gorgias ever since Bernays detected in them the oldest prose reference to the Olympic games. He believed that the mention of the herald's summons made this certain. But then αἶνιγμα became unintelligible, and he asked whether Clement or his scribe imagined that there was a riddle competition at Olympia. So the word was emended to bring it into harmony with the second sentence, and, as may be seen from the text printed above, other words which do not suit the hypothesis that Gorgias uttered them at Olympia are now treated as Clement's additions.

But all this depends upon the double assumption that Clement drew two consecutive sentences from one speech, and that both must allude to the Olympic contest. With a writer who interweaves quotations from all sources into his discourse this is a hazardous procedure. If it can be shown that the first sentence, as it stands, is a plain allusion to a famous legendary feat of σοφία, that Gorgias had excellent grounds for comparing his own σοφία to it, and that Clement actually turns Gorgias' vaunt against vain contending with words, then the text will be justified.

When Gorgias arrived in Athens in 427, he professed himself able to answer any question addressed to him. This is the boast with which he opens the discussion in Plato's *Gorgias*, after custom had staled his triumphs. But his first exhibition in Athens was conducted in a manner so impressive that the story, repeated in the literature of rhetoric for centuries, was actually used by Themistius as the ground of a comparison with the universal instruction of the sun-god. I arrange four of these passages below, as their language sheds light upon the origin of our fragment.

1. Quorum [sc. sophistarum] e numero primus est ausus Leontinus Gorgias in conventu poscere quaestionem, id est, iubere dicere, qua de re quis vellet audire. Audax negotium: dicerem impudens, nisi, etc. [Cicero *De finibus* ii. 1. 1.]

2. Isque [sc. Gorgias] princeps ex omnibus ausus est in conventu poscere, qua de re quisque vellet audire. . . . [Cicero *De oratore* iii. 32, 129; cf. i. 22, 103.]

3. ἡ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ὁ θεὸς οὗτος δημοσίᾳ ἐφ' ἐκάστης ἡμέρας ἐπιδείκνυσθαι τὴν σοφίαν; οὐκ εἰς τὴν πνίκα συλλέγων, οὐδ' εἰς τὴν θυμέλην παριὼν Ἀθηναίῃν, ὥσπερ ὁ Γοργίας, ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ μέγα θέατρον τοῦτο καὶ ἀτεχνῶς Ὀλύμπιον, ἐν ᾧ συνακαλῶν καὶ ἀγείρων πάντας ἀνθρώπους διδάσκει τε καὶ ἐξηγᾶται πηνίκα μὲν δέοι σπεῖρειν, πηνίκα δὲ φυντεῖν, πηνίκα δὲ ἀμᾶν, κ.τ.λ. [Themistius *Or.* 26. 331a.]

4. σχεδίου δὲ λόγου Γοργίας ἄρξει (παρελθὼν γὰρ οὗτος ἐς τὸ Ἀθηναίων θέατρον ἐθάρρησεν εἰπεῖν 'προβάλλετε' καὶ τὸ κινδύνεμα τοῦτο πρῶτος ἀνεφθέξατο ἐνδεικνύμενος δῆπου πάντα μὲν εἶδέναι, περὶ παντὸς δ' ἂν εἰπεῖν ἐφίεις τῷ καιρῷ), τοῦτο δ' ἐπελθεῖν τῷ Γοργίᾳ διὰ τόδε. [Philostratus *Vitae sophistarum* i. *Prooem.* 4: Diels, 76A, 1a.]

It was, Philostratus says, out of a spirit of rivalry with Prodikos, who habitually recited the stale set piece about Herakles and the two ways, that Gorgias came forward with his daring new art of extemporary speech. According to this account, the mark of the sophistic which Gorgias invented was that, unlike the older σοφία of Greece, those who professed it began with such bold words as οἶδα or πάλαι δέσκεμμαι.<sup>1</sup> Their art was like the mantic of the seers and the oracles, and took the form of the Pythian verse:

οἶδα δ' ἐγὼ ψάμμον τ' ἀριθμὸν καὶ μέτρα θαλάσσης.

If we compare such words as *ausus*, *audax*,<sup>2</sup> ἐθάρρησεν, κινδύνεμα<sup>3</sup> with the language of Clement's quotation, and reflect that προβάλλετε of itself suggests αἶνιγμα,<sup>4</sup> it is a fair inference that Clement has preserved a boast with which Gorgias presented himself to the Athenians. If the tradition may be trusted, he came before the assembly in the theater of Dionysus—that must be the theater meant—and took his stand by the θυμέλη. There he risked discomfiture by proclaiming that he could answer any question impromptu. And in the sentence quoted by Clement he compared his new σοφία to the legendary feat of Oedipus, who *dared to face the danger* of the man-devouring Sphinx, and won a kingdom by *knowing the riddle*. It seems probable that Gorgias marked his break with the line of Greek σοφία down to Anaxagoras (compare *Hippias minor* 281e) by this not unhappy comparison with the wise man who could say οἶδα to the Sphinx, and who

<sup>1</sup> Gorgias answers Chaerephon (see below) thus: ἐγὼ δὲ ἐκεῖνο πάλαι οἶδα.

<sup>2</sup> Plato's word is ἀφόβως; cf. *Meno* 70b: καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἔθος ἡμᾶς εἴθικεν ἀφόβως τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἔαν τις τι ἔρηται.

<sup>3</sup> νῦν γὰρ ἅπας ἐνθάδε κίνδυνος ἀνέγεται σοφίας, ἥς περὶ τοῖς ἡμοῖς φίλοις ἔστιν ἀγὼν μέγιστος. [*Clouds* 955.]

<sup>4</sup> Chaerephon's impertinent question, which has come down to us, might pass for a riddle. Georgias, οὐδὲν ταραχθεῖς, snubbed him well (Philostratus *Vit. soph.* i. 6: Diels, 76A, 24).

used his wisdom for *political* ends.<sup>1</sup> In *ἀγώνισμα* we may see, not the introduction to a simile of the Olympian games, but the earliest example of the common metaphor for rhetoric, colored here, it may be, by the associations of the stage. As it is doubtful whether Gorgias mentioned the herald at Olympia, I shall leave the point till I have asked how Clement in turn applied this saying.

The chapter in the *Stromata* with which our quotation ends is a warning against the wisdom of this world, against the *ζητήσεις* and *λογομαχίαι* of false philosophers. Such pursuits and contests belong to youth. But in the Christian search too—so, I think, the connection runs—there is room for daring and wisdom. It is not difficult to discover what part these virtues play in the life of the *γνωστικός*. St. Paul's saying in the First Epistle to the Corinthians 3. 1, is virtually the text of the fifth book of the *Stromata*: *σοφίαν δὲ λαλοῦμεν ἐν τοῖς τελείοις, σοφίαν δὲ οὐ τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου οὐδὲ τῶν ἀρχόντων τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου τῶν καταργουμένων· ἀλλὰ λαλοῦμεν θεοῦ σοφίαν ἐν μυστηρίῳ, τὴν ἀποκεκρυμμένην* (see, e.g., v. 4. 25; 10. 65; 12. 80). A great part of this book is devoted to showing that the Christian religion, like those of the Hebrews, Greeks, and barbarians, reveals its central mysteries to the few who are chosen, in *αἰνίγμασι καὶ συμβόλοις ἀλληγορίαις τε αὐτὰ καὶ μεταφοραῖς* (v. 4. 21). But again those who seize the kingdom (v. 3. 16) are 'βιασταί' οὐ τοὺς ἐριστικοὺς λόγοις, ἐνδελεχεία δὲ ὀρθοῦ βίου ἀδιαλείπτως τε εὐχαῖς ἐκβιάζεσθαι εἰρήνται. . . .

οὐ γὰρ ἐν μέσοις κείται  
δῶρα δυσμάχητα Μοισῶν  
τῷπιτυχόντι φέρειν.

Courage, then, and the wisdom to solve the enigmas of the mysteries are needed by those who turn their backs on the *βέβηλοι κενωφονίαι* (i. 10. 49) of this world.

There is no convincing evidence that Gorgias added the comparison of the Olympic games to his parallel with Oedipus. True, Themistius *may* have made his implied contrast between the theater made by hands and the true Olympian temple because Gorgias had named the Olympic games. But little weight can be attached to that, since his own figure of itself suggests the contrast. Nor do the balanced style and the commonplace contrast of *βούλεσθαι* and *δύνασθαι* give any firm ground for detecting the style of

<sup>1</sup> For a similar application of the legend of the Sphinx, see Cebes *Tabula* iii: *ἔστι γὰρ ἡ ἐξηγήσις τοικῆα τῷ τῆς Σφιγγὸς αἰνίγματι, ὃ ἐκείνη προεβάλλετο τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. εἰ μὲν οὖν αὐτὸ συνή τις, ἐσώζετο· εἰ δὲ μὴ συνή, ἀπώλετο ὑπὸ τῆς Σφιγγὸς.*

It is just conceivable that Gorgias made a topical allusion if it is true, as Fr. Marx ingeniously argues, that the *Oedipus Tyrannus* was acted in 427; but this hardly makes the comparison more happy.

<sup>2</sup> There is an echo of this phrase at the beginning of *Str.* i. 11, the chapter under discussion.

Gorgias here. In *Str.* vii. 3. 20 the same antithesis is fused with a reminiscence of *Republic* x. 617e: ἐλαίται δὲ ὁ δυνάμενος καὶ ὁ βουληθεὶς ισχύσει.<sup>1</sup> If we bear in mind that Clement twice draws upon II Timothy, chapter 2, in this discussion, the second time immediately before our quotation, and that the fifth verse of that chapter runs thus, ἐὰν δὲ καὶ ἀθλῇ τις, οὐ στεφανοῦται ἐὰν μὴ νομίμως ἀθλήσῃ, it is enough, in default of definite evidence, to suppose that the word ἀγώνισμα suggested another similitude for the life of the gnostic.

Clement, then, takes an arrow from the sophist's own quiver to enforce the claim of his σοφία against vain strivings with words; and the adaptation has its peculiar felicity because Gorgias himself, in breaking away from the traditional σοφία, had compared his art to that of Oedipus. Even if the presence of αἶνγμα did not compel us to see an allusion to the story of Oedipus here, the argument gains in coherence if we suppose that the contrast between the true and the false σοφία is carried through by such a reference to an older claim.

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#### DEMOSTHENES AGAINST BOEOTUS I (xxxix). 37-38

Blass regarded these sections as an afterthought, awkwardly interpolated by the orator after the delivery of the speech; consequently he enclosed them in double parentheses, together with a later allusion to their contents (41). His reasons for refusing to give them their traditional place in the text are twofold: "Dies Stück wird ganz abgerissen eingeführt, und 39 schliesst sich genau an 36 an, nicht aber an 38. Die §38 erwähnte Thatsache trat erst nach dem Schiedsgericht, also kurz vor der Gerichtsverhandlung ein" (*Att. Bered.*, III [1893], i, 476, n. 1). Paley and Sandys of course follow Blass in their critical notation of the passage, since they have adopted the Dindorf-Blass text for the convenience of students. However, the inclusion of Blass's argument without comment in the explanatory notes indicates concurrence in his judgment. We must regard the passage as under suspicion.

To begin with the second objection, it is difficult to see why matters that took place after the arbitration, and consequently, as Blass puts it, shortly before the trial, might not have formed part of the address to the court. Blass perhaps had in mind the rule that only those facts that are introduced in evidence at the arbitration may be introduced at the trial on appeal. If so, the words "also kurz vor der Gerichtsverhandlung" are quite beside the point. In any case, the argument seems to be founded on a fundamental misconception of the procedure involved in the μὴ οὖσα δίκη, which leads Blass to assume that the filing of Boeotus' petition brought the case directly before a dicastic court, just as if an appeal had been taken.

<sup>1</sup> ἐλαίται (Bywater); ισχύσει (Stählin) for MS ισχύει.

But it is distinctly stated by the lexicographers that, when the petition was filed, the case was begun again *de novo* and sent back to the arbitrator (Poll. 8. 60: καὶ ἡ ἐρήμη ἐλύετο ὡς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ δαιτητήν. *Lex. Cantabrig.*, s.v., μὴ οὔσα δίκη: ὥστε ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς ἀκέραιον αὐτοῖς καθίστασθαι τὸν ἀγῶνα). That this procedure was followed in the present instance is shown by a passage in which the speaker excuses himself for not presenting evidence to prove one of his assertions on the ground that the occurrences described took place σεσημασμένων ἤδη . . . τῶν ἐχίνων (17). As I have noted elsewhere (*Class. Phil.*, XIV, 28), this expression indicates that the arbitration was completed and the case appealed in the usual way, for Aristotle's account of the procedure in arbitration shows conclusively that the sealing of documents takes place only if one of the litigants has appealed from the award (*Cons. Ath.* 53. 2). The act mentioned in 38, the filing of the petition, cannot then be described as having taken place, as Blass puts it, after the arbitration and shortly before the trial. It took place after the award by default, but before the second arbitration which followed the reopening of the suit. The documents read by the clerk apparently formed part of the evidence presented at the second arbitration, were put under seal after an appeal had been taken, and could be brought before the court in its review of the case with entire propriety.

Inasmuch as the objections having to do with procedure are seen to be unsound, those founded on the arrangement of the argument might fairly be passed over. No scholar, however eminent he may be, should be conceded the right to strike out or stigmatize portions of a text where the manuscripts are in agreement merely because the arrangement is, in his opinion, not consecutive. In the present instance, however, even this criticism is not well founded. The thought of 39 may not follow directly upon that of 38, but it is the development of one of the topics proposed in 37. There the speaker states that he has still to show, not only that the dicasts will be true to their oath as judges if they decide in his favor, but also that the defendant himself, by his very acts, has confessed that Boeotus is his rightful name. He then goes on to describe these acts and to establish them by documentary evidence, reserving the more general topic first proposed, which is a commonplace of the courts, for the peroration that is to follow the reading of the evidence. We need not seek to justify this order by pointing out that it is rather unusual to end a court speech with the reading of evidence. The habit of stating two or more topics and then elaborating them in reverse order has been a natural and common one from Homer down (for examples from Homer, see Bassett *Harv. Stud.*, XXXI [1920], 39-53). We perhaps catch a glimpse of the psychology that underlies this arrangement from Renan's list of saints in his *Souvenirs*, in which his eponymous saint, of whom he is going to talk, is reserved for the last place.

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## BOOK REVIEWS

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*Phéniciens: Essai de contribution à l'histoire antique de la Méditerranée.* Par C. AUTRAN. Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1920. Small folio, pp. xv and 146. Fr. 30.

This was not an easy book to write and it is far from being an easy book to review; for it involves a survey of the whole ancient history of the Near East, including much of Greece also. The work is done with that refinement of literary quality which we have come to expect as a matter of course from a Frenchman of letters. It displays fine taste, a charming style, and a very engaging spirit of frankness and intellectual rectitude quite evident in the opening words of the Preface: "Ceci est une œuvre 'de bonne foy.' Je ne cherche ni à étonner ni à contredire, mais seulement à me convaincre et à m'instruire." But the author is not unmindful of the serious nature of the task he has undertaken, for he continues: "Aussi ne dissimulerai-je point que vingt ans de recherches et la pratique de la plupart des langues usitées dans l'antiquité, de l'Inde à la Méditerranée, m'ont amené à une conception de l'histoire ancienne assez différente, sous plusieurs rapports, de celle qui a prévalu jusqu'ici."

M. Autran's reconstruction of the course of human development from prehistoric times down through the entire pre-Hellenic age and far into Greek times is indeed new and revolutionary. The main contentions of his book are four (though the author himself does not wholly disengage and treat them separately): (1) that the original source and center of pre-Hellenic civilization in the Near East were in Asia Minor, specifically in Cappadocia; (2) that this earliest culture of inner Asia Minor, styled by the author "Asiatic," was subsequently gradually diffused throughout the Eastern Mediterranean and the adjacent lands as far east as Mesopotamia, thus becoming a far-reaching Aegeo-Caro-Cilician-Mycenaean-Phoenician civilization, and that this diffusion was due to *migrations* of the primitive Cappadocians themselves; (3) that the non-Semitic creators and carriers of this civilization therefore *colonized* Palestine and Syria, where they were the real Canaanites and Phoenicians, who were originally non-Semitic; (4) that the Semitic Phoenicians were late intruders who merely inherited the high culture of their non-Semitic Aegeo-Caro-Cappadocian predecessors and then at once fell into decay.

In support of these revolutionary conclusions the author marshals a formidable array of evidence, the great bulk of which is etymological. The



volume furnishes therefore a very useful discussion of words in Greek which seem to be of non-Greek origin—the more useful because all such words, indeed all ancient words and proper names discussed by the author, are fully indexed at the end of the book. The other chief body of evidence consists of the statements which the author has garnered from Greek literary sources of every sort, with which he displays an enviable familiarity. The book also makes some use of archaeological evidence, especially that collected in Père Vincent's monumental *Canaan*; and the author endeavors to show that the archaeological remains also support his reconstruction.

This exceedingly interesting essay of M. Autran thus forces us to take a far-reaching account of stock and to make a searching re-examination of our current general conclusions regarding the course of history in the Near East down to the advent of the Greeks and later. We shall be able to do this best by proceeding from the known to the unknown, or from the imperfectly known to the almost entirely unknown, that is, to begin with the chronologically latest of M. Autran's processes, which we have enumerated above as the third and fourth, according to which the Phoenicians and Canaanites were non-Semitic Aegeo-Cappadocians, succeeded only at a late date by the Semitic Phoenicians and Canaanites.

For the sake of clearness we will call M. Autran's original Phoenicians, as he often does, "Aegeo-Phoenicians." The first body of evidence adduced is etymological. For example, in the conversation between Ulysses and the swineherd (*Odyssey*, xv. 417 ff.) we find mentioned a Phoenician named Ἀρύβας. M. Autran (p. 66) contends that this name is neither Semitic nor Greek, but is to be connected with a group of names beginning with Ἀρ found among the Carians, Lycians, Lydians, and Cilicians on the one hand, and on the other appearing in Old Testament geographical names like *Arumah* and *Araunah*, or Ἀρβα the name of the giant of the Anakim (Josh. 14:15), whom our author would identify with the swineherd's Phoenician, Arybas. Similarly, "les Philistins viennent de Cappadoce, où leur dieu Dagon paraît, d'ailleurs, avoir laissé sa trace." This trace, as we are told in a footnote, is the name of the Cappadocian town Δάγωνα. After presenting a large body of evidence of this character the author concludes that the etymology of the proper names alone establishes the "Caro-Lycian nationality" of the Canaanite peoples and adds, "C'est là, semble-t-il, un argument décisif" (p. 79). Nevertheless, with his usual engaging frankness, the author admits (p. 81) that these coincidences do not of a surety furnish "une démonstration régulière." Most historical students will without doubt share the author's misgivings at this point.

More substantial historical witnesses are then summoned to testify, and in the author's opinion they show that "the Phoenicians and Canaanites were groups of the same Asianic race, whose destinies are intimately united to those of the Aegeo-Mycenaean civilization which was theirs" (p. 75.) Again, after recalling that in Greek times Asia Minor was strong in "history

and philosophy," our author says: "The Phoenicians are, then, without doubt, a people of Asia Minor, for a unanimous tradition accords them an incontestable priority in all these domains" (p. 52), viz., "history and philosophy." Furthermore, there is an explicit statement in Athenaeus that Caria was once called Phoenicia (p. 53), a bit of evidence which goes back to Corinna and Bacchylides, that is, as far as the sixth century B.C. Historically it would seem that this bit of evidence could only be interpreted as indicating the strength of Semitic Phoenician control or colonization which once extended into Caria. This conclusion would also fit in very well with the author's next item of evidence. Herodotus, says our author, indicates that the ancestry of Thales was Phoenician. Evidence of a much later date follows, and the conclusion is, "The Phoenicians were, then, Carians in origin" (p. 55). Perhaps most of us would rather interpret this evidence more cautiously as showing that *some* of the inhabitants of Caria were Phoenicians. On the basis of Greek literature, reaching no farther back than the sixth century B.C. and most of it far later in date, the author determines the origins of a people who are shown by contemporary evidence of the Egyptian monuments to have been in Syria in the first half of the third millennium B.C. We cannot but ask, What could Herodotus or any other Greek of the literary age know of the beginnings of a people who appear in the Egyptian documents as already in Syria fifteen hundred or more years before the Greeks had learned to write?

Herein lies the weakness of this reconstruction, that it is based so largely on Greek literary documents dating from a time literally thousands of years later than the historical movements under discussion. For if the Phoenicians are to be traced back to Asia Minor, it is evident their migration thence took place at a period so remote that no possible memory of it could be expected in Greek tradition, which failed to preserve any definite recollections back of the Trojan War and the outgoing Mycenaean age. Where in Greek tradition is the slightest echo of their own early northern pastoral life before they migrated southward to the Mediterranean? How much less will they have known anything of far earlier chapters in the life of another and a relatively distant people of Asia!

To this objection the archaeological evidence adduced is not open. It is, however, open to another, equally fatal. Metal-work and pottery and decorative patterns do not demonstrate the *race* of their makers. Vincent's fine summary of Canaanite archaeology proves beyond a doubt the deep impression made by Aegean civilization in Syria. It was a priori to be expected. The interfusion of neighboring cultures is a universal phenomenon, and we cannot expect Syria and the Aegean to be any exception. The wares of the Aegean craftsmen were widely distributed in Syria and Palestine, and without doubt some Aegean merchants may have found their way into the market towns of Phoenicia; but that is very far from making Aegeans of the historic Phoenicians. They may even have begun to copy

Aegean wares, for such imitation was characteristic of the Phoenicians, but this again has no bearing on the racial question.

With his customary intellectual frankness, the author manfully confronts one outstanding archaeological difficulty (pp. 76-78): Why have no written monuments of the hypothetical non-Semitic "Aegeo-Phoenicians" survived to bear witness of them in Syria? He finds the explanation of this difficulty in Herodotus, who states (v. 58) that at a time when the papyrus was scarce the Phoenicians wrote on the skins of goats and sheep. In the perishable nature of the writing material, then, our author would find the reason for the complete lack of written documents surviving from his "Aegeo-Phoenicians." Contemporary evidence some seven hundred years older than Herodotus, however, might have been adduced; for the Egyptian envoy Wenamon of the late twelfth century B.C. carried a considerable consignment of five hundred rolls of papyrus to a Phoenician prince.

But the question arises: Are we in fact so entirely without written documents from the great age of these alleged "Aegeo-Phoenicians"? The author finds the causes for their fall involved in two historic events: the fall of Troy and the Hebrew migration into Palestine (pp. 63 f. and 122), and he would date the incoming of the Semitic Phoenicians, who displaced them, in the period from 1200 to 1000 B.C. (p. 58). The Amarna Letters, dating from the first half of the fourteenth century B.C., are contemporary with the great age of the "Aegeo-Phoenicians," when according to our author these non-Semitic people held Canaan and Phoenicia, or Palestine-Syria. Yet of these three hundred letters the great majority were written by the kings and rulers of Palestine-Syria *in a Semitic tongue*, and these rulers, together with their peoples and their towns, *bear Semitic names*. This is especially true of the cities of Phoenicia from whose rulers the Amarna correspondence contains a long series of letters. In view of these facts, based on contemporary evidence, it is inconceivable that a non-Semitic population should have been dominant in these regions for centuries preceding 1200 B.C. Moreover, it is a fair question to ask why we should so exhaustively question a late Greek onomasticon when we have *contemporary* documents like the Amarna Letters in cuneiform besides the long lists of Syrian-Palestinian towns in Egyptian? But strangely enough, the Amarna Letters, which are absolutely fundamental to the discussion of the questions raised in this volume, are referred to but once in a minor connection (p. 112), and its decisive lists of proper names are never mentioned.

As we examine the evidence for the earlier stages of the "Aegeo-Phoenician" colonization of Phoenicia, we find that the events and the evidence adduced are still farther apart. The first migration of the "Aegeo-Phoenicians" was to Tyre and Sidon (p. 85). The only support brought forward is Genesis, chapter 10, and the Greek myths. The date for this alleged migration does not seem to be mentioned anywhere by the author, but it is

evidently far too remote, as conceived by him, to be demonstrated by the evidence mentioned. No examination of contemporary evidence is offered.

Turning now to the shift of this ancient "Cappadocian" culture and population from Asia Minor to the Aegean and the countries adjacent, we find that the author identifies his Aegeo-Caro-Cilician Phoenicians or Cappadocians with the well-known "Minoan" Cretans of Knossos and the other Cretan centers, and states that they possessed all the characteristics of "la belle race caucasienne" (p. 82). The evidence for this diffusion of Asia Minor population is again really evidence for the dissemination of *culture* rather than the migration of a people. It is drawn from Greek tradition (p. 93) and concerns the outgoing and declining stages of Aegean history, with no light on the situation before 1000 B.C. (p. 94). The lack of dates in the discussion renders it difficult to follow the argument. The migration of the Cappadocians is conceived by the author in successive waves at least three in number (p. 97), the most ancient of which was subdivided into three different "courants principaux," one of which passed into Mesopotamia; a second "by way of Egypt and North Africa [*sic*] penetrated into the Mediterranean," while the third is the one which reached Phoenicia-Canaan—the one which we have already discussed. The author frankly admits that "the paucity of our sources renders the diffusion of this most ancient wave very difficult to follow." Nevertheless, he uses good and contemporary evidence for the "current" that passed into Mesopotamia. Cuneiform documents of the twenty-third century B.C., found in Cappadocia, have indeed long made evident the connection with Mesopotamia; and that Hittite influences had much to do in shaping the early history of Assyria can hardly be doubted. It is again what we could hardly fail to expect.

The author at first claims only "Asiano-Aegean *influence*" (not migration) in Egypt. No one can doubt it after the fifteenth century B.C., when there was a diffusion of culture influences between Crete and Egypt in both directions; but the contention of this book is that Egypt owed to this "Asiano-Aegean influence" the origins of civilization. But the relative chronology is decisive in this question. At about 2000 B.C. Aegean civilization had reached a point attained by Egypt in the middle of the fourth millennium. The Aegeans gained metal about 3000 B.C.; it was used in Egypt over a thousand years earlier. The author cites the Pyramid Texts, the oldest Egyptian literature, to show that the Egyptians had knowledge of the Aegeans (pp. 100-101). Surely we could not expect it to be otherwise, with the Egyptians coursing the Mediterranean in the earliest known sailing ships in the thirtieth century B.C. After the Pyramid Texts (third and fourth millennia B.C.) it is a little bewildering to be shifted abruptly to the Old Testament and Herodotus, both some millennia later than the events they are expected to prove. Old indeed is the evidence of domesticated grains, but wheat and barley, as shown by surviving specimens

from prehistoric burials, were being grown in Egypt in the fifth millennium B.C.; and who will venture to claim knowledge of the culture of Asia Minor at that remote date? In the discussion of these things we find the long current legend of Egyptian indifference to the sea still functioning as evidence without reference to the facts (p. 106). The contemporary monuments of Egypt, beginning in the thirtieth century B.C., make it quite obvious where we are to find the origins of salt-water navigation. Besides the fleets of Snefru in the thirtieth century, they show us those of Sahure in the twenty-eighth, of the Pepi's in the twenty-sixth, and the long series of voyages on the Red Sea from the twenty-seventh to the nineteenth century B.C.—all maritime ventures of the Pharaohs enormously earlier than those of any other people known. At the same time the fact seems to be generally overlooked that a Theban tomb painting not later than the fifteenth century B.C., long ago published by Daressy, displays several Syrian ships at their moorings in the Nile, manned by bearded Semites, wearing characteristic Syrian costumes. Ashore some of the same Syrians are trading in the Egyptian bazaars. It is quite evident that we have here Semitic Phoenician traders landing and trafficking exactly as described by Herodotus. But the decisive point is that their ships are exact models of Egyptian sea-going ships, shown in the reliefs of Sahure as far back as the twenty-eighth century B.C.

Nevertheless, our author advances a step farther and claims the existence of an Aegean colony in Egypt (p. 108) as far back as the Old Kingdom in the first half of the third millennium—a colony which introduced copper, bronze, and the cereals, although these things were known in Egypt at least a thousand years earlier than the date of their appearance in the Aegean. In view of these facts we find ourselves bewildered by the remark (p. 87) that the "Asiano-Aegeans" brought "movement and organization" to a childhood world—a childhood world which had built the pyramids of Gizeh, the greatest monuments ever erected by ancient man, at a time when the Aegeans were just emerging from the Stone Age!

Finally we may notice the author's primary contention that Asia Minor was the original "pre-Hellenic" center of culture, in other words, the cradle of civilization (p. 95). Racially the originators and bearers of this earliest known civilization are confidently affirmed to be Caucasian, for the author avers that the Aegeans brought in "this same Caucasian element, Tyrsenians, Hittites, Syrians, or their relatives, which we know to have been in the entire Mediterranean the active agent of the international exchanges" (p. 109). He refers to it as a "superior element descended from the Caucasus" (p. 87), so that he means a people actually and immediately derived from the Caucasus. But it is clear from the sculptured monuments of Asia Minor that there were at least two racially distinct types among the peoples we call Hittite. The cuneiform tablets of Boghaz Keui have likewise disclosed a group of probably seven dialects. Moreover, it can be positively

demonstrated that the short-headed Alpine type, so evidently that of the old Hittites, cannot be the same racially as that of the Aegeans.

But our author is equally confident on other difficult problems involved in this complicated situation, including the social organization of these earliest "Caucasians." Their society is described as feudal (p. 86), a character which the author frequently mentions, although it is evident that the period when they were still occupying their Cappadocian home lies far back of any adducible evidence. We are here in a world of pure fantasy. Indeed, with his characteristic frankness the author states (p. 95) that "a history, properly so called, of the Cappadocian tribes hardly commences for us until toward the fifteenth century B.C."<sup>1</sup> One cannot forbear the question, How is it possible to demonstrate that a country whose history begins for us in the fifteenth century B.C. (over two thousand years later than that of Egypt, and almost as much later than that of Babylonia) was the original seat of civilization? When this civilization arose is nowhere stated in terms of years B.C., but it is alleged to have brought in three things which did not before exist in the Mediterranean world: wheat, oil, and wine. Now the first of these, as we have stated before, was cultivated in Egypt in the fifth millennium, and the second in the fourth, and we must again remark that it is a bold investigator who will affirm what was happening in Asia Minor at those remote dates. Indeed, it is quite clear that the early culture of Asia Minor was always inferior to that of Babylonia and Egypt until Greek times. Equally evident is the fact that the early stages of civilization in Asia Minor were later, and very much later, than those of Egypt and Babylonia.

The author has again demonstrated with conclusiveness that the Greek world was early profoundly influenced by the older cultures of Asia Minor, and his demonstration is accompanied by a very able and exceedingly useful survey of the surviving proper names, which he has used with great skill and effectiveness. While the reconstruction he presents is strong and sound for archaic Greek times, the same direction of the tide of cultural influences cannot be upheld for the pre-Hellenic age. The archaeological evidence demonstrates clearly that for over fifteen hundred years after some 3000 B.C., the mainland both of Europe and Asia lagged behind the Aegean Islands in culture advance, and while traces of Asiatic influence may be found in early Crete probably in the third millennium B.C., the dominant civilization is clearly in the Aegean and not on the mainland. A very simple principle applies here, viz., that between two neighboring peoples culture diffusion is

<sup>1</sup> In this connection the author's statement that at this date we meet the Hittite kings fighting with the great Pharaohs of the Eighteenth Dynasty must be due to some misapprehension. None of the Eighteenth Dynasty kings carried on war with the Hittites. On the contrary, the Eighteenth Dynasty Pharaohs received gifts from the Hittite rulers, and the Egyptian war with the Hittites did not begin until the Nineteenth Dynasty, which is doubtless what the author had in mind.



reciprocal and in both directions, no matter which civilization is the superior and leader. But the mere fact that "people B" has made contributions to the life of "people A" is no good ground for concluding that "people B" is superior in civilization to "people A." Otherwise the presence of potatoes, Indian corn, and tobacco in Europe would demonstrate the cultural superiority of the American savages over the peoples of Europe who received these things from America. It is exactly the failure to heed this obvious principle which has made possible the recent wide currency of a similar hypothesis which would find the original cradle of civilization in a vaguely defined upper Euphrates country (mostly desert!) called in cuneiform records Amurru and identified with the land of the Biblical Amorites.

In conclusion the reviewer is unable to see any reason for changing or even modifying the now dominant view regarding the course of pre-Hellenic culture—the view which finds the rise of earliest civilization quite obviously on the Nile, whence it was diffused through the Eastern Mediterranean, while but slightly later a related culture rose on the lower Tigris and Euphrates, the two forming an Egypto-Babylonian culture complex, which, developing in the intercontinental region of Africa and Eurasia as the earliest nucleus of civilization in the career of man, gradually radiated in all directions through the outlying continental areas, and especially through the Mediterranean, whence our own culture has chiefly descended to us. Some six thousand years later, in a significantly analogous geographical position in the intercontinental region between the two Americas, the *Western Hemisphere* had brought forth another center of radiating culture influences which was crushed by the Spanish invasion. These two primitive centers of culture on the two hemispheres (quite obviously the only two original sources of civilization on the globe) show us pretty clearly where we must look for the earliest germs of civilization in the genial climatic conditions bordering on the tropics, and not in the rigors of mountainous regions like Asia Minor.

For a most interesting and suggestive book, charmingly written, all readers will be greatly indebted to M. Autran; and if his general conclusions differ fundamentally from those of the reviewer, nevertheless the volume has distinct value in many respects—not least in the wide range of other possibilities which it suggests—possibilities so attractively presented that they force us to a searching re-examination of our evidence and our conclusions regarding the origins of civilization and their relation to the rise of Greek culture.<sup>1</sup>

JAMES H. BREASTED

<sup>1</sup> The reviewer has noticed a small number of philological matters which might be corrected in a future edition. On p. 35 see Παρθενος (three times). The author has a fondness for the Hebrew *toledah* for "genealogy" (pp. 44, 101), but it should be noted that this word occurs in Hebrew *only in the plural*, and a "généalogie biblique" is always *toledoth*, never *toledah*. The absolute form of the Canaanite pillars is מִצְבֹּת, not מִצְבֹּת (p. 61). In the hieroglyphic on p. 72 the sign for *rud* should be *w*; and on p. 100, there is no hieroglyphic word *rer* meaning "circular"; this old reading has been shown to be properly *phr*. On p. 66 the transliteration of the Canaanite 'rb' should be *Aruba*, not *Aruba*.



*Roman Essays and Interpretations.* By W. WARDE FOWLER.  
Oxford: The Clarendon Press. Pp. 290.

The twenty-eight papers which this volume contains deal mainly with religious and historical subjects, with several parallels between ancient and modern incidents and practices, and with certain passages in Virgil and Horace. It closes with appreciations of Niebuhr and Mommsen and a study of the "Tragic Element in Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar*." By mentioning a few titles we may illustrate how wide a range of topics it covers. We find discussed in it the "Origin of the *Lar familiaris*," the "*Lex frumentaria* of Gaius Gracchus," the "Plague of Locusts in 125, and a Modern Parallel," and "Horace *Odes* iii. 1-6." Perhaps in this brief review we can to best advantage select for comment one or two topics from each of the four sections into which the book is divided. In the "Latin History of the Word *Religio*" Professor Fowler finds that the word expresses the natural awe which the primitive man feels in the presence of what he cannot explain. In this stage of its meaning it goes back to the period antedating state priesthoods and rituals. This feeling of awe inevitably suggests the development of the proper rites by which the unseen powers may be propitiated. The second meaning of the word emerges in Cicero. It naturally develops in the third stage to cover the whole sphere of worship and man's attitude toward the supernatural, and finally in the second century of our era, when the several creeds were clearly distinguished from one another and a keen rivalry sprang up between them, the word took on the meaning which we give it today. One of the most convincing articles in the book is that which deals with the "Religious Meaning of the *Toga Praetexta* of Roman Children." The author shows clearly that the garment was holy, that it was worn by priests when they were performing their sacrificial duties and by curule magistrates, perhaps because they had the right to offer sacrifices in behalf of the community. In the household of a Roman freeman in early days the father acted as priest, and his children attended him as ministrants. Consequently they wore a priestly garment, and, after the state religion had swallowed up that of the household, children still continued to wear the *praetexta*, but henceforth it was simply a mark of free birth. In his paper on the corn law of Gaius Gracchus, Professor Fowler makes a vigorous protest against the tendency of historians to estimate the motives and methods of Gracchus by modern standards of experience and in the light of our present-day knowledge of the principles of political economy. The most interesting point in the paper is the author's attempt to show that Gracchus tried to bring down the price of corn at Rome by stimulating its production in Italy through erecting granaries and improving the roads. This rational explanation of his plan relieves him from the charge of trying to bribe the plebs to support his legislative program. At the best, however, his measure was a temporary palliative. He failed to strike at the roots of the evil, as Professor Fowler remarks. Perhaps the author's opinion that "you cannot

put an artificial price on corn, even within a limited space," might have been modified, if the article had been written today, in the light of our common experience in such matters during the Great War. Varro's dedication of his book on religious antiquities to Julius Caesar, Caesar's revival of an archaic procedure in the case of Rabirius, his use of an antique ritual in punishing two mutinous soldiers in 46 B.C., and his interest in the Druids lead Professor Fowler in another paper to find in him an unsuspected interest in ancient procedure. We could follow him in this surmise if he merely meant that Caesar had an acquaintance with ancient religious practices and an interest in them, but the reviewer cannot accept the theory that Caesar's taste for such things clouded his political judgment, nor can we believe with the author that Caesar did not understand the motley population of Rome (p. 144). In our opinion the dramatic procedure followed in the trial of Rabirius and in the punishment of the soldiers was well devised to make a deep impression on the Roman masses. In Part III of the book perhaps the student of Latin will be most interested in the short paper on the "Disappearance of the Earliest Latin Poetry." The genius of Ennius consigned older Latin poetry to oblivion, and for a century after his death Rome produced no great poet. In the same way the introduction of the music of Handel into England in the eighteenth century blotted out the memory of earlier English music and no great English composer appears for a century after Handel's time. In the "Vergiliana" we have a finely conceived interpretation of the Dido episode. The ungovernable passion of Dido was repugnant to the Roman conception of ordered family life. The relations of husband and wife in Italy were characterized by *pietas* or *concordia*. The *amor* of Dido was out of harmony with the ideals of the Roman, and in his eyes would justify Aeneas in leaving her. These papers which the reviewer has picked out for notice, almost at random, may give the reader some conception of the learning and the judgment which characterize the criticism and interpretation throughout the book. Professor Fowler need not have felt the doubt, to which he gives expression in the Preface, of the wisdom of publishing it.

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*Plutarch's Lives*. With an English translation by BERNADOTTE PERRIN. Vol. IX. ("Loeb Classical Library.") London: William Heinemann; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1920.

The ninth volume of Professor Perrin's translation of Plutarch's *Lives* deserves as high praise as the preceding volumes. The lives included are those of Demetrius and Antony, and Pyrrhus and Marius.

In the "Life of Demetrius," chapter xi, σφαιρίζομεν should not be changed in translation to a past tense, "used to play ball." In chapter xix, καὶ Δημητρίου χειμῶνι μεγάλῳ καὶ κλύδωνι κινδυνεύσαντος εἰς τόπους ἀλμμένους καὶ χαλεποὺς ἐκριφῆναι, which is translated "and since Demetrius also encountered a great storm and a heavy sea and was cast upon a rough coast which had no harbors," ἐκριφῆναι depends upon κινδυνεύσαντος, and the meaning is "was in danger of being cast," etc. In chapter xxv Professor Perrin's translation is perhaps a little vaguer than the Greek; he renders Σικωνίους δὲ φήσας παρὰ τὴν πόλιν οἰκεῖν τὴν πόλιν "as for the Sicyonians, he told them their city was in the wrong place." More exactly it would be, "their city was beside, or just outside, the [real] city," i.e., the acropolis; compare Diodorus Siculus xx. 102. Also in chapter xxv, Ἀγαθοκλέους δὲ τοῦ Σικελιώτου νησιάρχου, should be rendered "and Agathocles the Sicilian as Island Governor" rather than "and Agathocles as Island Governor of Sicily." We may note that in chapter xxviii, ἰππεὺς δὲ πεντακοσίου τῶν ἐκείνου πλείονας, "five hundred more horse than he," Lindskog's emendation πεντακοσίοις is almost necessary. Chapter xxxviii contains one very difficult phrase, τέλος δ' αὐτοῦ καταγνόντα δεινῶν μὲν ἐπιθυμεῖν, ἀνήκεστα δὲ νοσεῖν, κεκρατῆσθαι δὲ τῷ λογισμῷ, which Professor Perrin translates "condemning himself for his inordinate desires, for his incurable malady, and for the subjugation of his reason." Dochner similarly translates *consilioque esse destitutum*. It is difficult, however, to believe that the phrase κεκρατῆσθαι δὲ τῷ λογισμῷ can mean anything else than "and yet realizing that he was checked by his reason [from attempting to satisfy his desires]."

In the "Life of Antony," chapter xxviii, in the sentence beginning καὶ γὰρ αὐτίκα γένοιτ' ἂν Ἀντώνιον δειπνον δεσθῆναι, the text is almost certainly corrupt. Lindskog-Ziegler after Stephanus indicate a lacuna. Professor Perrin's interpretation could be secured, however, by the omission of δὲ. In chapter xxxiii, to the statement that Antony "was appointed to the priesthood of the elder Caesar," Professor Perrin appends this note: "That is, he was made Pontifex Maximus." The office of Pontifex Maximus was held by Lepidus from 44 to 14 B.C. Antony was appointed *flamen Iulianus*; compare Wissowa, *Religion und Kultur der Römer*, page 285, note 2. Also in chapter xxxiii Professor Perrin translates καὶ διαλαμβάνων τοὺς νεανίσκους ἐτραχίλιζεν "and he would take the young combatants by the neck and part them"; the meaning is rather "and he would take the young men about the waist and overpower them." In chapter lx, "and Iras, and the tire-woman of Cleopatra" is plainly a misprint for "Iras the tire-woman of Cleopatra." In chapter lvi, in the sentence beginning ἀπεθραύοντο γὰρ τὰ ἱμβόλα, δεδεμένους is almost certainly corrupt, as is indicated by Lindskog-Ziegler.

In the "Comparison of Demetrius and Antony," chapter v, Professor Perrin undoubtedly gives the right meaning, "but Demetrius, as many say, invented false accusations, upon which he acted, and denounced one who had been wronged by him; the murder was not in retaliation for wrongs

done to him." But this cannot be got out of our present text, Δημήτριον δὲ πολλοὶ λέγουσι ψευδὲς αἰτίας, ἐφ' οἷς ἔδρασε, πλασάμενον κατηγορεῖν ἀδικηθέντα, οὐκ ἀδικήσαντα ἀμύνασθαι. Ziegler-Lindskog emend ἀδικηθέντα to ἀδικηθέντος.

At the end of chapter v of the "Life of Pyrrhus" Professor Perrin reads φθάσας with the manuscripts; it is much easier to follow Lindskog-Ziegler in reading φθάσαντ', after Coraēs. In chapter xvi the name of the Italian who fought against Pyrrhus was Oplacus, not Oplax. In chapter xvii, in the clause αὐτὸς δὲ τὴν χλαμύδα καὶ τὰ ὅπλα παραδούς ἐνὶ τῶν ἑταίρων Μεγακλεῖ, τοῖς δὲ ἐκείνου τρόπον τινὰ κατακρύψας ἑαντὸν, the meaning is not "and hiding himself after a fashion behind his men," but "concealing his identity by assuming the armor and cloak of Megacles."

In the "Life of Marius," chapter xiv, in this clause καὶ μεγάλων διδομένων ἐπ' οὐδενὶ προσήκατο τὸ σῶμα, ἐπ' οὐδενὶ means not "to anyone," but "for any price." In chapter xxviii, τῆς δὲ ἐκτῆς ὥς οὐδὲ εἰς πρώτης ὠρέγετο may better be translated, accurately, "but he was more eager for his sixth than another would have been for his first," than "but he was as eager for a sixth as another would have been for his first." In chapter xxxiii, περὶ νεύρα γεγονὼς νοσώδης is surely not "when his nerves were diseased."

It is very gratifying to learn that Professor Perrin completed before his death the remaining two volumes of this work.

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*Seneca: ad Lucilium epistulae morales*, with an English translation by RICHARD M. GUMMERE. Vol. II. London: William Heinemann; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1920. Pp. vi+480. \$2.25.

The second volume of Dr. Gummere's work contains the text and translation of the *Moral Epistles* 66 to 92. As in the first volume, the English is spirited and produces the general effect of Seneca's style.

In Epistle 66, section 5, *sermones—quos subinde egeram et ad te permittam* is translated "conversations which I at once took up for study and shall pass on to you." *Egeram* is rather from *egero* and means "I shall put into written form." In section 9 Gummere adopts Capps's emendation and reads *Omnis sine modo est virtus*, "Every virtue is limitless," though the manuscripts and editions read *in modo*. Seneca's thought is that virtue is a thing perfect, to which no increase is possible. But to the mind of one trained in Greek philosophy the idea of perfection is associated with the idea of limit, *modus*, rather than with the idea of the infinite or indefinite. *In modo* is exactly what is required here. As a parallel we may cite Epistle 76, section 24: *Solum ergo bonum est honestum, cui modus est*. In section 23,

*alioqui hoc erit ex servorum habitu dominum aestimare* is translated "since that would mean rating the master low because he is dressed like a slave." It is rather "this will be to judge a master by the appearance of his slaves." In section 29 the three varieties of goods referred to are not those of the soul, of the body, and external goods, as is stated in the note, but are the three kinds referred to in section 5.

In Epistle 67, section 11, *sunt quaedam vota, quae non gratulantium coetu, sed adorantium venerantiumque celebrantur*, translated "There are certain prayers which are offered by a throng," etc., is rather "the offering of which is hailed by a throng." In section 13 *vellem quae velles* means "I wish all were as you would have it," not "I hope all will be as you wish." In Epistle 68, section 9, *nihil vidi, nihil audii, quod concupiscerem, ad quod reverterer* means "nothing I should crave, nothing I should come back to hear" rather than "nothing which I craved and which I came back to hear." In Epistle 70, section 8, Gummere reads with Hense and certain manuscripts *sibi commodaret*, after *non commodabit poenae suae manum*. It seems very doubtful if these words can mean "to himself, however, he would lend a hand." The phrase is rejected by Fickert and the older editors. In Epistle 70, section 24, *proximam quamque* means "the nearest at hand," not "the next best." In Epistle 71, section 8, "not" should be omitted in the question. In Epistle 74, section 18, *ut non deseratur adfligitur* does not mean "to avoid being bereft, he suffers distress," but "though he be not bereft." In section 27, in the sentence *Licet alter (sci. circulus) diu manserit, alterum statim obdlexeris et in eum in quo scriptus est pulverem solveris, obdlexeris* is "efface," "rub out" rather than "contract." In a note on Epistle 75, section 12, to illustrate the difference between the first and the second class of οἱ προκόπτοντες, Gummere cites Epistle 72, section 6, where it is the difference between the sage and the man who is progressing which is in Seneca's mind.

In Epistle 82, section 15, *media* meaning τὰ ἀδιάφορα, should not be translated "average." The following sentence, *Non enim sic mors indifferens est, quomodo utrum capillos pares an impares habeas*, means "whether the number of your hairs is even or odd," not "whether your hair should be worn evenly or unevenly"; cf. von Arnim, *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta*, III, 119, 121. In Epistle 83, section 2, Gummere gives practically the same punctuation as Hense, *Interest (sci. deus) animis nostris et cogitationibus mediis intervenit—sic intervenit, dico, tamquam aliquando discedat*, and translates the latter part of the sentence "comes into them, I say, as one who may at any time depart." The explanation given by Lipsius is very attractive, "comes, do I say? as if he could ever depart!" In section 5 Gummere fails to bring out the full meaning of the clause *qui anno novo quemadmodum legere, scribere, dicere aliquid, sic auspicabar in Virginem desilire* by his translation "who, just as naturally as I would set out to do some reading or writing, or to compose a speech, used to inaugurate the

first of the year with a plunge into the Virgo aqueduct." The acts of reading, writing, and speaking were also a part of Seneca's celebration of the new year. In Epistle 84, section 12, *multum habent contumeliarum ut intres* means "they cost you many an insult to gain an entrance," not "as you enter the door."

In Epistle 87, section 4, the translation "my false embarrassment about the truth" does not exactly bring out the force of *perversa recti verecundia*. It is correctly explained by Bouillet, *nempe eum pudebat rei, cui nulla adhaerebat vera turpitudine*. In section 9 *cantherio* is not a "donkey." In section 38 the casual reader might be misled by the translation of *ex multis paupertatibus divitiae fiunt*: "But riches result from numerous cases of poverty." It should be made clearer that the meaning is that, if you add together the possessions of a number of poor men, the sum is riches.

In Epistle 89, section 20, in the sentence *facile vestrum quicquid potestis, dum plus sit alieni, alieni* is surely not a genitive of comparison: "provided only that it is more than your neighbor's." In Epistle 90, section 3, the addition of "all" in the second clause weakens the force of the remark *Desierunt enim omnia possidere, dum volunt propria*: "For men cease to possess all things the moment they desire all things for their own." In section 19, Gummere, following Capps, inserts *mollitia* before *molles corporis motus docentium*. In a note on section 28 *indigentia* is clearly a slip for *di indigetes*. In Epistle 92, section 4, where other editors read *in his erit beata vita, sine quibus non est*, Gummere follows Hense in replacing *non est* by *honestia*. He translates the sentence thus: "Then there will be the possibility of a happy life under conditions which do not include an honorable life." It would seem, however, that the Latin can mean only "under these conditions a happy life may be led, but in their absence, merely an honorable life." The common reading, however, yields an excellent sense, "upon these factors a happy life will depend, in the absence of which it is quite impossible." In section 35 the sentence *Sed tunc quoque, cum inter homines est, non timet ullas post mortem minas eorum, quibus usque ad mortem timeri parum est*, is translated "Nay, even when it is among the living; the soul fears nothing that may happen to the body after death; for though such things may have been threats, they were not enough to terrify the soul previous to the moment of death." The meaning is: "But even when he is among the living, he fears no threats of violence after his death, threats made by men who are not content with being the objects of terror up to the moment of their victim's death."

On page 475, in the Index of Proper Names, the Cyrenaic school is said to be an offshoot of Epicureanism. A more accurate statement is given on page 385, note *e*.

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*Herodotus*, with an English translation by A. D. GODLEY, Hon. Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford. Volume I. (Loeb Classical Library.) London: William Heinemann; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1921.

The present volume contains the translation of the first two books of Herodotus' history. In the first part of the short general introduction the translator discusses the few facts which are known about Herodotus' life, the scope of his work, his reputation for untrustworthiness, and the Ionic dialect in which he wrote. In the second part he gives a short list of books useful to the student of Herodotus, dismisses the question of manuscripts briefly and remarks upon his own method of dealing with translation. The introduction to the first two books gives a short summary supplemented by further remarks on Herodotus' veracity. The translator reaches the conclusion that Herodotus was accurate in describing what he had seen, but that for the historical parts of his narrative he was dependent upon very untrustworthy sources.

The translation itself is one of the highest merit. The translator adheres to the running style of Herodotus and renders him with extreme literalness, keeping the order of the Greek wherever it is compatible with good English. The translation is so careful and accurate that only a few mistakes can be found, such as for instance the translation of σοφισταί (i. 29) as "teachers." The word had not yet become technical. It means merely "wise men." The translator has himself noticed his inconsistent method of dealing with proper names.

His translation of the famous description of the homecoming of the exiled Pisistratus (i. 60) will serve to indicate the smooth and simple style of the whole.

Megacles then, being buffeted about by faction, sent a message to Pisistratus offering him his daughter to wife and the sovereign power besides. This offer being accepted by Pisistratus, who agreed on these terms with Megacles, they devised a plan to bring Pisistratus back, which, to my mind, was so exceedingly foolish that it is strange (seeing that from old times the Hellenic has ever been distinguished from the foreign stock by its greater cleverness and its freedom from silly foolishness) that these men should devise such a plan to deceive Athenians, said to be the cunningest of the Greeks. There was in the Paeanian deme a woman called Phya, three fingers short of four cubits in stature, and for the rest fair to look upon. This woman they equipped in full armour, and put her in a chariot, giving her all such appurtenances as would make the seemliest show, and so drove into the city; heralds ran before them, and when they came into the town made proclamation as they were charged, bidding the Athenians "to give a hearty welcome to Pisistratus, whom Athene herself honoured beyond all men and was bringing back to her own citadel." So the heralds went about and spoke thus: immediately it was reported in the demes that Athene was bringing Pisistratus back, and the townsfolk persuaded that the



woman was indeed the goddess, worshipped this human creature and welcomed Pisistratus.

In the much disputed passage inclosed in parentheses Mr. Godley has adopted the interpretation recently suggested by Professor Shorey in *Classical Philology*, XV (1920), 88 ff.

There are frequent footnotes in explanation for the most part of proper names which occur in the text. The volume ends with an index of proper names and a small map of Ionia and Western Asia Minor.

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*Ovid Metamorphoses*, with an English translation by FRANK JUSTUS MILLER, in two volumes. Loeb Classical Library, 1916.

The worst that may be said of Professor Miller's *Metamorphoses* is that in four or five instances in the first book it translates a variant of the text instead of the text itself, and in as many others contains faulty typography or punctuation. We are sending a list of these errors to the translator. The second book, and presumably the remainder of the work, will be found practically free from blemishes of the kind.

Aside from this Professor Miller has given readers a text and translation deserving of the "faithful and scholarly" applied to his Loeb Library *Tragedies of Seneca* by the *Classical Review*, which found nothing more severe to say of that edition than that there were to be detected in it occasional rhythmic survivals of his previous verse rendering of the same author—a rendering which never should have been sacrificed to the great god uniformity. The plain, vigorous, narrative style of Professor Miller's *Metamorphoses*, poetic and yet not obtrusively or elaborately ornamental, represents admirably, so far as is possible in prose, the Ovidian straightforwardness and intentness of the story. The English is as direct, clear, and rapid as story-telling English ought to be, and reads without effort and without suggestion of the Latin mold. To ease and rapidity of narrative the translator has contributed in no slight measure by the almost complete omission of footnotes both explanatory and critical, the omission of the former being frequently made possible by the device of converting translation into a manner of explanation, e.g., *Nabataea regna*, "the realms of Araby" (i. 61); *Tenebrosa Tartara*, "the dark world of death" (i. 113). This practice, and what may be called retouching, e.g., *septem sine flumine valles*, "seven broad channels, all without a stream" (ii. 256); *caesae pectora palmis*, "with bruising hands beating their naked breasts" (ii. 341), may be questionable, but there is no doubt of their contribution to the running quality of the translation. Professor Miller is to be congratulated on a rendering which will give the maximum of pleasure to both scholar and general reader.

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